Finland WORLD WAR II, 1939-45
For most of Finland's history, the country had lived on
the
periphery of world events, but for a few weeks during the
winter
of 1939-40, Finland stood at the center of the world
stage.
Finland's stand against Soviet aggression aroused the
world's
admiration. The Winter War, however, proved to be only a
curtain-
raiser for Finland's growing entanglement in World War II.
The Winter War
Finnish machine gunners during the Winter War (1939-40)
Courtesy Embassy of Finland, Washington
Unavailable
Figure 7. Finland, Adjustments to the Frontier, 1940-1944
Source: Based on information from Anthony F. Upton, Finland in Crisis,
1940-41: A Study in Small-Power Politics, London, 1964, 22; and D. G. Kirby,
Finland in the Twentieth Century, Minneapolis, 1979, x.
The underlying cause of the Winter War was Soviet
concern
about Nazi Germany's expansionism. With a population of
only 3.5
million, Finland itself was not a threat to the Soviet
Union, but
its territory, located strategically near Leningrad, could
be
used as a base by the Germans. The Soviets initiated
negotiations
with Finland that ran intermittently from the spring of
1938 to
the summer of 1939, but nothing was achieved. Finnish
assurances
that the country would never allow German violations of
its
neutrality were not accepted by the Soviets, who asked for
more
concrete guarantees. In particular, the Soviets sought a
base on
the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, from which they
could
block the Gulf of Finland from hostile naval forces. The
Finnish
government, however, felt that accepting these terms would
only
lead to further, increasingly unreasonable, demands.
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, by
bringing together these former archenemies, revolutionized
European politics. The secret protocol of the pact gave
the
Soviet Union a sphere of influence that included Finland,
the
Baltic states, and parts of Eastern Europe. When the
Germans won
a stunningly quick victory over Poland in September 1939,
the
Soviets hastened to take control in their sphere of
influence. In
addition to the land taken from Poland in September, the
Soviets
quickly turned the three Baltic states into
quasi-protectorates.
Finland followed these events closely; thus, when, on
October 5,
the Soviets invited Finland to discuss "concrete political
questions," the Finns felt that they were next on the
Soviets'
agenda. Finland's first reaction was to mobilize its field
army
on October 6, and on October 10 Finland's reservists were
called
up in what amounted to a general mobilization. The
following day
the two countries began negotiations that were to last
until
November 8.
In the negotiations, the main Soviet demand was that
the
Finns cede small parcels of territory, including a naval
base on
the Gulf of Finland that the Soviets wanted to help them
protect
Leningrad. In exchange, the Soviets offered to cede to
Finland
about 8,800 square kilometers of Karelia along the Finnish
border, or about twice the amount of land to be ceded by
Finland.
Unlike the previous negotiations, these talks were
conducted in
the public eye, and the Finnish people, like the
government, were
almost unanimous in rejecting the Soviet proposals. The
ostensible reasons for Finland's refusal were to protect
its
neutral status and to preserve its territorial integrity.
In
addition, moving the Finnish border on the Karelian
Isthmus away
from Leningrad would have given the Soviets possession of
much of
the line of Finnish fortifications, the loss of which
would have
weakened Finland's defenses. Underlying the hardline
Finnish
negotiating position were a basic mistrust of the Soviets
and a
feeling that the Soviet offer was merely a first step in
subjugating Finland. In this suspicion of an ulterior
motive, the
Finns were matched by the Soviets, who believed that
Finland
would willingly assist Germany in a future war.
The Finnish government appears to have underestimated
the
Soviet determination to achieve these national security
goals.
The two main Finnish negotiators, Vainö Tanner and Juho
Paasikivi, vainly urged the Finnish government to make
more
concessions, because they realized that Finland was
completely
isolated diplomatically and could expect no support from
any
quarter if events led to war. General Mannerheim also
urged
conciliating the Soviets, because Finland by itself could
not
fight the Soviet Union. When he was ignored, he resigned
from the
Defense Council and as commander-in-chief, saying that he
could
no longer be responsible for events. Mannerheim withdrew
his
resignation when war broke out, however, and served ably
as the
Finnish military leader. Some historians suggest that the
war
could have been prevented by timely Finnish concessions.
It
appears that both sides proceeded from a basic mistrust of
the
other that was compounded by mutual miscalculations and by
the
willingness to risk war.
The Soviets attacked on November 30, 1939, without a
declaration of war. The Soviet preparations for the
offensive
were not especially thorough, in part because they
underestimated
the Finnish capabilities for resistance, and in part
because they
believed that the Finnish workers would welcome the
Soviets as
liberators. However, almost no Finns supported the Soviet
puppet
government under the veteran communist Otto Kuusinen. In
addition, in one of its last significant acts, the League
of
Nations expelled the Soviet Union because of its
unprovoked
aggression against Finland.
The task facing the Finnish armed forces, to obstruct a
vastly larger enemy along a boundary of about 1,300
kilometers,
appeared impossible. Geography aided the Finns, however,
because
much of the northern area was a virtually impassable
wilderness
containing a few, easily-blocked roads, and Finland
generally
presented difficult terrain on which to conduct offensive
operations. Thus the Finns were able to use only light
covering
forces in the north and to concentrate most troops in the
crucial
southeastern sector, comprising the Karelian Isthmus and
the area
north of Lake Ladoga, that protected the isthmus from rear
assault. The position on the isthmus was strengthened
considerably by the Mannerheim Line. An additional Finnish
advantage lay in the Finns' unorthodox military doctrine.
They
were trained in the use of small, mobile forces to strike
at the
flanks and the rear of road-bound enemies. By means of the
so-
call motti tactic (the name is taken from the
Finnish word
for a cord of firewood), they sought to break invading
columns
into small segments, which were then destroyed piecemeal.
The
final advantage of the Finns was their phenomenally high
morale;
they knew they were fighting for their national survival.
Finland's main disadvantage lay in the glaring,
fifty-to-one
disparity between its population and that of the Soviet
Union.
The Finnish hope was to hold out until help could arrive
from the
West, a forlorn hope as events turned out.
Most observers expected an easy Soviet victory. The
Soviets
simply advanced all along the front with overwhelming
forces,
apparently intending to occupy all of Finland. Thanks to
the
foresight the Soviets had shown in previous years by
constructing
bases and railroads near the Finnish border, they were
able to
commit much larger forces than the Finns had anticipated.
The
main Soviet assault on the Mannerheim Line was stopped,
though,
in December 1939. Farther north along the line, the Finns
were
able to employ their motti tactics with surprising
effectiveness. At the most famous of these engagements,
the
Battle of Suomussalmi, two Soviet divisions were virtually
annihilated. By the end of December 1939, the Finns had
dealt the
Soviets a series of humiliating defeats. For a few weeks,
the
popular imagination of the outside world was captured by
the
exploits of the white-clad Finnish ski troops gliding
ghostlike
through the dark winter forests, and in general by the
brave
resistance of the "land of heroes."
The Soviet invasion brought the Finns together as never
before. In an act that only a few years before would have
been
unthinkable, on Christmas Eve in December 1939,
middle-class
Finns placed lighted candles on the graves of Finnish Red
Guards
who had died in the civil war. The magnificent courage
displayed
by Finnish soldiers of all political persuasions during
the
Winter War of 1939-40 led Mannerheim to declare afterwards
that
May 16 would no longer be celebrated, but that another day
would
be chosen to commemorate "those on both sides who gave
their
lives on behalf of their political convictions during the
period
of crisis in 1918."
The defeats and the humiliations suffered by the Soviet
Union
made it even more determined to win the struggle. The
military
command was reorganized, and it was placed under General
S. K.
Timoshenko. The Soviets made intensive preparations for a
new
offensive, assembling masses of tanks, artillery, and
first-class
troops. On February 1, 1940, the Soviet offensive began,
and this
time it was confined to the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet
tactics were
simple: powerful artillery bombardments were followed by
repeated
frontal assaults, using masses of tanks and infantry. The
Finnish
defenders were worn down by the continual attacks, the
artillery
and the aerial bombardments, the cold, and the lack of
relief and
of replacements. On February 11, 1940, the Soviets
achieved a
breakthrough in the Mannerheim Line that led to a series
of
Finnish retreats. By early March, the Finnish army was on
the
verge of total collapse. Finland was saved only by
agreeing
quickly to Soviet terms, which were encompassed in the
Peace of
Moscow, signed on March 13, 1940.
By the terms of the Peace of Moscow, Finland ceded
substantial territories: land along the southeastern
border
approximately to the line drawn by the Peace of
Uusikaupunki in
1721, including Finland's second-largest city, Viipuri;
the
islands in the Gulf of Finland that were the object of the
negotiations in 1938-39; land in the Salla sector in
northeastern
Finland (near the Murmansk Railroad); Finland's share of
the
Rybachiy Peninsula in the Petsamo area; and the naval base
at
Hanko on the Gulf of Finland, which was leased for thirty
years.
The ceded territories contained about one-eighth of
Finland's
population; virtually all of the inhabitants moved over to
Finnish territory, thereby losing their homes and
livelihoods
(see
fig. 7).
Finland's losses in the war were about 25,000 dead,
10,000
permanently disabled, and another 35,000 wounded, out of a
population of only 3.5 million. Estimates of Soviet losses
vary
greatly. A subsequent Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev,
estimated
in his memoirs that the Soviet losses were about one
million men.
In addition, the Soviets lost much of their military
credibility.
Foreigners had observed keenly the performance of the Red
Army in
Finland, with the result that the military capabilities of
the
Soviet Union were widely discounted. Four months after the
conclusion of the Winter War, Adolf Hitler decided to
invade the
Soviet Union, an event that historians generally consider
a
turning point of World War II.
It is true that the Red Army had performed badly in
Finland,
but there had been some extenuating circumstances. The
winter of
1939 to 1940 was one of the coldest winters of the
century, and
the Soviet troops were not trained for action under Arctic
conditions. The Soviet officer corps had been decimated by
the
purges of the 1930s, and the officers were intimidated by
the
presence of political commissars within their units. There
was,
especially in the first phase of the fighting, poor
coordination
of the various arms (infantry, artillery, armor,
aircraft), and
there were deficiencies in preparation and in
intelligence. In
the year following the Winter War, the Soviets worked hard
at
correcting their weaknesses, with the result that in 1941
the Red
Army was a much more effective military machine.
Data as of December 1988
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