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Vietnam China
The deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations was gradual,
commencing perhaps most dramatically with Richard M. Nixon's 1972
visit to China (which Hanoi later called the beginning of China's
betrayal of Vietnam), but in the mid-1970s the signs of an
impending breakdown were barely discernible. Until 1977 the
Vietnam-Cambodia dispute appeared to the outside world to be
purely bilateral and China's strategic considerations seemed only
distantly connected to the skirmishes taking place on the
Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The Chinese in the 1976-77 period
were preoccupied with internal affairs, including the deaths of
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the arrest of Mao's widow, and the
return to power of Deng Xiaoping. As the situation between
Vietnam and Cambodia deteriorated, the signs of a potential SinoVietnamese rift became clearer the more Cambodia's strategic
importance for both China and Vietnam. appeared at risk. Aside
from risking the return of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam, viewed a
disengagement from Cambodia as paramount to inviting China to
create a two-front threat by establishing a foothold on a second
Vietnamese frontier. In China's view, Vietnam's sustained
presence in Cambodia not only precluded such an accomplishment,
but conferred territory, once administered by an acknowledged
Chinese ally, to the authority of an historic Asian adversary
that was closely allied with a contemporary superpower rival, the
Soviet Union.
Vietnam's and China's shared modern experiences, namely their
common exploitation by colonial powers and adaptations to
communist ideology, did little to alter Vietnam's historical view
of China, which was colored by lengthy periods of Chinese
conquest and domination. During the Second Indochina War, China
acted as North Vietnam's closest ally, but, according to later
Vietnamese statements, the Chinese tried to dominate the
relationship from the beginning. Vietnam's desperate need for
Chinese assistance forced it to maintain good relations with
Beijing for the duration of the war, despite Vietnamese
suspicions that China's ultimate purpose was to weaken Vietnam
(see
The Chinese Millennium;
Nine Centuries of Independence
, ch. 1).
After the end of the Second Indochina War, underlying
tensions between the two countries surfaced, and in 1978 a number
of issues converged to bring the relationship to the breaking
point. In addition to the growing dispute in Cambodia, these
issues included territorial disagreements and Vietnam's treatment
of its own largest minority group, the
Hoa (see Glossary) or
ethnic Chinese, who numbered nearly 2 million.
The territorial dispute involved primarily delineation of
territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin and sovereignty over two
archipelagos in the South China Sea, the Paracel and the Spratly
Islands (the Xisha and the Nansha in Chinese; the Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa in Vietnamese). A border dispute on land (over fewer
than sixty square kilometers) was responsible for the relatively
steady occurrence of low-level border clashes involving crossborder violations and the exchange of small-arms fire. In 1958
the two governments decided to defer settling their border
differences until after victory had been achieved in the South.
Disagreement over territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin
stemmed from agreements reached between China and France in 1887,
stipulating a territorial limit of no more three nautical miles.
These agreements had been adequate until 1973, when Hanoi
announced to Beijing its intention to negotiate contracts with
foreign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin.
The disputed islands in the South China Sea assumed importance
only after it was disclosed that they were near the potential
sites of substantial offshore oil deposits. In January 1974,
Chinese military units seized islands in the Paracels occupied by
South Vietnamese armed forces, and Beijing claimed sovereignty
over the Spratlys. Following their conquest of South Vietnam in
the spring of 1975, units of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
nevertheless moved to occupy the Spratly Islands previously held
by the Saigon regime.
Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa became an issue in 1978, when
Hanoi instituted a crackdown on the Chinese community because of
its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its
alleged subversive activities in the North. The government action
forced an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the
border into China, prompting Beijing to accuse Vietnam of
persecuting its Chinese community and of breaking a 1955
agreement that called for the gradual and voluntary integration
of the Hoa into Vietnamese society. The situation was aggravated
when Vietnam denied landing privileges to three Chinese ships
dispatched to evacuate Hoa seeking voluntary repatriation to
China. Beijing threatened Hanoi with unspecified retaliation, and
Chinese activities on the Sino-Vietnamese border escalated.
The deterioration in bilateral relations became evident when
China reduced in May 1978 and then cancelled on July 3 its
remaining aid projects in Vietnam. The officical announcement
followed by only a few days Hanoi's admission on June 29 to the
Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(
Comecon--see Glossary). A few months later, in
November 1978, a new era
in Soviet-Vietnamese relations began with the signing of a Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation that called for mutual assistance
and consultation in the event of a security threat to either
country. The document facilitated Soviet use of Vietnamese
airports and port facilities, particularly the former United
States military complex at Cam Ranh Bay
(see The Armed Forces
, ch. 5). In return, it assured Vietnam of
economic and military
aid for the anticipated invasion of Cambodia and established the
Soviet Union as a deterrent to possible Chinese intervention in
Cambodia.
Vietnam's decision to align with the Soviets together with
its invasion of Cámbodia and mistreatment of the Hoa, provoked
Beijing to "teach Hanoi a lesson." A "self-defense
counterattack," mounted by China along the Sino-Vietnamese border
on February 17, 1979, ended less than a month later, on March 5,
when Chinese leaders announced that their objectives had been met
and proceeded to withdraw their forces
(see History
, ch. 5).
Despite the Chinese boast of having shattered the myth of
Vietnam's invincibility, the invasion effected little more than
the diversion of some Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The bulk
of the resistance reportedly was offered by local Vietnamese
border units and regional forces. Outnumbered, they performed
well, exposing significant weaknesses in Chinese tactics,
strategy, logistics, equipment, and communications. In the final
analysis, the results were far from conclusive. Peace
negotiations were initiated following the disengagement of
forces, but broke down several times before being discontinued in
December 1979.
The Cambodian crisis, too, remained stalemated, and
Vietnamese dependence upon the Soviet Union continued. In 1987
tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border erupted in sporadic
fighting. China believed that the Cambodian conflict would serve
Chinese interests by draining the Vietnamese economically and
weakening Hanoi. China's sustained pressure on Vietnam's northern
border would also tax Vietnam militarily, while satisfying
ASEAN's requests for Chinese assistance in the conflict and
providing Chinese armed forces with invaluable combat experience.
Consequently, Vietnam's dry-season campaigns to eliminate CGDK
resistance base camps along the Thai-Cambodian border were
generally matched by corresponding Chinese acts along the SinoVietnamese border. China issued vague threats to Vietnam of a
"second lesson" in the mid-1980s but as of 1987 had not acted on
these threats.
China imposed the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia
as a precondition to improved Sino-Soviet relations, and
diplomatic activity in late 1986 indicated that Vietnam might
mend its differences with China in the event the Soviets moved
closer to the Chinese. Despite Hanoi's desire to ease tensions
with Beijing, however, it was not willing to do so at the expense
of its position in Cambodia.
Data as of December 1987
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