Haiti Chapter 10. Haiti: National Security
Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis
CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER in the hands of
strongmen has
made the armed forces the institutional pillar of Haitian
society. Born of revolutionary violence and plagued by
socioeconomic deterioration, Haiti never succeeded in
building
civilian institutions capable of rivaling military rule.
Part of Haiti's history is the story of competing
mercenary
bands (cacos) and peasant groups (piquets),
who
fought a ramshackle military. The United States
occupation, after
1915, reversed the collapse of national institutions that
had
marked this part of Haiti's history. But the most visible
product
of the occupation, ironically, turned out to be the Garde
d'Haïti, which has evolved into today's armed forces, the
Haitian
Armed Forces (Forces Armées d'Haïti--FAd'H). The military
has
continued to be Haiti's only truly national organization
with any
degree of institutional cohesion.
A shrewd autocrat, François Duvalier (1957-71)
ruthlessly
suppressed all opposition groups. Duvalier purged the army
of
individuals suspected of disloyalty and brought the
remaining
soldiers under his absolute control. A powerful
paramilitary
counterbalancing organization--the Volunteers for National
Security (Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale--VSN), or
tonton makouts (bogeymen)--was created to protect
the
regime and to enforce its directives. François Duvalier's
son,
Jean-Claude Duvalier, assumed power in 1971 and
demonstrated
initial political endurance. During Jean-Claude's tenure,
a
reconstituted officer corps emerged, partly to
counterbalance the
overwhelming power of the paramilitary forces organized by
his
father.A vague strategy to modernize Haiti's economic and
political structure in the 1970s also led to a brief
upgrading of
the armed forces. Jean-Claude's regime added a tactical
unit (the
Leopard Corps), purchased new equipment for the Air Corps
(Corps
d'Aviation), reopened the Military Academy, and secured a
small
amount of military assistance from the United States. Yet
the
authoritarian, and often aimless, governance isolated the
regime
from national realities, leading to a tide of popular
discontent
between 1983 and 1985 and to the fall of the regime in
February
1986.
Under pressure from the international community,
Duvalier
fled Haiti. A hastily constructed interim junta replaced
him. The
junta was put together mostly by the armed forces, the
only
institution in a position of authority. The junta fared
badly in
its political mission, however, and the failed and flawed
elections of 1987 and 1988 reflected the military's
institutional
unraveling and its inability to control the nation. A
succession
of coups in 1988 and a serious intramilitary revolt in
early 1989
underscored the gravity of the problem.
The character of Haiti's domestic security situation
has
attracted considerable international attention. Reports of
brutal
violence and human-rights infractions have outraged many
countries and international agencies. The government's
inability-
-or unwillingness--to control paramilitary violence and a
rise in
crime since 1986 have undermined the military's
credibility. A
growing narcotics network, involving Haitian military
personnel
has also reduced the credibility of the armed forces.
Behind domestic security problems is an antiquated and
unresponsive legal system. The 1987 Constitution separates
the
functions of the police and the conventional military, but
the
FAd'H continued to be the government's primary
law-enforcement
agency. Haiti had no national police force in the late
1980s. The
armed forces handled rural security duties, and in
Port-au-
Prince, police duties were carried out by a part of the
army.
Several national political crises and budgetary
constraints have
led to a recent streamlining of FAd'H's operations and to
improvement in its administration.
Data as of December 1989
|