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Uganda Postindependence Security Services
Uganda's independence constitution in 1962 reaffirmed
the
British policy of allowing the kingdoms of Buganda,
Bunyoro,
Toro, and Ankole to maintain local police forces, which
were
nominally accountable to Uganda's inspector general of
police.
When the 1967 Constitution abolished the federal states
and
Buganda's special status, the local police forces merged
into the
Uganda Police Force or became local constabularies
responsible to
the district commissioner under the inspector general's
authority.
During the 1960s, the Uganda Police Force comprised a
Uniform
Branch, which was assigned mainly to urban duties; Special
Branch
and Criminal Investigation Department (CID); Special
Constabulary; Special Force Units; Signals Branch; Railway
Police; Police Air Wing; Police Tracker Force; Police
Band; and
Canine Section. Four regional commanders directed police
operations and assisted the inspector general. The Police
Council--composed of the inspector general, the permanent
secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and four
other
members appointed by the minister--recommended policies
regarding
recruitment and conditions of service. The Public Service
Commission, in consultation with the inspector general,
appointed
senior police officers. The Police Training School in
Kampala
conducted initial training for new recruits. In-service
training
for noncommissioned officers and constables took place at
the
Uganda Police College at Naguru, and many officers studied
in
Australia, Britain, Israel, and the United States.
By 1968 the Uganda Police Force was a multiethnic,
nonpolitical, armed constabulary of between 7,000 and
8,000
officers and constables. In addition to regular urban
police
activities, it undertook extensive paramilitary duties,
provided
honor guard detachments for visiting dignitaries, and
performed
most of the public prosecution in the criminal courts.
During the late 1960s, the government increased its use
of
the police, and in particular, the CID, to eliminate
political
dissent. Some politicians complained that this emphasis
allowed
street crime to flourish. President Obote also created the
General Service Department (GSD) outside the police
organization
to monitor the political climate and report disloyalty.
Some GSD
agents infiltrated other organizations to observe policies
and
record discussions. They reported directly to the
president on
political threats arising from other government agencies
and the
public. Ugandans both ridiculed and feared GSD agents,
whom they
described as spies in their midst.
During the 1970s, the police force was practically
moribund,
but President Amin, like his predecessor, used a number of
agencies to root out political dissent. More arrests were
made
for political crimes than for street crimes or corruption.
Amin's
government relied on the Military Police, the Public
Safety Unit
(PSU), and the State Research Bureau (SRB) to detect and
eliminate political disloyalty. In 1971 Amin created the
SRB as a
military intelligence unit directly under the president's
control. Its agents, who numbered about 3,000, reportedly
kidnapped, tortured, and murdered suspects in their
headquarters
in Nakasero. Many SRB personnel were non-Ugandans; most
had
studied in police and military academies in Britain and
the
United States. Most served one-year tours of duty with the
SRB
and were then assigned to military duty, government
service, or
overseas embassy guard duty.
During the early years of the Amin regime, the PSU and
the
Military Police also acquired reputations as terrorist
squads
operating against their compatriots. In 1972 the PSU,
which was
created as an armed robbery investigative unit within the
civil
police organization, was equipped with submachine-guns.
Amin
ordered PSU agents to shoot robbers on sight, but in
practice, he
exerted almost no control over them, and PSU agents became
known
among many Ugandans as roving death squads.
In the early 1980s, the strength of the police force
was only
about 2,500, many of whom were trained in Britain or North
Korea.
The heads of the four police departments--administration,
criminal investigation, operations, and training--reported
to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Special Branch of the
CID
assumed the responsibilities of the SRB. The Police
Special
Force, a paramilitary riot control unit, engaged in
widespread
atrocities against people who opposed the regime,
especially in
Buganda.
Another internal security agency, the National Security
Agency (NSA), was formed in 1979. Many of its first
recruits were
former GSD members. NSA agents testified before human
rights
investigators later in the 1980s that although they did
not wear
uniforms, they carried arms, and many believed themselves
to be
above the law. Their testimony also related instances of
torture
and murder, as well as frequent robbery and looting.
Detainees
were sometimes held in military barracks, in keeping with
the NSA
policy of avoiding police or prison system controls. In
the
notorious Luwero Triangle in Buganda, NSA agents became
known as
"computer men," because they often carried computer
printouts in
their search for reported subversives.
When the NRA seized power in 1986, Museveni inherited a
force
of 8,000. A screening exercise revealed that out of the
8,000
personnel, only 3,000 qualified to be retained as police
officers. The government augmented this force by
contracting
2,000 retired police officers. However, at 5,000 this
force was
too small to maintain law and order. Museveni therefore
ordered
the NRA to assume responsibility for internal security. He
also
announced plans to upgrade police training and equipment,
increase the force to 30,000 personnel, revive a defunct
marine
unit to combat smuggling on Uganda's lakes, improve the
Police
Air Wing's reconnaissance capability by acquiring more
aircraft,
and form a new paramilitary unit to bolster internal
security.
In December 1988, Uganda's inspector general initiated
investigations into charges of police abuse, in the hope
of
improving the force's reputation. In July 1989, he also
announced
the creation of new departments of political education,
legal
affairs and loans, and local government, but their
authority had
not been fully defined.
In December 1989, President Museveni announced that the
police, then numbering almost 30,000, and other internal
security
organs eventually would assume responsibility for law and
order
in all districts except Lira, Apac, Gulu, Kitgum, Moroto,
Kotido,
Soroti, and Kumi--where antigovernment rebels remained
active. He
also announced plans to end the army's internal security
mission
as the police assumed greater responsibility for law and
order.
These changes would enable the army to pursue new training
programs and, he hoped, improve morale. Museveni also
directed
the minister of internal affairs to augment police
salaries by
providing basic rations, such as food, soap, and blankets,
and to
investigate ways of supplementing educational costs for
the
police.
During the 1980s, Britain, France, North Korea, Egypt,
and
Germany provided assistance to the Uganda Police Force.
British
instructors taught courses on criminal investigations and
police
administration, and they trained future police
instructors.
British assistance also included equipment, such as highfrequency radio sets and Land Rovers, and London had
agreed to
furnish bicycles, office equipment and supplies, and crime
detection kits.
In 1989 French police officials provided three-month
training
courses in riot control and suppression techniques. The
first
thirty Ugandans to complete this training became
instructors for
subsequent courses. In December 1990, another French team
of five
police officials trained 100 Ugandan police officers in
antiriot
techniques. Museveni also accepted North Korean offers of
equipment and training assistance. By July 1989, P'yngyang
also
had trained and equipped Uganda's newly established Mobile
Police
Patrol Unit (MPPU) of 167 officers.
By May 1991, the police force numbered about 20,000.
Despite
British, French, and North Korean training, the government
admitted that the police still needed specialized training
programs to improve its investigative capabilities.
Data as of December 1990
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