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Afghanistan
Politicized Islam
Although Shariah courts existed in urban centers after Ahmad
Shah Durrani established an Afghan state in 1747, the primary
judicial basis for the society remained in the tribal code of
the Pushtunwali until the end of the nineteenth century.
Sporadic fatwas (formal legal opinions) were issued and
occasional jihads were called not so much to advance
Islamic ideology as to sanction the actions of specific individuals
against their political opponents so that power might be consolidated.
The first systematic employment of Islam as an instrument for
state-building was introduced by Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901)
during his drive toward centralization. He decreed that all laws
must comply with Islamic law and thus elevated the Shariah
over customary laws embodied in the Pushtunwali. The
ulama were enlisted to legitimize and sanction his state
efforts as well as his central authority. This enhanced the religious
community on the one hand, but as they were increasingly inducted
into the bureaucracy as servants of the state, the religious leadership
was ultimately weakened. Many economic privileges enjoyed by religious
personalities and institutions were restructured within the framework
of the state, the propagation of learning, once the sole prerogative
of the ulama, was closely supervised, and the Amir became the
supreme arbiter of justice.
His successors continued and expanded Amir Abdur Rahman's policies
as they increased the momentum of secularization. Islam continued
central to interactions, but the religious establishment remained
essentially non-political, functioning as a moral rather than
a political influence. Nevertheless, Islam asserted itself in
times of national crisis. And, when the religious leadership considered
themselves severely threatened, charismatic religious personalities
periodically employed Islam to rally disparate groups in opposition
to the state. They rose up on several occasions against King Amanullah
(1919-929), for example, in protest against reforms they believed
to be western intrusions inimical to Islam.
Subsequent rulers, mindful of traditional attitudes antithetical
to secularization were careful to underline the compatibility
of Islam with modernization. Even so, and despite its pivotal
position within the society which continued to draw no distinction
between religion and state, the role of religion in state affairs
continued to decline.
The 1931 Constitution made the Hanafi Shariah the state
religion, while the 1964 Constitution simply prescribed that the
state should conduct its religious ritual according to the Hanafi
School. The 1977 Constitution, declared Islam the religion of
Afghanistan, but made no mention that the state ritual should
be Hanafi. The Penal Code (1976) and Civil Law (1977), covering
the entire field of social justice, represent major attempts to
cope with elements of secular law, based on, but superseded by
other systems. Courts, for instance, were enjoined to consider
cases first according to secular law, resorting to the BCShariah
in areas where secular law did not exist. By 1978, the government
of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) openly expressed
its aversion to the religious establishment. This precipitated
the fledgling Islamist Movement into a national revolt; Islam
moved from its passive stance on the periphery to play an active
role.
Politicized Islam in Afghanistan represents a break from Afghan
traditions. The Islamist Movement originated in 1958 among faculties
of Kabul University, particularly within the Faculty of Islamic
Law which had been formed in 1952 with the announced purpose of
raising the quality of religious teaching to accommodate modern
science and technology. The founders were largely professors influenced
by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a party formed in the 1930s
that was dedicated to Islamic revivalism and social, economic,
and political equity. Their objective is to come to terms with
the modern world through the development of a political ideology
based on Islam. The Afghan leaders, while indebted to many of
these concepts, did not forge strong ties to similar movements
in other countries.
The liberalization of government attitudes following the passage
of the 1964 Constitution ushered in a period of intense activism
among students at Kabul University. Professors and their students
set up the Muslim Youth Organization (Sazmani Jawanani Musulman)
in the mid-1960s at the same time that the leftists were also
forming many parties. Initially communist students outnumbered
the Muslim students, but by 1970 the Muslim Youth had gained a
majority in student elections. Their membership was recruited
from university faculties and from secondary schools in several
cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. These professors and
students became the leaders of the Afghan Resistance in the 1980s.
With the takeover of government by the PDPA in April 1978, Islam
became central to uniting the opposition against the communist
ideology of the new rulers. As a politico-religious system, Islam
is ideally suited to the needs of a diverse, unorganized, often
mutually antagonistic citizenry wishing to forge a united front
against a common enemy; and war permitted various groups within
the mujahidin to put into effect competing concepts of organization.
The mujahidin leaders were charismatic figures with dyadic ties
to followers. In many cases military and political leaders replaced
the tribal leadership; at times the religious leadership was strengthened;
often the religious combined with the political leadership. Followers
selected their local leaders on the basis of personal choice and
precedence among regions, sects, ethnic groups or tribes, but
the major leaders rose to prominence through their ties to outsiders
who controlled the resources of money and arms.
With the support of foreign aid, the mujahidin were ultimately
successful in their jihad to drive out the Soviet forces, but
not in their attempts to construct a political alternative to
govern Afghanistan after their victory. Throughout the war, the
mujahidin were never fully able to replace traditional structures
with a modern political system based on Islam. Most mujahidin
commanders either used traditional patterns of power, becoming
the new khans, or sought to adapt modern political structures
to the traditional society. In time the prominent leaders accumulated
wealth and power and, in contrast to the past, wealth became a
determining factor in the delineation of power at all levels.
With the departure of foreign troops and the long sought demise
of Kabul's leftist government, The Islamic State of Afghanistan
finally came into being in April 1992. This represented a distinct
break with Afghan history, for religious specialists had never
before exercised state power. But the new government failed to
establish its legitimacy and, as much of its financial support
dissipated, local and middle range commanders and their militia
not only fought among themselves but resorted to a host of unacceptable
practices in their protracted scrambles for power and profit.
Throughout the nation the populous suffered from harassment, extortion,
kidnapping, burglary, hijacking and acts dishonoring women. Drug
trafficking increased alarmingly; nowhere were the highways safe.
The mujahidin had forfeited the trust they once enjoyed.
In the fall of 1994 a Muslim "student militia" came forth vowing
to cleanse the nation of the excesses sullying the jihad. Their
avowed intention is to bring in a "pure" Islamic state subject
to their own strict interpretations of the Shariah. Many of the
leaders of this movement called the Taliban (seekers or students
of Islam) were one-time mujahidin themselves, but the bulk of
their forces are comprised of young Afghan refugees trained in
Pakistani madrassas (religious schools), especially those
run by the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam Pakistan, the aggressively conservative
Pakistani political religious party headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman,
arch rival of Qazi Husain Ahmed, leader of the equally conservative
Jamaat-e-Islami and long time supporter of the mujahidin.
Headquartered in Kandahar, initially almost entirely Pushtun,
predominantly from the rural areas, and from the top leadership
down to the fighting militia characteristically in their thirties
or forties and even younger, the Taliban swept the country. In
September 1996 they captured Kabul and ruled over two-thirds of
Afghanistan.
The meteoric take over went almost unchallenged. Arms were collected
and security was established. At the same time, acts committed
for the purpose of enforcing the Shariah included public executions
for murder, stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, a bann
on all forms of gambling such as kite flying, chess and kawk
(partridge) fighting, prohibition of music and videos, proscriptions
against pictures of humans and animals, and an embargo on women's
voices over the radio. Women are to remain as invisible as possible,
behind the veil, in purdah in their homes, and dismissed from
work or study outside their homes. Like many before them, the
Taliban wave the flag of women's chasteness to prove their superior
Muslimness.
Because of the strong religious sentiments that animate their
minds, rural Afghans are still mostly captivated by the Taliban
at the beginning of 1997. Others look on appalled at the rigidly
orthodox dictates of these self-proclaimed arbiters of Islamic
rectitude. To them Taliban interpretations of the Shariah are
foreign deviations alien to the Islam practiced in Afghan society
which has always stressed moderation, tolerance, dignity, individual
choice and egalitarianism.
Data as of 1997
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