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Syria CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Data published in the government's Statistical
Abstract do not lend themselves to a realistic analysis of
Syria's crime problems. The total number of persons reported to
have been convicted in penal cases rose steadily from about
56,000 in 1952 to nearly 275,000 in 1969, and then dropped
dramatically to about 165,000 in 1971, at which level it remained
through 1975, apparently reflecting Assad's loosening of pre-1970
police controls.
The 1985 statistics, the most recent statistics available in
early 1987, cited a total of 187,944 convictions of Syrian
nationals in penal cases. Nearly three-fourths of these
convictions were for crimes and contraventions neither mentioned
in the penal code nor further identified. Of the other
convictions, the largest category was for "crimes against
religion and family" (not further defined). Other frequent crimes
were acts endangering or causing loss of life, robbery,
insolence, and crimes against public security.
A rapid increase in crimes against religion and family was
the only trend discernible in the data for the 1970-85 period.
The figures for the number of convictions in nineteen other
classifications of crime remained stable. Accounts of crimes
committed in Syria published in Western publications were limited
to crimes against state security, such as assassinations and
bombings, and to such crimes as bribery and embezzlement as
exposed by the Committee for the Investigation of Illegal
Profits. The latter committee was set up by the government in
September 1977 to investigate a reported growth in corruption by
government officials and business leaders.
In 1986 petty offenses were tried in magistrate courts, also
called peace courts, found in all population centers. Courts of
the first instance, located in twenty-four major urban areas,
tried more serious crimes and acted as courts of appeal from the
magistrate courts
(see The Judiciary
, ch. 4). The courts of
appeal heard appeals from both lower courts. Juveniles, defined
as those between the ages of seven and eighteen, were tried in
separate juvenile courts.
The Court of Cassation acted as Syria's supreme court.
Located in Damascus, it reviewed appeal cases to determine if the
lower courts had applied the law correctly. If an error were
found, the case was sent back for retrial to the court of
original jurisdiction.
The judicial system and constitutional rights to some extent
were abrogated and superseded by martial law imposed when the
National Revolutionary Command Council invoked Syria's State of
Emergency Law on March 8, 1963. By early 1987 Assad had not
repealed this condition. The State of Emergency Law provided for
the selection by the president of a martial law governor (the
prime minister) and a deputy martial law governor (the minister
of the interior). Article 4 of the State of Emergency Law
empowered the martial law governor or his deputy to issue written
orders to impose restrictions on freedom of individuals with
respect to meetings, residence, and travel. It sanctioned
preventive arrest, censorship, withdrawal of licenses for
firearms, evacuation or isolation of areas, and the
requisitioning or sequestration of movable property, real estate,
and companies, with compensation to be deferred indefinitely.
Article 6 of the State of Emergency Law defined as violations
of martial law "offenses against the security of the state and
public order, or public authority, and actions which disturb
public confidence, or constitute a general danger." More
specifically, Article 6 prohibited "actions considered
incompatible with the implementation of the socialist order in
the state" and opposition to the unification of the Arab states
or any of the aims of the revolution. Furthermore, it enjoined
communicating with or benefiting from any organization or foreign
state for the purpose of undertaking any action, verbal or
physical, hostile to the aims of the revolution. Article 6 also
proscribed attacks on places of worship, command centers,
military establishments, or other government institutions.
Finally, hoarding of or profiteering in foodstuffs, and currency
regulation violations, fell under martial law.
Because the 1963 martial law directives gave blanket
authority to the martial law governor, in 1979 Assad vowed to
"apply firmly the sovereignty of law" and to "strengthen the
authority of the judiciary." He issued orders limiting the
jurisdiction of the State Security Courts and annulled martial
law in cases not actually affecting state security. Moreover, the
written orders implementing extraordinary measures were subject
to review by the Administrative Court of Justice (Majlis ad
Dawlah), which had ruled in several instances that the martial
law governor's powers did not exceed the limits specified in
Article 4. In such cases, the administrative court could rule the
martial law governor's actions illegal and invalid and award
compensation to the injured party.
Martial law offenses were tried at State Security Courts,
whose presiding members were appointed by presidential decree.
The verdicts of State Security Courts were not subject to appeal,
but were ratified by the president, who could suspend or vacate
the verdict, order a retrial, or reduce the penalty. The decision
of the president was irreversible.
In 1987, criminal and judicial procedures continued to be
modeled after those of France. Following an arrest, the police
presented their evidence to a public prosecutor, who conducted
his own investigation. If the prosecutor decided to proceed, he
referred the case to the appropriate court. Decisions were made
by a majority of the three judges of the court, who ruled on
questions of law and fact. There was no trial by jury. In the
mid-1980s about 90 percent of all criminal court cases resulted
in a conviction. Although the legal code provides for due
process, it is not always followed. For example, in its Human
Rights Report to the United States Congress of 1985, the United
States Department of State stated that "under the state of
emergency in force since 1963...an individual may be held
indefinitely without charge or trial, especially in political and
security cases." Penalties were severe. They included loss of
civil rights, fines, imprisonment for up to life, forced labor,
exile, and death by hanging or firing squad. Public hangings in
Damascus Square of convicted thieves, murderers, assassins, and
spies continued to be a common occurrence in 1987. Amnesty
International reported that 15 "officially confirmed executions"
took place in 1985.
Observers have asserted that the Syrian penal system was
geared toward punishment rather than rehabilitation. In a 1986
report, the United States Department of State provided little
detailed information about prison conditions, but reported that
those charged with or convicted of criminal offenses have been
detained in isolation from those charged with political and
security offenses. Health care, food, and access by family to
persons held in ordinary prisons were reported to be adequate,
while conditions at prisons where political and security
prisoners were held were reported to be more severe, with family
visits prohibited. In its 1985 human rights report, the
Department of State also noted that "there have been numerous
credible reports of torture, primarily during arrest and
interrogation," and (referring to the 1985 Amnesty International
Report) added that "use of torture by the Syrian security forces
is routine."
In 1985 the Syrian government declared two general amnesties,
but only one benefited political prisoners, covering between 200
and 500 members of a faction of the banned Muslim Brotherhood
(see
Anti-Regime Opposition Movements
, this ch.). In
1986 Amnesty International estimated that there were thousands of
political prisoners under Syria's state of emergency legislation,
including 290 prisoners of conscience.
* * *
English-language literature on Syrian national security was
extensive in 1987. Valuable information regarding the development
of the Syrian armed forces, their political role, and the
sociology of the military is contained in the works by Gordon H.
Torrey, Nikolaos Van Dam, Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, John
Devlin, Eliezer Beeri, J.C. Hurewitz, Itamar Rabinovich, Benedict
F. FitzGerald, Amos Perlmutter, and George H. Haddad. The most
informative and reliable sources on current Syrian national
security issues are the annual Middle East Military
Balance, published by Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies, the annual Middle East Contemporary
Survey, published by Tel Aviv University's Shiloah Center for
Middle Eastern and African Studies, the annual Strategic
Survey and The Military Balance, both published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the annual
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, published
by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All
these sources have been widely used for a variety of information,
particularly on the changing size and equipment inventories of
military organizations and national security doctrines and
concerns. (For complete citations and further information
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of April 1987
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