|
Vietnam The Soviet Union
Since the earliest days of the VCP, when the party's primary
mentor was the Comintern, the Soviet Union has played a complex
role in VCP affairs. Many of Vietnam's leaders had trained in the
Soviet Union and had formed personal ties with their Soviet
contemporaries. Historically, however, the relationship between
the two nations has been characterized by strain, particularly on
the Vietnamese side, and the record suggests several instances of
Soviet neglect or betrayal of Vietnamese interests. These
included Moscow's indifference to the founding of the VCP in
1930; failure to support materially or otherwise the Vietnamese
resistance war against the French in the 1930s and early 1940s;
failure to recognize North Vietnam until five years after its
founding; failure to support Vietnam's application for membership
in the UN in 1948 and 1951; support for the partitioning of
Vietnam at the Geneva Conference in 1954; and sponsorship of a
proposal to admit both North and South Vietnam to the UN in 1956.
These examples of Soviet policy reminded the Vietnamese of the
peril inherent in placing too much trust in a foreign ally.
The Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s favorably altered the
Soviet attitude toward Vietnam. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets
initiated a program of military assistance to Hanoi that proved
invaluable in carrying on the Second Indochina War. Hanoi,
however, continued to suspect Soviet motives and perceived that
Soviet aid, when offered, was insufficient and given only
grudgingly after repeated appeals.
Following the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, Hanoi sought
to retain the equilibrium of its wartime relations with both
China and the Soviet Union, but mounting tensions with Beijing,
culminating in the loss of Chinese aid in 1978, compelled Hanoi
to look increasingly to Moscow for economic and military
assistance. Beginning in late 1975, a number of significant
agreements were signed between the two countries. One coordinated
the national economic development plans of the two countries, and
another called for the Soviet Union to underwrite Vietnam's first
post-reunification Five-Year Plan. The first formal alliance was
achieved in June 1978 when Vietnam joined Comecon. That
organization, which facilitated the economic integration of the
Soviet Union, six East European countries, Cuba, and Mongolia,
was able to offer economic assistance for some of the projects
abandoned by China
(see Foreign Trade and Aid
, ch. 3).
Vietnam's decision to invade Cambodia, which the leadership
apparently made shortly after joining Comecon, required more than
economic assistance from the Soviets
(see Laos and Cambodia
, this
ch.). The possibility of a formal alliance between Hanoi and
Moscow had apparently been discussed since 1975, but the
Vietnamese had rejected the idea in order to protect their
relationship with China. In 1978 that relationship had
deteriorated to the point where protecting it was no longer a
consideration, and circumstances in Cambodia confirmed the need
for Vietnamese-Soviet military cooperation. In spite of Vietnam's
needs, it is likely that the November 1978 Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation was imposed by the Soviets as a condition for
military assistance. As a result of the treaty, the Vietnamese
granted the Soviets access to the facilities at Da Nang and Cam
Ranh Bay. Use of the bases represented a substantial regional
strategic gain for Moscow, whose naval bases in the Pacific
Ocean, until then, had been limited to the Soviet Far East.
Soviet support sustained Vietnamese operations in Cambodia.
Military aid in 1978 approached US$800 million annually, but
after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack
on Vietnam in February 1979, the figure rose to almost US$1.4
billion. The sharp increase, reflecting the Soviet effort to
replace quickly Vietnamese equipment losses on the SinoVietnamese border, was subsequently reduced to between US$800 and
900 million in 1980 and between US$900 million and 1 billion in
1981. Military aid increased to 1.7 billion annually in the 1982-
85 period, and decreased to an estimated US$1.5 billion in 1985.
Reported Soviet dissatisfaction with Hanoi's handling of
Cambodia, stemming from the stalemated battlefield situation and
its high costs, did not appear to affect Moscow's decision to
continue to provide assistance for the war. At the end of 1987,
there was no indication that the Soviets were pressing Vietnam to
resolve the conflict.
In addition to its role as Vietnam's exclusive donor of
military aid, the Soviet Union in 1987 was also Vietnam's largest
contributor of economic aid and its biggest trade partner. During
the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85), the Soviets provided some
US$5.4 billion in balance-of-payments aid, project assistance,
and oil price subsidies. Total economic aid for 1986 was an
estimated US$1.8 billion. The Soviets also have been a major
supplier of food and commodity aid on a mostly grant-aid or softcurrency basis. By 1983 they were supplying 90 percent of
Vietnam's petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizer, and cotton
imports and 70 percent of its grain imports
(see Foreign Trade and Aid
, ch. 3).
Soviet-Vietnamese ties in the mid-1980s were sound, although
troubled by some underlying strain. The Vietnamese distrusted
Soviet intentions and resented Hanoi's dependent role; the
Soviets in turn distrusted the Vietnamese for not confiding in
them. Reportedly, on a number of occasions Moscow learned of
major Vietnamese policy plans and changes only after the fact.
According to some foreign observers, the Soviets were not
entirely prepared for the sudden deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese
relations in 1978, and they may not have been aware of the full
extent of Vietnamese plans in Cambodia. Others believe the Soviet
Union was aware of the deterioration and was allowing Vietnam to
play the role of proxy in Moscow's own dispute with Beijing.
Friction was particularly evident in economic relations. The
Soviets resented the enormous burden of their aid program to
Vietnam and felt that much of it was wasted because of Vietnamese
inefficiency. In turn, the Vietnamese were offended by Moscow's
1980 decision to reduce aid in the face of severe economic
hardships in Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, aid continued at a
reduced rate although Vietnam's economic situation had worsened.
The prospect of an improvement in the state of Sino-Soviet
relations in the mid-1980s did not appear to threaten the Soviet
Union's ties with Vietnam. Although China demanded that Moscow
ensure Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition to
normalizing the Sino-Soviet relationship, Vietnamese leaders
proceeded as if they were sure their existing policy in Cambodia
would not be threatened. The Soviets even went so far as to
promote improved relations between Hanoi and Beijing. At
Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the senior
member of the Soviet delegation suggested that the normalization
of relations between Vietnam and China would improve the
situation in Asia and the world as a whole. The Vietnamese agreed
with this premise but were unwilling to seek improved ties at the
expense of weakening their position in Cambodia.
Data as of December 1987
|
