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Ethiopia Manpower Considerations
Although volunteers made up a large part of the regular
army, the government had to rely increasingly on conscripts
to fill the lower ranks. In mid-1991 approximately 6 million
Ethiopian males aged eighteen to thirty-two were eligible
for military service. This number constituted an adequate
source of personnel for the country's defense needs and in
fact was more than the country could support logistically or
train effectively.
Under the National Military Service Proclamation of May
1983, all Ethiopians aged eighteen to thirty were required
to undergo six months' military training followed by two
years' active service and assignment to reserve status until
age fifty. In reality, the national call-up, which was
administered by regional military commissars, was selective
rather than universal. According to the conscription law,
each peasant association or kebele was required to forward
lists of eligible recruits to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs military commissariat. The ministry then would issue
call-up orders, after which the peasant associations were
required to ensure that conscripts reported for duty.
The first two national call-ups occurred in May 1984 and
January 1985. Each raised about 60,000 recruits. The armed
forces used the first group mainly for back-up duties and
the second for duty in Eritrea. The EPLF captured many
soldiers belonging to the second group around the Nakfa
front. The third national call-up, which sought to recruit
120,000 men, took place in December 1985. Growing public
disaffection with the wars in northern Ethiopia manifested
itself in popular resistance to the call-up. Many young men
moved in with relatives outside the kebeles where they were
registered. To prevent desertions, the government sent
conscripts from Addis Ababa to training camps in outlying
regions such as Kefa and Welega and transported Eritrean and
Tigrayan recruits by air to Addis Ababa.
After the November 1986 national call-up, which also
prompted widespread opposition, the Mengistu regime
increasingly had to resort to force to satisfy military
manpower requirements. In mid-1989, for example, armed press
gangs often roamed the streets of Addis Ababa and other
major cities looking for males as young as thirteen years
old, or they held families at the local kebele office and
then inducted their sons when family members went to the
authorities to report their relatives missing. Parents who
could afford to do so sent their sons abroad or to remote
areas in Ethiopia where chances of escaping the call-up were
greater.
A number of debilitating conditions, such as dietary
deficiencies, endemic diseases, and illiteracy, often
affected the quality of the available manpower. Despite
these factors, the average soldier, with proper training and
guidance, appeared capable of using modern equipment.
The ratio of officers to enlisted personnel was
approximately one to twenty. Officers generally were
committed to active service until they retired or were
released from duty because of incapacity. Retirement
benefits were modest, but officers received many
perquisites, particularly in housing and transportation.
At the time of the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, a
generational cleavage existed between older, conservative
field-grade officers and younger, better-trained, and
increasingly radical officers who had joined the military in
the 1950s and 1960s. Another factor in these differences was
the variety of countries in which Ethiopian officers had
been trained. By 1989 this problem had diminished, as an
increasing number of officers had the shared experience of
being trained by Soviet, East German, or Cuban military
advisers. However, opposition to Mengistu and the wars in
northern Ethiopia continued to cause cleavages throughout
the armed forces.
The officer corps was composed largely of volunteers and
included many who had risen from the enlisted ranks. Since
the early 1950s, however, a significant proportion of
officer candidates had been conscripted into military
service for life (or until retired or physically
incapacitated) from the upper levels of secondary school
graduating classes and from among the most promising firstyear university students. Not all of those selected in this
manner were suited for military life, and many resented not
being allowed to pursue civilian careers. Prior to 1974, an
estimated 10 percent of all Ethiopians educated beyond
secondary school level were members of the armed forces.
The officers who were among the Derg's original members
came largely from the junior-grade ranks. Although many
subsequently received promotions to mid-level grades, rank
alone did not necessarily indicate an officer's importance.
Many lieutenants and captains, for example, received
assignments to important government posts. Mengistu himself
became a lieutenant colonel only in 1976. In early 1977, be
became chairman of the Derg. Starting with Revolution Day
1979, however, he was referred to as "commander in chief."
When he appeared in uniform as commander in chief, he wore
shoulder insignia identical to those worn by field marshals
of the old imperial army.
Up-to-date official information on the ethnic composition
of the officer corps was not available in mid-1991. However,
in the early 1970s about 65 percent of officers at the rank
of lieutenant colonel and above were Amhara, whereas 20
percent were Oromo, the latter proportion having nearly
doubled during the previous decade. Below lieutenant
colonel, the percentage who were Amhara was 60 percent,
while 30 percent were Oromo. Estimates published in the late
1970s suggested that 50 percent of the officer corps was
Amhara, 20 percent Tigray, and 30 percent Oromo and Eritrean
(see
Ethiopia's Peoples, ch. 2).
Many enlisted personnel had joined the military because it
offered steady, well-paid employment, service-connected
benefits, and the opportunity for advancement. Others
enlisted because they could not find suitable work in the
cities. Basic pay for the lowest-ranking personnel in the
armed forces equaled that of an experienced skilled worker
in industry. In the late 1970s, the ethnic composition of
the enlisted ranks in the army was about 33 percent Amhara,
33 percent Oromo, and 25 percent Tigray, with the remainder
coming from other groups. The proportion of Eritreans
serving in the air force and navy was greater than in the
army, the result of better access to higher education, which
made Eritreans more suited for technical training.
Data as of 1991
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