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Caribbean Islands Strategic and Regional Security Perspectives
STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL security issues pertaining to the
Commonwealth Caribbean insular subregion need to be considered, to
a certain extent, within the wider context of the Caribbean Basin
region. This geopolitical concept encompasses all of the Caribbean
island polities, as well as the rimland countries of the United
States, Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana.
Of the Latin American rimland countries, only Venezuela, which
exports petroleum to the United States through the Caribbean and
has 2,816 kilometers of Caribbean coastline, has played an economic
and diplomatic role of any significance to the Commonwealth
Caribbean since the late 1970s. Venezuela's influence was most
noticeable in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In general, however,
aside from its longstanding territorial dispute with Guyana,
Venezuela did not play an important security role in the
Commonwealth Caribbean as of late 1987. For this reason, it is not
discussed in this chapter. The only non-Commonwealth countries in
the Caribbean Basin discussed here in a geopolitical context are
the United States and Cuba, whose strategic or other interests have
influenced the security of the English-speaking islands. The
strategic interests of two extrahemispheric powers--Britain and the
Soviet Union--also are examined for the same reason.
The strategic aspects of the Commonwealth Caribbean islands
largely account for United States, Soviet, and Cuban interest in
this subregion, as well as in the Caribbean Basin area in general.
The transition to independence of the Commonwealth Caribbean
islands during the period from the early 1960s to the early 1980s
was accompanied by a gradual withdrawal of Britain's security and
defense responsibilities. This situation created a strategic vacuum
in the subregion and made the islands more vulnerable to external
subversion. Since the 1960s, Cuba and the Soviet Union, in growing
competition with the United States, have attempted to fill this
vacuum, albeit in an incremental way in order to avoid provoking a
United States response.
As German submarines demonstrated during World War II, the
geography of the Caribbean Sea region is ideal for interdiction of
the vital sea-lanes on which much American and world trade depend.
Efforts by the United States to reinforce and resupply European
allies in time of war also would be dependent on these Caribbean
lifelines. Cuba and the Soviet Union have developed the military
capabilities to interdict shipping on the Caribbean sea-lanes and
control vital "choke points" among the numerous passages and
straits in the region, as well as the Panama Canal. The Soviet
Union and Cuba nearly gained a foothold in Grenada in the early
1980s, but the landing on the island of combined United StatesCaribbean forces on October 25, 1983, dealt their strategic plans
for the Eastern Caribbean a major setback. The swift military
action by the United States, which contrasted markedly with
Britain's hesitation, enhanced United States influence in the
Commonwealth Caribbean and appeared to confirm regional perceptions
that the United States was assuming responsibilities once held by
the British.
For the Commonwealth Caribbean islands, regional security
issues are of much greater concern than strategic affairs. The
English-speaking islands of the Eastern Caribbean became
increasingly interested in a regional security arrangement
following the 1979 coup in Grenada by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel
Movement (NJM), a self-described pro-Cuban Marxist-Leninist party,
and several incidents involving mercenary or other subversive
activities in the region. In October 1982, five Eastern Caribbean
states--Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines--signed a memorandum of understanding
creating a Regional Security System (RSS). Nevertheless, in the
late 1980s the English-speaking Caribbean remained a highly
vulnerable area guarded mainly by police. This subregion continued
to have one of the highest concentrations of pro-Western democratic
governments in the world, and it looked primarily to the United
States, not Britain, for economic, military, and other security
assistance.
Data as of November 1987
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