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Caribbean Islands The Cuban Presence
In an effort to break out of its isolation and expand its
influence in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba began a diplomatic and
propaganda offensive in the early 1970s that included the
Commonwealth Caribbean. Despite their concerns over Cuban
subversive activities, as well as growing Soviet-Cuban ties and
Cuba's intervention in Angola, the four newly independent
Commonwealth Caribbean states--Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago--defied both the United States and the
Organization of American States and established relations with Cuba
in December 1972. Cuba subsequently established technical and
commercial exchanges with Guyana and even closer ties with the
Michael Manley government in Jamaica. Cuba's relations with the
Manley government helped provide the Castro regime with the
diplomatic support that it sought in Third World forums. The Manley
and Castro governments became increasingly active in the Nonaligned
Movement and were outspoken on Third World issues; both signed
numerous agreements during the decade. Cuba also opened diplomatic
ties with the Bahamas in 1976 but failed to make any further
diplomatic advances in the Commonwealth Caribbean until Maurice
Bishop seized power in Grenada in 1979.
Cuba's political offensive made use of Cuban cultural exports
and "solidarity brigades" of teachers, doctors, engineers, and
advisers to local political groups. Unable to serve as a
development model, however, Cuba provided only revolutionary
legitimacy and the means for seizing power. By the late 1970s, the
Commonwealth Caribbean islands, particularly Jamaica, were clearly
a principal focus of Cuban subversive efforts in the region (see
Regional Security Threats, 1970-81, this ch.).
In addition to being concerned by Cuba's subversive activities
in the Caribbean region and its close ties with Jamaica in the
1970s, the United States became increasingly concerned by Cuba's
growing military capabilities. American military analysts noted
that these capabilities posed potential threats not only to the
Commonwealth Caribbean islands but also to the Caribbean sea-lanes.
Furthermore, Cuba developed a growing capability in the 1980s to
carry out amphibious operations against the Eastern Caribbean
ministates. The Cuban navy's acquisition in 1982 of two Polnocnyclass amphibious landing ships from the Soviet Union, in addition
to its smaller amphibious craft, gave Cuba the capability to place
an initial assault force of about 1,000 soldiers, with either tanks
or artillery support, on nearby island nations. In its 1986
Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces, the United States
Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that the Cuban air force and
civil air fleet could land a force of 15,000 to 25,000 combat
soldiers anywhere in the Caribbean Basin region within 2 to 3 weeks
and have important elements in place within a few hours. Cuban
merchant marine and fishing vessels also could transport personnel
to any country in the Caribbean. The former has engaged in
extensive training exercises for that very purpose. The United
States is the only regional power with the means to repel such
attacks.
Writing about choke-point warfare and interdiction in the Gulf
of Mexico and the Caribbean in 1887, Mahan stated that strategy was
a study of positions and that positions should be considered for
both their military and their commercial value. After a study of
the passages, islands, and harbors of Cuba, he concluded that the
island not only was an exemplary haven for submarines and torpedo
boats but also held the key to the entire Caribbean Basin. By the
mid-1980s, Cuba had the military capabilities to interdict vital
sea-lanes in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico and to control key
passages. Cuba's strategic location between the Yucatán Channel and
the Straits of Florida places the island in an excellent blocking
position.
With extensive funds, equipment, and advice provided by the
Soviet Union between 1978 and 1982, Cuba has built a modern air
force, navy, and army with offensive interdiction capabilities. The
Cuban air force's inventory of over 200 Soviet jet fighter-bombers
and interceptors in the mid-1980s far surpassed the other air
forces in the Caribbean Basin region. Nevertheless, Cuba's three
squadrons of MiG-23s, with their 520-nautical-mile (964-kilometer)
range, were capable of striking only three Commonwealth Caribbean
members--Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos Islands--as
well as Hispaniola (the island containing Haiti and the Dominican
Republic) and part of the Florida peninsula. The fact that all of
the Eastern Caribbean islands and Venezuela are outside this range
may help to explain why the 3,048-meter Point Salines runway in
Grenada would have been of strategic value to the Cubans and
Soviets.
The Cuban navy also posed a significant potential threat to
sea-lanes in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. As a result of the
acquisition of two Koni-class submarine warfare frigates in the
early 1980s, the Cuban navy developed an ocean antiship capability
for the first time. Cuba demonstrated its ability to project an
offensive operation into the Caribbean in a May 1983 exercise. The
Cuban antiship capability also included three Foxtrot-class diesel
submarines and two highly capable kinds of missile patrol boats:
Styx missile-equipped Osa-I- and Osa-II-class torpedo hydrofoils.
These warships enabled the navy to conduct operations throughout
the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico and, to a limited degree, in the
Atlantic. The Cuban navy probably would use its Foxtrot-class
submarines and missile attack boats as the primary means of
disrupting the sea-lanes. These craft would be supported both by
the Koni-class frigates and by the land-based aircraft of the Cuban
air force. The navy's interdiction efforts could be augmented by
vessels of the merchant and fishing fleets, which could deploy sea
mines in the sea-lanes. The use of Cuba to support Soviet naval
units was demonstrated in early October 1986 when a Cuban ship went
to the rescue of a Soviet Yankee-class nuclear submarine that
caught fire in the Atlantic and sank before it could be towed to
Cuba.
Data as of November 1987
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