|
Ghana The Second Coming of Rawlings: The First Six Years, 1982- 87
The new government that took power on December 31, 1981, was
the eighth in the fifteen years since the fall of Nkrumah. Calling
itself the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), its
membership included Rawlings as chairman, Brigadier Joseph
Nunoo-Mensah (whom Limann had dismissed as army commander), two
other officers, and three civilians. Despite its military
connections, the PNDC made it clear that it was unlike other
soldier-led governments. This was immediately proved by the
appointment of fifteen civilians to cabinet positions.
In a radio broadcast on January 5, 1982, Rawlings presented a
detailed statement explaining the factors that had necessitated
termination of the Third Republic. The PNDC chairman assured the
people that he had no intention of imposing himself on Ghanaians.
Rather, he "wanted a chance for the people, farmers, workers,
soldiers, the rich and the poor, to be part of the decision-making
process." He described the two years since the AFRC had handed over
power to a civilian government as a period of regression during
which political parties attempted to divide the people in order to
rule them. The ultimate purpose for the return of Rawlings was,
therefore, to "restore human dignity to Ghanaians." In the
chairman's words, the dedication of the PNDC to achieving its goals
was different from any the country had ever known. It was for that
reason that the takeover was not a military coup, but rather a
"holy war" that would involve the people in the transformation of
the socioeconomic structure of the society. The PNDC also served
notice to friends and foes alike that any interference in the PNDC
agenda would be "fiercely resisted."
Opposition to the PNDC administration developed nonetheless in
different sectors of the political spectrum. The most obvious
groups opposing the government were former PNP and PFP members.
They argued that the Third Republic had not been given time to
prove itself and that the PNDC administration was unconstitutional.
Further opposition came from the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), which
criticized the government's use of people's tribunals in the
administration of justice. Members of the Trade Union Congress were
also angered when the PNDC ordered them to withdraw demands for
increased wages. The National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS)
went even farther, calling on the government to hand over power to
the attorney general, who would supervise new elections.
By the end of June 1982, an attempted coup had been discovered,
and those implicated had been executed. Many who disagreed with the
PNDC administration were driven into exile, where they began
organizing their opposition. They accused the government of human
rights abuses and political intimidation, which forced the country,
especially the press, into a "culture of silence."
Meanwhile, the PNDC was subjected to the influence of
contrasting political philosophies and goals. Although the
revolutionary leaders agreed on the need for radical change, they
differed on the means of achieving it. For example, John Ndebugre,
secretary for agriculture in the PNDC government, who was later
appointed northern regional secretary (governor), belonged to the
radical Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guard, an extreme left-wing
organization that advocated a Marxist-Leninist course for the PNDC.
He was detained and jailed for most of the latter part of the
1980s. Other members of the PNDC, including Kojo Tsikata, P.V.
Obeng, and Kwesi Botchwey, were believed to be united only by their
determination either to uplift the country from its desperate
conditions or to protect themselves from vocal opposition.
In keeping with Rawlings's commitment to populism as a
political principle, the PNDC began to form governing coalitions
and institutions that would incorporate the populace at large into
the machinery of the national government. Workers' Defence
Committees (WDCs), People's Defence Committees (PDCs), Citizens'
Vetting Committees (CVCs), Regional Defence Committees (RDCs), and
National Defence Committees (NDCs) were all created to ensure that
those at the bottom of society were given the opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process. These committees were
to be involved in community projects and community decisions, and
individual members were expected to expose corruption and "anti-
social activities." Public tribunals, which were established
outside the normal legal system, were also created to try those
accused of antigovernment acts. And a four-week workshop aimed at
making these cadres morally and intellectually prepared for their
part in the revolution was completed at the University of Ghana,
Legon, in July and August 1983.
Various opposition groups criticized the PDCs and WDCs,
however. The aggressiveness of certain WDCs, it was argued,
interfered with management's ability to make the bold decisions
needed for the recovery of the national economy. In response to
such criticisms, the PNDC announced on December 1, 1984, the
dissolution of all PDCs, WDCs, and NDCs, and their replacement with
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). With regard to
public boards and statutory corporations, excluding banks and
financial institutions, Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) that
acted as advisory bodies to managing directors were created.
The public tribunals, however, despite their characterization
as undemocratic by the GBA, were maintained. Although the tribunals
had been established in 1982, the law providing for the creation of
a national public tribunal to hear and determine appeals from, and
decisions of, regional public tribunals was not passed until August
1984. Section 3 and Section 10 of the PNDC Establishment
Proclamation limited public tribunals to cases of a political and
an economic nature. The limitations placed on public tribunals by
the government in 1984 may have been an attempt by the
administration to redress certain weaknesses. The tribunals,
however, were not abolished; rather, they were defended as
"fundamental to a good legal system" that needed to be maintained
in response to "growing legal consciousness on the part of the
people."
At the time when the foundations of these sociopolitical
institutions were being laid, the PNDC was also engaged in a debate
about how to finance the reconstruction of the national economy.
The country had indeed suffered from what some described as the
excessive and unwise, if not foolish, expenditures of the Nkrumah
regime. The degree of decline under the NRC and the SMC had also
been devastating. By December 1981, when the PNDC came to power,
the inflation rate topped 200 percent, while real GDP had declined
by 3 percent per annum for seven years. Not only cocoa production
but even diamonds and timber exports had dropped dramatically. Gold
production had also fallen to half its preindependence level.
Ghana's sorry economic condition, according to the PNDC, had
resulted in part from the absence of good political leadership. In
fact, as early as the AFRC administration in 1979, Rawlings and his
associates had accused three former military leaders (generals
Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo) of corruption and greed and of
thereby contributing to the national crisis and had executed them
on the basis of this accusation. In other words, the AFRC in 1979
attributed the national crisis to internal, primarily political,
causes. The overthrow of the Limann administration by the PNDC in
1981 was an attempt to prevent another inept administration from
aggravating an already bad economic situation. By implication, the
way to resolve some of the problems was to stabilize the political
situation and to improve the economic conditions of the nation
radically.
At the end of its first year in power, the PNDC announced a
four-year program of economic austerity and sacrifice that was to
be the first phase of an Economic Recovery Program (ERP). If the
economy were to improve significantly, there was need for a large
injection of capital--a resource that could only be obtained from
international financial institutions of the West. There were those
on the PNDC's ideological left, however, who rejected consultation
with such agencies because these institutions were blamed in part
for the nation's predicament. Precisely because some members of the
government also held such views, the PNDC secretary for finance and
economic planning, Kwesi Botchwey, felt the need to justify
World Bank (see Glossary) assistance to Ghana in 1983:
It would be naive and unrealistic for certain sections of
the Ghanaian society to think that the request for
economic assistance from the World Bank and its
affiliates means a sell-out of the aims and objectives of
the Ghanaian revolution to the international community.
. . . It does not make sense for the country to become a
member of the bank and the IMF and continue to pay its
dues only to decline to utilize the resources of these
two institutions.
The PNDC recognized that it could not depend on friendly
nations such as Libya to address the economic problems of Ghana.
The magnitude of the crisis--made worse by widespread bush fires
that devastated crop production in 1983-84 and by the return of
more than one million Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria
in 1983, which had intensified the unemployment situation--called
for monetary assistance from institutions with bigger financial
chests.
Phase One of the ERP began in 1983. Its goal was economic
stability. In broad terms, the government wanted to reduce
inflation and to create confidence in the nation's ability to
recover. By 1987 progress was clearly evident. The rate of
inflation had dropped to 20 percent, and between 1983 and 1987,
Ghana's economy reportedly grew at 6 percent per year. Official
assistance from donor countries to Ghana's recovery program
averaged US$430 million in 1987, more than double that of the
preceding years. The PNDC administration also made a remarkable
payment of more than US$500 million in loan arrears dating to
before 1966. In recognition of these achievements, international
agencies had pledged more than US$575 million to the country's
future programs by May 1987. With these accomplishments in place,
the PNDC inaugurated Phase Two of the ERP, which envisioned
privatization of state-owned assets, currency devaluation, and
increased savings and investment, and which was to continue until
1990.
Notwithstanding the successes of Phase One of the ERP, many
problems remained, and both friends and foes of the PNDC were quick
to point them out. One commentator noted the high rate of Ghanaian
unemployment as a result of the belt-tightening policies of the
PNDC. In the absence of employment or redeployment policies to
redress such problems, he wrote, the effects of the austerity
programs might create circumstances that could derail the PNDC
recovery agenda.
Unemployment was only one aspect of the political problems
facing the PNDC government; another was the size and breadth of the
PNDC's political base. The PNDC initially espoused a populist
program that appealed to a wide variety of rural and urban
constituents. Even so, the PNDC was the object of significant
criticism from various groups that in one way or another called for
a return to constitutional government. Much of this criticism came
from student organizations, the GBA, and opposition groups in self-
imposed exile, who questioned the legitimacy of the military
government and its declared intention of returning the country to
constitutional rule. So vocal was the outcry against the PNDC that
it appeared on the surface as if the PNDC enjoyed little support
among those groups who had historically molded and influenced
Ghanaian public opinion. At a time when difficult policies were
being implemented, the PNDC could ill afford the continued
alienation and opposition of such prominent critics.
By the mid-1980s, therefore, it had become essential that the
PNDC demonstrate that it was actively considering steps towards
constitutionalism and civilian rule. This was true notwithstanding
the recognition of Rawlings as an honest leader and the perception
that the situation he was trying to redress was not of his
creation. To move in the desired direction, the PNDC needed to
weaken the influence and credibility of all antagonistic groups
while it created the necessary political structures that would
bring more and more Ghanaians into the process of national
reconstruction. The PNDC's solution to its dilemma was the proposal
for district assemblies.
Data as of November 1994
|
