Yugoslavia Post-Rankovic Diversification
In 1966 the party's liberal majority convinced Tito to oust
Rankovic by proving that the security chief had grossly abused
his power. With secret police activity reduced and the
conservatives lacking a leader, new political forces blossomed in
Yugoslavia. In 1967 a series of constitutional amendments,
instigated by Bosnia and Hercegovina, enlarged the role of the
Chamber of Nationalities in federal decision making. The
amendments specified separate functions for that chamber and
canceled the centralizing force the 1963 constitution had exerted
on the Federal Assembly. A new generation of younger, more
pragmatic leaders began replacing conservative, older party
members, and issues of nationalism and economics now were debated
hotly and openly in the League of Communists. With politicians no
longer allowed to hold concurrent federal and party positions,
the bodies of state government grew more independent of party
domination. (In the next twenty-plus years, however, national
leaders moved constantly from party to state positions and back,
thus largely preserving the connection.)
After 1966 the Yugoslav media more openly criticized
government and party policy, and economic enterprises became more
truly "self managing." In 1967 and 1968, the party openly debated
whether delegates to the Federal Assembly could ignore
constituent demands to take an "all-Yugoslav" position. Largely
because most politicians identified such a position with Serbian
centralist domination, delegates were held to strict pursuit of
regional interests. Discussion of such issues signaled the
rekindling of ethnic nationalist conflicts that had been muffled
by totalitarianism in the past, and the resolution of the
delegate responsibility question indicated ascendancy of
nationalist forces. Beginning in 1966, ethnic conflicts sparked
frequent demonstrations throughout the country. Bosnia and
Hercegovina complained in 1966 that development funding was
insufficient; the longstanding rivalry between Serbia and Croatia
resurfaced in 1967; and Albanians demonstrated in Kosovo and
Macedonia in 1968. A national-liberal coalition of Croatia,
Slovenia, and Macedonia fought for additional decentralization
and against anticipated Serbian efforts to dominate the federal
government. Although that alliance disintegrated in 1969, its
liberal approach dominated policy making until 1971. In an effort
to regain control of the republics, the LCY decentralized its
structure, giving much more decision-making power to the party at
the republic level and lower.
In both party and state political structures, the new
regional influence enormously complicated federal policy making.
Now every decision required consultation and compromise. The FEC
began consulting its equivalents in each republic before
performing its role in national executive decision making. The
compromise process often led to stalemate, especially on the
explosive issue of economic development in the richer versus the
poorer republics. To streamline the process, Tito intervened in
1969 to form a new Executive Bureau for the Party Presidium. The
Executive Bureau was a central party organ empowered to mediate
disputes among the parties of the republics. (The Party Presidium
itself, comprising representatives from each republic, was
inherently fragmented along regional lines.) Later that year,
however, the Executive Bureau was helpless when demonstrations in
Slovenia over distribution of
World Bank (see Glossary) funds
prompted divisive statements by party leaders of other republics
and strong Slovenian criticism of the system. In 1970 the
Croatian party began a protracted, powerful campaign against the
existing federal system, which it described as a tool for Serbian
domination of the other republics. The chief goal of the Croatian
campaign was to change federal policy so that a single republic
could veto any federal action.
Tito again responded by creating a new federal body, this
time in the apparatus of the state rather than the party. Like
the party's Executive Bureau, the collective State Presidency
included the most qualified representatives of each republic and
was intended to provide a forum for national compromise,
insulated from regional pressures. Meanwhile, the outburst of
ethnic factionalism that surfaced in the late 1960s became
especially severe in Croatia. Between 1969 and 1971, protracted
negotiations for new amendments to the federal constitution only
heightened Croatian separatism. The Croatian nationalists, based
in the powerful Matica Hrvatska cultural organization, split the
Croatian party and launched a massive separatist propaganda
campaign that resulted in serious clashes with ethnic Serbs in
Croatia.
Data as of December 1990
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