Zaire Patrimonial Politics and Corruption
The Inga dams barrage, Zaire's largest source of
electricity, on the lower Congo River near Matadi
Courtesy Agence Zaïre Presse
Mobutu's efforts to centralize state power in his hands
in
order to penetrate all aspects of society have been
analyzed by
Thomas Callaghy, who has demonstrated that in the economic
realm
these efforts met with catastrophic results. When Mobutu
came to
power, Zaire began major state expansion and
consolidation. Key to
this process was the notion of economic sovereignty.
Furthermore,
Mobutu sought to bring economic activity within his tight
control
and was especially concerned with mining activity in the
secessionist Shaba and Kasai (present-day Kasai-Oriental
and KasaiOccidental ) regions. Some have speculated that insecurity
about
Shaba separatism in part led Mobutu to construct the
country's
primary source of electricity, the Inga I and Inga II
hydroelectric
plants, west of Kinshasa, in order to increase the
capital's
control over Shaba. Mobutu sought to reverse the
traditional
dominance of the mining region over the rest of the
nation. The
nationalization of the Belgian-owned UMHK in 1967 and its
transformation into the Zairian-owned parastatal
Gécamines, for
example, was both a political and an economic act,
deliberately and
carefully planned. Its primary objective was the
consolidation of
presidential authority and spending ability. To finance
state
goals, Mobutu had to acquire major new financial resources
for
development projects and for slush money.
The government became increasingly preoccupied
throughout the
1970s with raising revenue to finance grandiose projects.
The
practice of patrimonialism gave free rein to the
enrichment of the
president and his associates in government and other
spheres.
According to Callaghy, "the revenue needs of the state
intersected
the need of the regime to finance its patrimonial
processes of
power maintenance and the ambition of the emergent
political class
for a swift accumulation of wealth."
These needs and ambitions led to a continuing financial
crisis.
Government administration developed weak, inefficient, and
infamously corrupt financial structures; the revenue
collection
system, in particular, was little more than an open
invitation for
personal enrichment by favored administrators. Mobutu, as
the
patron of patrons, demonstrated a voracious desire for
more revenue
to spend as he saw fit. Much of this spending was
untraceable,
according to foreign technocrats brought in to salvage the
economy
as its crisis deepened. The expense of this quest for
power and
glory, and the costs of defense, grandiose projects, and a
lavish
life-style as well as the corruption and largesse inherent
in a
patriarchal patrimonial regime also brought the Zairian
state to
the point of collapse in the late 1970s.
In Zaire, corruption appeared to be the norm, not just
an
occasional or problematic exception. Access to high office
was
controlled by the president
(see
The
Presidency;
The
National Executive Council
, ch. 4). Because no one could be sure of
remaining in office for very long, the incentive was to
profit as
quickly and as much as possible. Access to high office was
the only
hope of the Zairian elite or would-be-elite to attain, or
maintain,
a decent standard of living. The system guaranteed that
top
functionaries would serve the president, the ultimate
source of
their livelihood, rather than the nation. But corruption
in Zaire
was economically dysfunctional. Corruption did not serve
to grease
the wheels of the economic machine by creating jobs or
other forms
of expansion. Unfortunately for millions of Zairians as
well as for
frustrated foreign donors, the system was incapable of
promoting
sustained development. Nonetheless, to the extent that
this system
had enriched the president and kept him in firm control of
a
disparate society, it had worked well, and Mobutu appeared
unlikely
to abandon it, even under the heavy internal and external
pressures
he faced in the early 1990s.
Data as of December 1993
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