Venezuela THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC RULE
Venezuelan oil worker, ca. 1942
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Divisions, Library of Congress
During the twenty-three years of transition to
democratic
rule, institutions developed as the military transferred
political power to civilians. However, the military was
still
very dominant, and the death of Gómez left a leadership
vacuum
that could only be filled by the old dictator's
tachirense
minister of war, General Eleazar López Contreras. After he
finished Gómez's term of office in 1936, the Congress, all
the
members of which had been appointed by Gómez, selected
López to
serve his own five-year term in office.
When the riots following Gómez's death precipitated
demands
for liberalizing the dictatorship, López quickly realized
that
his survival depended on his allowing some civilian
political
expression. Accordingly, he freed long-time political
prisoners
and dismantled the worst part of Gómez's repressive
apparatus.
Exiles returned to establish the first mass political
organizations in the nation's history, the most important
of
which was the Venezuelan Organization (Organización
Venezolana--
Orve) led by the populist Betancourt. Another surviving
leader of
the Generation of 1928, Jóvito Villalba, revived the
Marxist-
oriented Venezuelan Student Federation (Federación
Estudiantil de
Venezuela--FEV); the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido
Comunista Venezolano--PCV) was also reorganized, although
it
remained banned from political activities in the revised
constitution of 1936. In a related area, liberalized labor
legislation encouraged the organization of the nation's
first
modern labor syndicates.
A highly effective general strike in June 1936,
however, led
the López regime to the conclusion that the proper
boundaries of
reform had been crossed. Accordingly, the López government
rejected a November application by Orve and other leftist
opposition elements for legal recognition of a united
National
Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional--PDN) and
brutally
suppressed a strike by oil workers the following month.
The
regime justified the outlawing of the nascent labor unions
in
1937 by claiming that they had engaged in illegal
political
activities. Soon thereafter, the regime proscribed
virtually all
organized political opposition.
López decided instead to concentrate his reform efforts
in
the relatively noncontroversial sphere of economic
modernization.
The government established a central bank, along with
state-
controlled industrial and agricultural development banks,
opened
new oil fields to exploitation and, employing the slogan
of
sembrar el petróleo ("sowing the oil"), launched a
program
for developing the national economic and social
infrastructural,
although at a lackluster pace that led critics to question
the
program's efficacy.
In 1941 López's Congress selected yet another
tachirense, minister of war Isaías Medina Angarita,
to
replace López. In this respect, it appeared to be politics
as
usual. A more ambitious economic development plan,
announced by
Medina in 1942, was interrupted during World War II when
German
submarines played havoc with tankers transporting
Venezuela's
oil. New laws governing the state's relationship with
foreign oil
companies in 1943 resulted in substantially increased
revenues,
spurring renewed development efforts in 1944. Construction
activity boomed during the waning years of the war, a
period that
also saw the passage of Venezuela's first income tax and
social
security laws.
Perhaps more consequential, however, was Medina's
expansion
of the political opening begun by López. The PDN was
legalized
and promptly changed its name to Democratic Action (Acción
Democrática--AD). Its members soon constituted a
vociferous
minority in local governments and, after the January 1943
elections, in the lower house of Congress known as the
Chamber of
Deputies (the upper house was the Senate). The president
responded by organizing his own political party, the
Venezuelan
Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Venezolano--PDV),
which
waged a vigorous campaign and gained a legitimate victory
in the
crucial 1944 congressional elections. With his party thus
assured
of control of the 1945 Congress, which would hold indirect
elections for president, Medina appeared poised to
designate his
successor.
To the surprise of many, he chose Diógenes Escalante, a
liberal civilian serving as ambassador in Washington. A
delighted
AD agreed to support Escalante's candidacy. Medina's
opposition
on the right, however, which had expected former President
López
to receive the nomination, was incensed by the choice.
Fear was
in the air during the summer of 1945, as rumors circulated
that
the forty-six-year-long rule by tachirenses was
about to
be ruptured by a civil war between the lopecistas
and
medinistas (followers of López and Medina).
Escalante soon
became too ill to pursue the presidency, however, and his
announced replacement was a colorless figure widely
regarded as a
puppet of Medina. Ironically, it was not the
lopecista
right that brought the era of tachirense rule to a
close.
Instead, on October 18, 1945, the AD in conjunction with
junior
military officers suddenly overthrew Medina.
The conspiracy to overthrow Medina had been hatched
inside
the Patriotic Military Union (Unión Patriótica
Militar--UPM), a
secret lodge of junior officers who were disgruntled over
the
persistence of cronyism and the lack of professionalism
within
the tachirense senior ranks. These officers had
invited AD
to join their plot in June and asked Betancourt to serve
as the
president of the new government. AD did not agree to
cooperate
with the UPM, however, until after the October 1
announcement of
Medina's replacement for Escalante.
After the coup, Betancourt named a seven-man governing
junta
consisting of four adecos (members of AD), two
military
officers, and one independent. AD thus controlled the
government,
and the UPM controlled the military. All officers who had
attained ranks above major before the 1945
rebellions--Carlos
Delgado Chalbaud, Julio Vargas, and Marcos Pérez
Jiménez--were
hence promptly sent into retirement. Political reform was
the
first item on the junta's agenda, and in March 1946, it
decreed a
sweeping new electoral law. Universal suffrage for all
citizens
over eighteen, including women, at last became law. All
political
parties were legalized, and the number of congressional
seats was
to be apportioned according to each party's percentage of
the
total vote.
AD's principal competitor in the October 1946
Constituent
Assembly elections, held to elect a body that would draft
a new
constitution, was the Christian Democratic Party (Comité
de
Organización Política Electoral Independiente--COPEI),
recently
founded by Rafael Caldera Rodríguez. COPEI appealed mainly
to
conservative Roman Catholics. Other parties of less
conservative
leanings but narrower electoral appeal included the
Democratic
Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática--URD), a
personal
vehicle for Villalba, and the communists, whose various
factions
united in 1947 under the banner of the PCV, which had been
legalized in 1942. Although competition among the parties
was
intense, AD won overwhelming majorities in the Constituent
Assembly elections as well as in the presidential and
congressional elections of December 1947 and the municipal
elections of May 1948.
AD's wide margin of victory (in 1946 it drew 79 percent
of
the vote); in 1947, 73 percent) led its leaders to believe
that
they could push through a highly progressive program
without
considering the conservative political opposition. A new
constitution was promulgated in 1947. The party's vigorous
pursuit of "social justice and better conditions for the
workers"
(as stated in a decree by the 1945 junta that established
a
separate ministry of labor) engendered widespread
hostility
within the business community, both foreign and local. The
overhaul of the 1943 petroleum law to assure the
government a 50
percent tax on the oil industry's profits intensified the
foreign
oil companies' antagonism. The junta's aggressive campaign
to
expand public education and its regulation of both public
and
private education incensed the Roman Catholic Church. The
church,
whose dominant role in education had heretofore gone
unchallenged, now enlisted COPEI in a strident
antigovernment
campaign.
The political polarization intensified following the
inauguration of Rómulo Gallegos as president on February
15,
1948. At that time, Venezuela's most renowned author,
Gallegos
proved less than adroit as a politician. His signing of
AD's
wide-ranging land reform bill in October pitted the
nation's
powerful landowners against him, and his reduction of the
military personnel in his cabinet and advocacy of a
reduced
military budget alienated the armed forces. In
mid-November, the
UPM issued an ultimatum to the president demanding that
COPEI
share political authority with AD and that Betancourt,
still AD
leader, be sent into exile. Gallegos refused, and on
November 24,
after barely ten months in office, the military overthrew
him in
a nearly bloodless coup and exiled him along with
Betancourt and
the rest of the AD leadership.
The three-man provisional military junta that assumed
control
of the government was headed by Colonel Delgado. Delgado
had
joined the anti-AD conspiracy only after Gallegos had
rejected
the UPM ultimatum and it was clear that his fall was
inevitable.
Delgado had been a UPM coconspirator in 1945, and had
served as a
member of the AD junta and as minister of defense under
Gallegos.
The military junta's other two members, UPM conspirator
Pérez
Jiménez and Luis Felipe Llovera Páez, were
tachirenses who
also held the rank of colonel. The junta quickly set about
undoing the reforms of the AD
trienio (see Glossary). It
voided the 1947 constitution and restored the
traditionalist 1936
constitution. The new military government outlawed AD and
persecuted its militants.
Delgado took a more moderate position than his fellow
junta
members on such issues as the persecution of AD and the
potential
transition from a military to a civilian government. His
disagreements with Pérez and Llovera, who advocated overt
military rule in the Venezuelan tradition, became
increasingly
public. In November 1950, Delgado was assassinated. Germán
Suárez
Flanerich served as a figurehead for Pérez, who assumed
leadership of the junta. Under pressure from non-AD
political
parties, the junta reluctantly convoked long-deferred
presidential elections for November 1952.
AD continued to be proscribed but was extremely active
underground. Pérez organized a progovernment party, the
Independent Electoral Front (Frente Electoral
Independiente--
FEI), which he mistakenly believed would be victorious and
thus
legitimize his rule. Caldera ran a conservative campaign
as the
presidential candidate of COPEI, and the URD's Villalba
ran a
fiery antigovernment campaign. When the early election
results
made it clear that the URD (supported clandestinely by
AD), was
far ahead of the government party, Pérez ordered the count
halted
and declared himself president. The other junta members
were sent
abroad "on vacation," and the leaders of the URD and COPEI
joined
their AD colleagues in exile.
The next five years saw a brutal dictatorship in a
country
that by now was notorious as the almost archetypical home
of
Latin American dictators. A regressive new constitution
reverted
to indirect elections for president by a puppet
legislature.
Pedro Estrada, described by historian Hubert Herring as
"as
vicious a man hunter as Hitler ever employed," headed the
vast
National Security Police (Seguridad Nacional--SN) network
that
rounded up any opposition, including military officers,
unable to
escape. Hundreds, if not thousands, were brutally tortured
or
simply murdered at the notorious Guasina Island
concentration
camp in the Orinoco jungle region. Labor unions were
harassed,
and the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor was abolished
and
replaced by a confederation under the control of the FEI.
When
the Central University of Venezuela became a center of
opposition
to the regime, it was simply shut down. Strict controls
over the
press recalled the worst days of the Gómez regime.
Political
power concentrated around Pérez and an inner circle of six
tachirense colonels who held key cabinet positions.
Pérez
revived Gómez's old "Democratic Caesarism" doctrine and
gave it a
new name, the "New National Ideal," under which politics
would be
deemphasized in favor of material progress (dubbed the
"conquest
of the physical environment" by apologists for the
dictatorship).
Under Pérez, much of the nation's ever-increasing
petroleum
revenues were used for ostentatious construction projects.
These
included a replica of New York's Rockefeller Center, a
luxurious
mountaintop hotel, and the world's most expensive
officers' club,
all of which served more as monuments to the dictator than
as
contributions to national development. An even larger
share of
the state treasury, fully 50 percent according to one
estimate,
was squandered or simply stolen. By the time Pérez was
forced to
flee to Miami, he alone had accumulated a fortune
estimated at
US$250 million. Meanwhile, government expenditures on such
human
resources as health and education stagnated.
Pérez's staunch anticommunism and his more liberal
policies
toward the foreign oil companies--compared with the
nationalistic
stance of AD--won him the open support of the United
States
government; President Dwight D. Eisenhower awarded him the
Legion
of Merit in 1954. His seemingly insatiable greed for
wealth and
power, however, as well as the widespread reports of his
debauchery, made him a growing object of scorn among his
countrymen. In mid-1957 the united civilian opposition
organized
an underground movement called the Patriotic Junta
dedicated to
overthrowing the dictatorship. Opposition to Pérez also
flourished within the military, especially among junior
officers
tired of the corruption and monopoly on power of the
ruling
generals. Pére's favoritism to the army alienated air
force and
naval officers.
A shameless electoral farce in 1957, obvious to all as
a bald
maneuver designed to perpetuate Pérez in power, proved
decisive
in the downfall of the dictator. Fearful of an
embarrassment
similar to that of 1952, Pérez cancelled planned elections
and
then scheduled a plebescite. Only two hours after the
polls had
closed on December 15, the government announced an
incredible 85
percent vote in favor of Pérez continuing in office.
Outrage at
this obviously fraudulent result was universal among both
the
civilian and military opposition.
Air force planes dropped bombs on the capital on
January 1,
1958, to signal the start of a military insurrection. The
anticipated coup d'état failed to materialize, however,
because
of the lack of coordination among the conspirators.
Nonetheless,
the bombing did give heart to the civilian opposition to
Pérez by
signaling that they were not without allies within the
military.
On January 10, the Patriotic Junta convoked a massive
demonstration of civilian opposition in downtown Caracas;
on the
twenty-first, it called for a general strike that proved
immediately effective. Street demonstrations as well as
fighting
erupted and quickly spread outside Caracas. When the navy
revolted on January 22, a group of army officers, fearful
for
their own lives, forced Pérez to resign. The following
day,
Venezuela's last dictator fled the country, carrying most
of what
remained of the national treasury. In addition, his ouster
cost
the nation some 300 dead and more than 1,000 wounded.
The five-man provisional military junta at first tried
to
rule without civilian participation. The Patriotic Junta,
however, called for the rebellion to continue until
civilians
were included. Two businessmen were promptly added to the
junta,
which ruled during the year required to dismantle the
institutions associated with the dictatorship and transfer
power
to a popularly elected civilian government. The junta
contained
personnel from all three military services, led by Admiral
Wolfgang Larrazábal, who headed the crucial January 22
naval
rebellion.
The junta also began a valiant effort to deal with the
grim
realities of an empty treasury and some US$500 million in
foreign
debt. It immediately stopped work on most of the
dictator's
public works projects, and later decreed a sharp increase
in
income taxes. Most important, the junta increased the
government's share of the profits on petroleum extraction
from 50
percent to 60 percent.
Under a new electoral law decreed in May, the junta
convoked
elections for December 1958. The political parties that
had
participated in the Patriotic Junta found themselves
unable to
reach a consensus on a single candidate. In the Pact of
Punto
Fijo, drawn up in October, the top party leaders did agree
to
resume their cooperation after the elections. They drew up
a
common policy agenda and agreed to divide cabinet posts
and other
governmental positions among the three major parties,
regardless
of whose candidate proved victorious in December. AD then
nominated Betancourt, the URD tapped the popular
Larrazábal as
its candidate, and COPEI again ran Caldera as its
candidate.
After a hard-fought campaign, Betancourt came out the
victor with
49 percent of the total; Larrazábal, who also had the
support of
the communists, received 35 percent; Caldera garnered 16
percent.
AD also gained a majority in both congressional bodies.
Although
few anticipated it at the time, Betancourt's inauguration
as
president on February 13, 1959, initiated a period of
democratic,
civilian rule of unprecedented length in the nation's
history.
Data as of December 1990
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