Haiti Public Order
National Police, Port-au-Prince
Courtesy United States Agency for International Development
Although the armed forces continued to be the nation's
ultimate law-enforcement agency, they had almost no
juridical
capability. Armed forces regulations provide for a
judicial
service, however, and the 1987 Constitution indicates the
existence of a Military Court, the jurisdiction of which
is
limited to times of war or military discipline.
The 1987 Constitution presents a significant
theoretical
departure from Haiti's past. It proposes a separate police
corps
and a new police academy under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry
of Justice. Political developments in Haiti since 1987,
however,
have precluded implementation of these changes.
Nevertheless, the
mission of the police corps was almost indistinguishable
from the
mission spelled out for the FAd'H. The characterization of
the
police as a corps armée (armed corps) reinforced
this
similarity in missions.
The only identifiable police force in Haiti operated in
Portau -Prince as part of the armed forces. This 1,000-member
force
had few operational or technical capabilities, even though
it was
responsible for narcotics and immigration control and
criminal
investigations. In the late 1980s, the Narcotics Bureau,
commanded by an army major, had acquired some visibility
and
resources of its own, with a reported staff of about
twenty-five
people.
There was no true rural police. Small garrisons,
operating
under military department command, with some cooperation
from the
lowest central government administrative head, section
chief
(chef de section), were responsible for rural
security. In
effect, the heads of these 562 rural communal sections
(sections rurales communales) functioned as police
chiefs,
as adjuncts of the nation's military infrastructure. This
fusion
of civil and military administration continued to be
possible
because of the broad range of responsibilities assigned to
the
Ministry of Interior and National Defense.
After 1986 the armed forces failed to reestablish a
nationwide police force and to subdue the VSN and other
vigilante
groups. Some observers have argued that links between the
senior
army command and remnants of the VSN have paralyzed
reforms in
Haiti's judicial system. An illustration of their point
was the
reported incorporation of some VSN personnel into FAd'H
units and
some members of the VSN, as plainclothes paramilitary
agents, in
the Dessalines Battalion. Other VSN members found their
way into
cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force, particularly in
the
Criminal Investigation Unit (Recheraches
Criminelles--renamed in
1988 the Anti-Gang Investigations Bureau), which was
traditionally based at the Dessalines barracks. The demise
of the
Dessalines Battalion and the Leopards, the latter of which
had
served as Haiti's special weapons and tactics unit, raised
questions in the spring of 1989 about the future of a
national
police force.
The Avril government reported some success in cracking
down
on abuses within the security services, but violence
continued to
be a serious problem. Insecurity rose dramatically after
1986
with the formation of ad hoc paramilitary groups that had
direct
links to the VSN and indirect links to the military. Many
of
these paramilitary groups engaged in banditry with no
political
motivation. The security situation in rural regions and at
the
section chief level remained unclear in 1989.
The human-rights record of post-Duvalier governments
was
generally negative. A major problem was the inability, or
the
unwillingness, of the FAd'H to contain domestic political
violence. Government and military personnel apparently
sanctioned
and participated in attacks on politicians and other
activists,
particularly during the second Namphy government. The
Avril
government boasted an improved record in this area, but as
of
mid-1989, it had proved incapable of restoring order.
Haitian military and police often brutally interrogated
detainees. Rural section chiefs, who wielded considerable
power
within their limited jurisdictions, arbitrarily harassed
and
physically abused citizens, according to some reports. In
an
effort to address this problem, Avril dismissed a number
of
section chiefs, and issued a decree in December 1988 that
ended
appointments of section chiefs and proposed putting the
posts up
for election
(see Urban Dominance, Rural Stagnation
, ch.
9).
Harsh conditions prevailed in the prison system.
Hygiene,
food, and health care were inadequate, and prison staff
regularly
mistreated inmates. The Avril government closed two
facilities
closely associated with the repression of the Duvalier
regimes--
Fort Dimanche and the detention center of the Criminal
Investigation Unit, both in Port-au-Prince--because of the
abuses
that had commonly taken place there.
Political turmoil between 1986 and 1989 resulted in
popular
justice and mob violence. The international media reported
on
some of this violence and featured scenes of burning or
dismembered bodies. Continued human-rights violations are
likely
to attract international criticism during the 1990s.
Lasting
improvements in internal security, however, appeared
unlikely
without the establishment of functional civilian
institutions and
some resolution of the status of the former members of the
tonton makouts.
***
Serious research on Haiti's military is scarce. Part of
the
problem lies in the nation's chaotic history, which has
resulted
in the destruction of primary documentation, or has simply
made
research in the country risky or unwelcome. Much of
Haiti's
archives burned down in 1883, and in 1912 the National
Palace
blew up. Obtaining material on Haiti has been difficult.
For
example, Robert Rotberg notes that the research for
Haiti, the
Politics of Squalor was "possible only with the
personally
granted authorization of Dr. François Duvalier."
Contemporary sources on Haiti's national security are
practically nonexistent in either French or English.
Useful
information can be found in three specialized studies, one
in
French, Armée et Politique en Haïti by Kern
Delince, and
two from a British military analyst, Adrian J. English,
Armed
Forces of Latin America and Regional Defense
Portfolio,
No. 1: Latin America. There are also lively secondary
sources
that can be useful but must be read with a careful eye.
These
include Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today, by
Bernard
Diederich and Al Burt, and Haiti: The Duvaliers and
Their
Legacy, by Elizabeth Abbott.
Alternatively, the reader is directed to more scholarly
volumes that intermittently make reference to Haiti's
national
security. English sources include the monumental work by
Robert
Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written in Blood:
The Story
of the Haitian People, as well as Rotberg and
Christopher
Clague's Haiti, the Politics of Squalor. The United
States
military occupation is well covered by David Healy's
Gunboat
Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-
1916 and Hans Schmidt's The United States
Occupation of
Haiti, 1915-1934. See also the opinionated studies by
Alex
Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy, and Patrick
BellegardeSmith , Haiti, the Breached Citadel. Both of these
works
contain useful references to the military's role in
politics.
Specialized, and often politically motivated, coverage can
be
found in the occasional records from United States
Congressional
hearings on Haiti and the reports published by human
rights
organizations. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1989
|