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Kuwait
Post-Persian Gulf War Foreign Policy
Kuwait's postwar foreign policy is therefore based on two assumptions.
The first is that security, notably with regard to Iraq, is its
primary concern. The second is that security ultimately can be
guaranteed only by the United States. It is clear that Kuwait
alone, or even Kuwait with the support of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), established in May 1981, and other Arab members
of the coalition--a formal plan, known as the Damascus Declaration,
to include Egypt and Syria in gulf defense arrangements was moribund
soon after its issuance--cannot provide for its own defense needs
(see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council ,
ch. 7). In August 1991, Kuwait and the United States signed a
US$81 million Foreign Military Sales agreement. In September 1991,
Kuwait signed a formal ten-year defense agreement with the United
States that permits the United States to pre-position weapons
and conduct military exercises in Kuwait at Kuwaiti expense. However,
the agreement does not provide for establishing a permanent United
States base there. In 1992 Kuwaiti and United States forces carried
out joint exercises under the defense agreement. Kuwait has backed
up its formal security arrangements with a close political and
economic relationship with the United States. It has given much
of its postwar reconstruction business to United States firms,
including civil reconstruction contracts that have been awarded
through the United States Army Corps of Engineers and many contracts
directly related to defense needs. The new pro-United States policy
is not without its detractors. In the summer of 1992, the speaker
of Kuwait's since-disbanded National Council asserted that the
United States ambassador was interfering in internal Kuwaiti affairs.
The Kuwaiti government and numerous Kuwaitis, however, condemned
these remarks.
Kuwait maintains similarly close ties with other members of the
coalition, signing defense agreements with Britain and in 1992
negotiating an agreement with France. It is seeking similar agreements
with the remaining Security Council permanent members, Russia
and China. It remains very close to Saudi Arabia. Relations with
a regionally resurgent Iran remain ambivalent. Kuwait's relationship
with Iran improved dramatically after the Iraqi invasion, which,
in drawing attention to Iraq's expansionist ambitions, seemingly
vindicated Iran's wartime position. An inevitable conflict remains,
however, between Kuwait's postwar aim of maintaining a high and
visible level of United States support and Iran's desire to limit
United States presence in the gulf. In mid-1992 this tension was
seen in a minor dispute over the fate of Kuwait Airways passenger
aircraft flown by Iraq to Iran during the war. Kuwait demanded
the swift return of the aircraft, whereas Iran demanded US$90
million for servicing them while they remained in Iran.
Kuwaiti policy toward states that had supported Iraq has been
unforgiving. One of the hard lessons Kuwait's rulers learned from
the Iran-Iraq War is that foreign aid does not buy popularity
or enduring political support. Some of its largest aid was to
Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen, countries that nonetheless failed to
support the coalition. Kuwait cut those countries from its foreign
aid program once sovereignty was restored. Kuwait was also a major
donor to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO's
wartime support of Iraq also resulted in severance of Kuwaiti
monetary and political support. In June 1992, the National Council
approved denying economic aid to Arab countries that supported
Iraq's invasion. Although foreign aid will continue as a feature
of Kuwait's foreign policy, Kuwait's limited postinvasion revenues
and its experience during the occupation indicate that such aid
would decrease.
Data as of January 1993
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