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Ghana The National Redemption Council Years, 1972-79
Despite its short existence, the Second Republic was
significant in that the development problems the nation faced came
clearly into focus. These included uneven distribution of
investment funds and favoritism toward certain groups and regions.
Furthermore, important questions about developmental priorities
emerged. For example, was rural development more important than the
needs of the urban population? Or, to what extent was the
government to incur the cost of university education? And more
important, was the public to be drawn into the debate about the
nation's future? The impact of the fall of Ghana's Second Republic
cast a shadow across the nation's political future because no clear
answers to these problems emerged.
According to one writer, the overthrow of the PP government
revealed that Ghana was no longer the pace-setter in Africa's
search for workable political institutions. Both the radical left
and the conservative right had failed. In opposing Nkrumah's one-
party state, Busia allegedly argued that socialist rule in Ghana
had led to unemployment and poverty for many while party officials
grew richer at the expense of the masses. But in justifying the
one-party state, Nkrumah pointed to the weaknesses of multiparty
parliamentary democracy, a system that delayed decision-making
processes and, therefore, the ability to take action to foster
development. The fall of both the Nkrumah and the Busia regimes
seemed to have confused many with regard to the political direction
the nation needed to take. In other words, in the first few years
after the Nkrumah administration, Ghanaians were unable to arrive
at a consensus on the type of government suited to address their
national problems.
It was this situation--the inability of the PP government to
satisfy diverse interest groups--that ostensibly gave Acheampong an
excuse for the January 13 takeover. Acheampong's National
Redemption Council (NRC) claimed that it had to act to remove the
ill effects of the currency devaluation of the previous government
and thereby, at least in the short run, to improve living
conditions for individual Ghanaians. Under the circumstances, the
NRC was compelled to take immediate measures. Although committed to
the reversal of the fiscal policies of the PP government, the NRC,
by comparison, adopted policies that appeared painless and,
therefore, popular. But unlike the coup leaders of the NLC, members
of the NRC did not outline any plan for the return of the nation to
democratic rule. Some observers accused the NRC of acting simply to
rectify their own grievances. To justify their takeover, coup
leaders leveled charges of corruption against Busia and his
ministers. In its first years, the NRC drew support from a public
pleased by the reversal of Busia's austerity measures. The Ghanaian
currency was revalued upward, and two moves were announced to
lessen the burden of existing foreign debts: the repudiation of
US$90 million of Nkrumah's debts to British companies, and the
unilateral rescheduling of the rest of the country's debts for
payment over fifty years. Later, the NRC nationalized all large
foreign-owned companies. But these measures, while instantly
popular in the streets, did nothing to solve the country's real
problems. If anything, they aggravated the problem of capital flow.
Unlike the NLC of 1966, the NRC sought to create a truly
military government; hence, in October 1975, the ruling council was
reorganized into the Supreme Military Council (SMC), and its
membership was restricted to a few senior military officers. The
intent was to consolidate the military's hold over government
administration and to address occasional disagreements, conflicts,
and suspicions within the armed forces, which by now had emerged as
the constituency of the military government. Little input from the
civilian sector was allowed, and no offers were made to return any
part of the government to civilian control during the SMC's first
five years in power. SMC members believed that the country's
problems were caused by a lack of organization, which could be
remedied by applying military organization and thinking. This was
the extent of the SMC philosophy. Officers were put in charge of
all ministries and state enterprises; junior officers and sergeants
were assigned leadership roles down to the local level in every
government department and parastatal organization.
During the NRC's early years, these administrative changes led
many Ghanaians to hope that the soldiers in command would improve
the efficiency of the country's bloated bureaucracies. Acheampong's
popularity continued into 1974 as the government successfully
negotiated international loan agreements and rescheduled Ghana's
debts. The government also provided price supports for basic food
imports, while seeking to encourage Ghanaians to become self-
reliant in agriculture and the production of raw materials. In the
Operation Feed Yourself program, all Ghanians were encouraged to
undertake some form of food production, with the goal of eventual
food self-sufficiency for the country. The program enjoyed some
initial success, but support for it gradually waned.
Whatever limited success the NRC had in these efforts, however,
was overridden by other basic economic factors. Industry and
transportation suffered greatly as world oil prices rose during and
after 1974, and the lack of foreign exchange and credit left the
country without fuel. Basic food production continued to decline
even as the population grew, largely because of poor price
management and urbanization. When world cocoa prices rose again in
the late 1970s, Ghana was unable to take advantage of the price
rise because of the low productivity of its old orchards. Moreover,
because of the low prices paid to cocoa farmers, some growers along
the nation's borders smuggled their produce to Togo or Côte
d'Ivoire. Disillusionment with the government grew, particularly
among the educated. Accusations of personal corruption among the
rulers also began to surface.
The reorganization of the NRC into the SMC in 1975 may have
been part of a face-saving attempt. Shortly after that time, the
government sought to stifle opposition by issuing a decree
forbidding the propagation of rumors and by banning a number of
independent newspapers and detaining their journalists. Also, armed
soldiers broke up student demonstrations, and the government
repeatedly closed the universities, which had become important
centers of opposition to NRC policies.
Despite these efforts, the SMC by 1977 found itself constrained
by mounting nonviolent opposition. To be sure, discussions about
the nation's political future and its relationship to the SMC had
begun in earnest. Although the various opposition groups
(university students, lawyers, and other organized civilian groups)
called for a return to civilian constitutional rule, Acheampong and
the SMC favored a union government--a mixture of elected civilian
and appointed military leaders--but one in which party politics
would be abolished. University students and many intellectuals
criticized the union government idea, but others, such as Justice
Gustav Koranteng-Addow, who chaired the seventeen-member ad hoc
committee appointed by the government to work out details of the
plan, defended it as the solution to the nation's political
problems. Supporters of the union government idea viewed multiparty
political contests as the perpetrators of social tension and
community conflict among classes, regions, and ethnic groups.
Unionists argued that their plan had the potential to depoliticize
public life and to allow the nation to concentrate its energies on
economic problems.
A national referendum was held in March 1978 to allow the
people to accept or reject the union government concept. A
rejection of the union government meant a continuation of military
rule. Given this choice, it was surprising that so narrow a margin
voted in favor of union government. Opponents of the idea organized
demonstrations against the government, arguing that the referendum
vote had not been free or fair. The Acheampong government reacted
by banning several organizations and by jailing as many as 300 of
its opponents.
The agenda for change in the union government referendum called
for the drafting of a new constitution by an SMC-appointed
commission, the selection of a constituent assembly by November
1978, and general elections in June 1979. The ad hoc committee had
recommended a nonparty election, an elected executive president,
and a cabinet whose members would be drawn from outside a single-
house National Assembly. The military council would then step down,
although its members could run for office as individuals.
In July 1978, in a sudden move, the other SMC officers forced
Acheampong to resign, replacing him with Lieutenant General
Frederick W.K. Akuffo. The SMC apparently acted in response to
continuing pressure to find a solution to the country's economic
dilemma. Inflation was estimated to be as high as 300 percent that
year. There were shortages of basic commodities, and cocoa
production fell to half its 1964 peak. The council was also
motivated by Acheampong's failure to dampen rising political
pressure for changes. Akuffo, the new SMC chairman, promised
publicly to hand over political power to a new government to be
elected by July 1, 1979.
Despite Akuffo's assurances, opposition to the SMC persisted.
The call for the formation of political parties intensified. In an
effort to gain support in the face of continuing strikes over
economic and political issues, the Akuffo government at length
announced that the formation of political parties would be allowed
after January 1979. Akuffo also granted amnesty to former members
of both Nkrumah's CPP and Busia's PP, as well as to all those
convicted of subversion under Acheampong. The decree lifting the
ban on party politics went into effect on January 1, 1979, as
planned. The constitutional assembly that had been working on a new
constitution presented an approved draft and adjourned in May. All
appeared set for a new attempt at constitutional government in
July, when a group of young army officers overthrew the SMC
government in June 1979.
Data as of November 1994
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