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Syria Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, 1975-87
Syria's post-1973 confidence in its military capability
contributed to its intervention in the civil war that broke out
in Lebanon in 1975. Syrian ties to the area comprising modern-day
Lebanon had been close for centuries; Lebanon was part of Greater
Syria under the Ottoman Empire, and both nations were subject to
French Mandate authority between the two world wars
(see The French Mandate
, ch. 1;
Foreign Policy
, ch. 4). Thus, Syrian
leaders viewed Lebanon's instability as a threat to Syria's
internal and external security interests, and Syria considered
itself strong enough to impose a military solution on the
Lebanese conflict.
In 1975 Syria played a vital diplomatic role throughout the
initial stages of the civil war. It acted as mediator for the
many cease-fires declared between Lebanon's Christians, who
dominated the country politically and economically, and the
majority
Sunni and
Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. The latter sought
to transform Lebanon into a Muslim Arab country; their drive for
greater power was afforded a military option by the presence of
thousands of armed Palestinian guerrillas who had relocated in
Lebanon after the PLO's 1970-71 defeat in Jordan. It was not
until January 1976, however, when a detachment of fifty Syrian
officers was sent to Beirut to help police the twenty-sixth
cease-fire, that Syrian military personnel entered Lebanon. On
March 16, Syria escalated its involvement by ordering Syrianbacked units of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA, the standing
army of the PLO) and As Saiqa to stop rebel leftist Muslim
officers of the Lebanese Army from attacking the palace of the
country's Christian president, Sulayman Franjiyah (also spelled
Frangie, Franjieh, or Franjiye)
(see Special and Irregular Armed Forces
, this ch.).
Lebanese Muslims and the PLO opposed the Syrian intervention,
which had prevented them from seizing the presidency from the
Christians. Much of the Arab world was outraged. The Syrian
intervention also gave rise to a crisis of allegiance within the
PLA and As Saiqa units, which found themselves battling forces
closely aligned with the PLO. For their part, Syrian leaders
talked of peace and stability in Lebanon, while privately
acknowledging that their concept of Syria's own security
interests made it necessary to have a moderate Lebanese
government compatible with Syrian interests. In their judgment, a
radical left-wing Muslim Lebanese government would have been a
security risk to the Assad regime, which preferred a Lebanese
state subservient to its own regional interests.
Syrian presence in Lebanon grew rapidly. Around 3,000 Syrian
regulars crossed Lebanese borders on April 9. In May the Lebanese
Parliament elected a new, Syrian-backed, Christian president,
Elias Sarkis. By October more than 22,000 Syrian troops had
entered Lebanon. The Syrian presence was sanctioned by the Arab
League as the major component of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF),
to which the League gave a mandate to stop any breach of the
peace. The ADF was technically under the command of President
Sarkis, but de facto power and control were in the hands of
Syrian military commanders.
After the June 1978 slaying by rival Christian militiamen of
Christian leader Tony Franjiyah, son of the former president and
Syria's firmest supporter in Lebanon, the ADF began a campaign
against Lebanese Christians that included massive artillery
barrages on Christian-held territories in East Beirut and other
areas. With this action, Syria in effect "switched sides" in the
ongoing civil war. The reason for this switch was the call by
Lebanese Christians, whose confidence had been bolstered by
increasingly overt Israeli support, for a partition of Lebanon
along religious lines. This call constituted the major challenge
to Lebanese stability and the authority of the Lebanese
government.
The majority of Syrian troops deployed in Lebanon were formed
into at least three divisions. Armored brigades and commando
units were also present, and naval and air force units were used
for transport purposes. Syria's heavy use of artillery, both
against Muslim factions in earlier fighting and against Christian
factions later, caused widespread criticism that the bombardments
were indiscriminately killing civilians and that Syrian troops
were pursuing a policy of genocide toward Lebanese Christians.
In 1987 Syria's military presence in Lebanon remained an
urgent security issue. In early 1987 the ADF in Lebanon consisted
of 25,000 Syrian troops (the troops from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and
the United Arab Emirates had withdrawn). The ADF units were
deployed throughout those areas of central and northern Lebanon
not under the control of the Christian militias. They were not
deployed south of the so-called "red line" at the Litani River,
near the Israeli border, or in the area controlled by the
Israeli-dominated SLA.
In February 1987, there was an intensification of clashes
between militiamen of the Syrian-backed Shia Amal and a coalition
of Palestinians, Druzes, and the Lebanese Communist Party. A
renewed deployment of an estimated 7,000 Syrian troops in West
Beirut and major highways linking Beirut to the mountains and the
northbound coastal road from southern Lebanon followed. Lebanese
Muslim leaders requested Syrian deployment, which was condemned
by some Maronite officials. Under the agreement for the Syrian
entry, the militias were to disband their forces and lay down
their weapons. To restore order, the Syrian troops, stationed at
most intersections, closed down militia offices, confiscated arms
caches, and rounded up militia and neighborhood strongmen. There
was concern, however, that the Syrians would have difficulty
resolving Lebanon's complex set of rivalries and disarming
remaining militia strongholds in and around Beirut. For instance,
Beirut's southern suburbs remained a stronghold of Shia
militants, particularly the growing pro-Iranian Party of God,
Hizballah, whose uncontrolled militancy and hostage-taking also
had become increasingly troublesome to Damascus. Meanwhile,
Christian militiamen still held ground in East Beirut.
In early 1987, few analysts believed Syrian occupation would
end until the Lebanese conflict was resolved. In its own security
interests, Syria could not afford for either radical leftist or
religiously fundamentalist Muslim groups to gain total control of
Lebanon. Also, President Assad had invested his political
reputation, both at home and within the Arab world, in Syrianimposed solutions to the civil war. Nevertheless, the Syrian
intervention was becoming increasingly costly to Syria's economy
as well as to the morale of the participating armed forces. Above
all, it weakened Syria's military threat to Israel by dividing
its forces into two fronts and diverting resources from
recapturing the Golan Heights; at the same time, the intervention
increased the possibility of direct confrontation with Israel. In
early 1987, following the Israeli withdrawal to south Lebanon,
the Syrian order of battle in Lebanon was reported to consist of
about two divisions, with a deployment of some six divisions
along the Damascus-Golan Heights region.
Some experts believed Syrian leaders preferred to maintain
the chaotic situation in Lebanon to preserve Syria's hegemony
there. However, other experts believed that the Syrian leaders
strongly desired a resolution to the Lebanese Civil War, so Syria
would be free to concentrate on the conflict with Israel.
Data as of April 1987
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