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Kuwait
Internal Security
Oman has not been exposed to a significant internal threat since
the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Tribal dissension,
a factor in the past, is considered unlikely to recur because
most tribal chiefs and leading families share the advantages of
rising oil income. The foreign labor force is large--estimated
at 58 percent of the working population--and most foreign workers
are Indians and Pakistanis who are not politically active. A few
observers foresee an internal power struggle over the succession
because Sultan Qabus ibn Said has no designated successor, but
others believe that the country is stable enough to avoid strife
over the selection of a new ruler.
The sultanate has not been the target of terrorist acts; it faces
few problems from the narcotics trade and considers the level
of general crime to be remarkably low. The security services are
described as large and efficient but not overly intrusive.
The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by the inspector general
of police and customs, is under the supervision of the Ministry
of Interior. The size of the force was estimated in 1992 at 7,000,
but this number is believed to include customs, immigration, civil
defense, firefighters, coast guard, and prison service. The principal
crime fighting unit is the Directorate General of Criminal Investigation.
An oil installation division has responsibility for security of
the oil industry, patrolling pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals.
The mounted division patrols border areas on horseback and camel
and also provides security control at airports and border points.
The coast guard contingent numbers 400; it is equipped with fifteen
AT-105 APCs and eighteen inshore patrol craft.
The home guard (firqat) units had been raised and trained
for irregular counterinsurgency operations by troops of the British
army's Special Air Services. Armed with small arms, firqat
units serve as tribal police and defense forces for the mountain
people engaged in herding cattle in areas infiltrated by the Dhofari
insurgents during the rebellion. After the insurgency, they remained
as paramilitary tribal police, numbering about 3,500 in 1992.
Oman's criminal court system provides for fair trials within
the framework of Islamic judicial practice. The defendant in criminal
trials is presumed innocent and cannot be detained for longer
than twenty-four hours without review of the case by a magistrate,
who may then allow the police to hold a suspect up to fourteen
days--extended if necessary up to seventy days--to carry out further
investigation. Some suits have been filed against police officers
for illegal arrest.
The accused can be represented by an attorney, but the government
does not pay for a public defender. There are no jury trials and
no right to a public trial. The judge can release the accused
on payment of bail. Only the judge questions witnesses at the
trial. The verdict and sentencing are frequently pronounced within
a day. Sentences of more than two months and more than US$1,300
in fines are subject to appeal. No executions have been carried
out since 1975 and are, in any event, subject to the sultan's
ratification. A rarely used security court system handles internal
security cases. The government can search private residences and
monitor telephones and private correspondence without warrant
but generally confines such actions to investigations of potential
security threats and individuals suspected of criminal activity.
According to the Department of State's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1991, torture, mistreatment, and
cruel punishment are not systematically practiced, nor are they
countenanced by Omani authorities. The traditional punishments
authorized by Islamic law, such as amputation and stoning, are
not imposed. The Department of State reported that some prisoners
had complained of beatings by police in 1991, and other physical
abuse had been reported in earlier years. Prison conditions are
described as harsh, with extreme temperatures in cells without
proper ventilation. However, a practice of punitive hard labor
under grueling desert conditions was discontinued in 1991.
* * *
Much of the data concerning the size and equipment of the armed
forces of the Persian Gulf states is based on The Military
Balance and on Jane's Fighting Ships. Some of the
discussion of internal security practices and judicial systems
is drawn from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1991 prepared by the United States Department of State.
Two general works, The Making of the Modern Gulf States
by Rosemarie Said Zahlan and The Turbulent Gulf by Liesl
Graz, provide background on security perceptions and problems
facing the smaller states of the gulf. Anthony H. Cordesman's
The Gulf and the West contributes details on the individual
armed forces, the military strengths and shortcomings of each
state, and each state's involvement in the naval confrontation
in the gulf in the 1980s. The Middle East, published
by the Congressional Quarterly, treats numerous topics dealing
with Persian Gulf security, including local disputes, United States
military sales, and the events leading up to the 1990-91 gulf
crisis.
Studies of the military strategy employed in Operation Desert
Storm in Desert Victory by Norman Friedman and Thunder
in the Desert by James Blackwell give limited mention to
the role played by the Persian Gulf states. Several analyses of
the geostrategic environment in the region, although dating from
the mid-1980s, still have relevance. They include Arms and
Oil by Thomas L. McNaugher and Saudi Arabia: The West
and the Security of the Gulf by Mazher A. Hameed. (For further
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Data as of January 1993
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