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Ethiopia Soviet Union
In 1976, after receiving Moscow's assurance of military
assistance, Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate, vice chairman
of the Derg, announced that Ethiopia would restrict its
future purchases to "socialist countries." By the time
Somali forces captured Jijiga in September 1977, Moscow
already had decided to supply military assistance to the
Mengistu regime.
Within three months of this decision, the Soviet Union had
initiated a massive arms transfer program. Approximately
fifty Soviet ships had passed through the Suez Canal on the
way to the port of Aseb to unload crated fighter aircraft,
tanks, artillery, and munitions--an estimated 60,000 tons of
hardware--for delivery to the Ogaden front. Moscow shipped
additional equipment from the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen (South Yemen). At the height of the buildup,
between November 1977 and February 1978, Soviet transport
aircraft, including giant An-22s, landed at twenty-five-
minute intervals at Ethiopian airports. An estimated 225
transports--about 15 percent of the Soviet air fleet--
participated in the operation.
The 1977-78 Soviet supply operation impressed Western
observers, who admitted that the display of Soviet transport
capability had added a "new strategic element" to the EastWest balance. The Soviet Union drew on large stockpiles of
equipment created by high production levels. Soviet aid--
which included eighty aircraft, 600 tanks, and 300 APCs--had
an estimated value of US$1 billion, surpassing in a matter
of months the total value of United States aid provided to
Ethiopia between 1953 and 1977. One-fourth of the Soviet
assistance was a gift; reportedly, the Libyan government
financed a small portion.
In November 1978, a few months after the end of the Ogaden
War, Addis Ababa and Moscow signed a twenty-year Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation. Among other things, the treaty
called for close military cooperation. With the promise of
future arms deliveries, the Mengistu regime continued to
pursue military victory against Eritrean and Tigrayan
separatists in northern Ethiopia. In July 1979, for example,
the Soviet Union underwrote Ethiopia's fifth offensive
against Eritrea by shipping military hardware to Ethiopian
army garrisons at Mersa Teklay and Asmera. Moreover, Soviet
officers reportedly commanded Ethiopian field units.
However, like the four earlier ones between 1974 and 1978,
this offensive failed to bring rebel areas under government
control.
By mid-1980 Ethiopia's military and economic debt to the
Soviet Union had grown dramatically. The total value to be
repaid was US$1.7 billion, to be spread over ten years
beginning in 1984, with 2 percent interest to be paid
concurrently on the principal. In addition, Ethiopia agreed
to repay a US$300 million commercial debt to the Soviet
Union for items such as trucks and cranes. Addis Ababa met
these obligations by sending coffee to the Soviet Union and
by making foreign-exchange payments from export earnings
elsewhere.
Throughout the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union's military
commitment to Ethiopia continued to grow, despite Moscow's
purported encouragement of a political settlement of the
Eritrean problem. In 1982, for example, Moscow provided
about US$2 billion worth of weapons to support Ethiopia's
various Red Star campaigns in Eritrea. The Red Star
campaigns were planned jointly by Soviet military advisers
and their Ethiopian counterparts. Although the 1982 campaign
failed to produce a military victory in Eritrea, the Soviet
Union remained committed to the Mengistu regime. By 1984
Moscow had provided more than US$4 billion in military
assistance to Ethiopia, with arms deliveries in 1984 (worth
approximately US$1.2 billion) at their highest level since
the Ogaden War. The number of Soviet and East European
military advisers in Ethiopia also grew from about 1,900 in
1981 to approximately 2,600 in 1984. Additionally, by 1984
more than 1,600 Ethiopian military personnel had received
training in the Soviet Union.
After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, Soviet
policy toward Ethiopia underwent a fundamental change. The
value of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union and its East
European allies declined to US$774 million in 1985 and to
US$292 million in 1986. The number of Soviet military
advisers in Ethiopia also declined, to about 1,400 in 1988,
although it returned to normal levels of approximately 1,700
in 1989.
More important, Gorbachev told Mengistu during a July 26,
1988, meeting in Moscow that the Soviet Union was unwilling
to increase military assistance to Ethiopia. Instead, the
Soviet leader encouraged a "just solution" to the disputes
in northern Ethiopia. In subsequent meetings between Soviet
and Ethiopian officials, Moscow refused Addis Ababa's
request to reschedule its debt and declined to indicate
whether it would conclude another arms agreement after the
one in force in 1989 expired in 1991.
As further evidence of the Soviet Union's interest in a
negotiated settlement of the Eritrean issue, in early July
1989 Yuri Yukalov, director of the African department at the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with Issaias
Afwerki, secretary general of the EPLF, to discuss
Ethiopia's future. Additionally, the Soviet Union expressed
support for the peace talks taking place in 1989 between the
Ethiopian government and the EPLF and TPLF.
Throughout 1990 Moscow continued to reduce its military
commitment to Addis Ababa. In March 1990, for example, the
Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its military
advisers from all combat zones. Despite Ethiopia's growing
need for helicopters and other counterinsurgency equipment,
Moscow refused to conclude any new weapons contracts with
the Mengistu regime. It should be pointed out, however, that
the Soviet Union honored all commitments set forth in the
military assistance agreement, which was to expire at the
beginning of 1991.
Data as of 1991
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