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Kuwait
Regional and National Security Considerations
ANY THREAT TO THE STABILITY of the Persian Gulf endangering the
region's oil flow greatly concerns the rest of the world. The
Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the opening stage in more than
a decade of upheaval. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq
in 1980, the expansion of the war to nonbelligerent shipping,
and the presence of foreign naval flotillas in the gulf followed.
When general hostilities eventually broke out, they arose from
an unexpected quarter--Iraq's sweep into Kuwait in August 1990
and the possibility of Iraqi forces continuing down the gulf coast
to seize other oil-rich Arab states. The smaller Arab regimes
volunteered use of their ports and airfields as bases for the
coalition of forces in Operation Desert Storm to defeat Iraq.
The overwhelming concentration of military power that enabled
Iraq to swallow up Kuwait underscored the vulnerability of the
territory and oil facilities of the other gulf states. To the
extent that their military resources permitted, each of the Arab
states participated in the coalition that defeated Iraq and drove
it out of Kuwait. It was clear, nonetheless, that they played
a subordinate role in the vast operation in which the United States,
Britain, and France predominated, accompanied by Egypt and Syria.
After its sharp setback, Iraq in early 1993 remained a major
regional power and a littoral state of the Persian Gulf, along
with Iran and Saudi Arabia. None of the five other Persian Gulf
littoral states--Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
or Oman--is in a position to defend its borders or territorial
waters alone. In the face of their fragility, these Persian Gulf
states continue to take measures to reinforce their individual
and collective security. Relative to size and population, they
have been among the world's most lavish spenders on the needs
of their armed forces. Nevertheless, their military potential
is limited by small manpower pools, ethnic divisions, limited
area, and little experience in the effective use of modern weaponry.
A few months after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the
six nonbelligerents--the five gulf states and Saudi Arabia-- in
1981 banded together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although
the GCC had economic, social, and political aims, its main purpose
was the creation of a defensive military alliance. The GCC leaders
feared that a decisive Iranian military victory would fuel the
drive of the radical Shia (see Glossary) Muslims of Iran to spread
their form of Islam. Concurrently, the GCC states accelerated
their individual military efforts by purchasing modern aircraft,
armored vehicles, air defense systems, and missile-armed naval
vessels.
The GCC members are determined to construct a collective self-defense
system without the direct involvement of foreign powers. For both
political and practical reasons, however, the military goals of
the GCC--standardization of equipment, coordination of training,
integration of forces, and joint planning--have been achieved
only to a limited degree. The gulf states have also been forced
to restrain their military purchases as a result of declining
oil revenues.
In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, agreement
was reached with the GCC to station Egyptian and Syrian troops
in Kuwait to ensure the military stability of the northern gulf.
By 1993, however, this plan seemed to have been abandoned. Instead,
Kuwait and most other gulf states turned to cooperation with the
West to develop a new security framework. The United States concluded
agreements to permit pre-positioning of United States equipment
for combat units, port access, and joint exercises and training.
Britain and France also negotiated military cooperation arrangements.
The effect was to spread a Western strategic umbrella over the
region without the permanent stationing of foreign forces, although
a United States and British naval presence is expected to continue.
In early 1993, more than a year after the gulf war ended, the
danger of renewed violence in the region had receded, although
no reconciliation among the antagonists had occurred. Iraq had
not fully recovered from its humiliating defeat; nevertheless,
its reduced army and air force still overshadow the combined forces
of the GCC. Iran's military strength was depleted during its eight-year
struggle with Iraq, and recovery is proceeding slowly. Although
it appears to have shifted to more moderate policies, Iran's ambition
to be a factor in regional gulf security has been treated with
suspicion.
Traditional rivalries and territorial disputes among the smaller
gulf states still linger but have steadily diminished as sources
of tension. Subversion and terrorist incidents, often linked to
Iran, have abated, as has the potential for disruption by foreign
workers manipulated by external forces. The police vigilantly
control internal dissent that can threaten the stability of the
existing regimes. Nevertheless, resistance to democratic reforms
by some members of the conservative ruling families of the gulf
increases the likelihood of future destabilization and upheaval.
Data as of January 1993
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