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Kyrgyzstan
Central Asian Neighbors
Kyrgyzstan is bordered by four nations, three of which--Kazakstan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan--are former Soviet republics. China's
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where a substantial separatist
movement has been active, also adjoins the republic. Although
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have recognized their existing borders
with Kyrgyzstan, as of 1996 Tajikistan had not done so. China
recognizes the old Soviet Union border but is said to have objections
to twelve specific points of its common border with Kyrgyzstan.
The objections have been referred to a Chinese-CIS border committee
for resolution.
Undoubtedly the most immediate concern is neighboring Uzbekistan,
which, under the leadership of President Islam Karimov, is emerging
as the strongest state in post-Soviet Central Asia. Although Uzbekistan
faces serious economic problems of its own, it has a homogeneous
and well-educated population of more than 20 million, a diversified
and developed economy, and sufficient natural resources to allow
the country to become self-sufficient in energy and a major exporter
of gold, cotton, and natural gas (see The Economy, ch. 5).
Uzbekistan has the best organized and best disciplined security
forces in all of Central Asia, as well as a relatively large and
experienced army and air force. Uzbekistan dominates southern
Kyrgyzstan both economically and politically, based on the large
Uzbek population in that region of Kyrgyzstan and on economic
and geographic conditions (see Ethnic Groups, this ch.). Much
of Kyrgyzstan depends entirely on Uzbekistan for natural gas;
on several occasions, Karimov has achieved political ends by shutting
pipelines or by adjusting terms of delivery. In a number of television
appearances broadcast in the Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces of Kyrgyzstan,
Karimov has addressed Akayev with considerable condescension;
Akayev, in turn, has been highly deferential to his much stronger
neighbor. Although Uzbekistan has not shown overt expansionist
tendencies, the Kyrgyz government is acutely aware of the implications
of Karimov's assertions that he is responsible for the well-being
of all Uzbeks, regardless of their nation of residence.
Although it presents no such expansionist threat, Kazakstan is
as important to northern Kyrgyzstan as Uzbekistan is to the south.
The virtual closure of Manas Airport at Bishkek makes Kazakstan's
capital, Almaty, the principal point of entry to Kyrgyzstan. The
northwestern city of Talas receives nearly all of its services
through the city of Dzhambyl, across the border in Kazakstan.
Although Kazakstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev has cooperated
in economic agreements, in May 1993 Kyrgyzstan's introduction
of the som caused Nazarbayev to close his country's border with
Kyrgyzstan to avoid a flood of worthless Kyrgyzstani rubles.
Kyrgyzstan's relations with Tajikistan have been tense. Refugees
and antigovernment fighters in Tajikistan have crossed into Kyrgyzstan
several times, even taking hostages. Kyrgyzstan attempted to assist
in brokering an agreement between contesting Tajikistani forces
in October 1992 but without success. Akayev later joined presidents
Karimov and Nazarbayev in sending a joint intervention force to
support Tajikistan's president Imomali Rahmonov against insurgents,
but the Kyrgyzstani parliament delayed the mission of its small
contingent for several months until late spring 1993. In mid-1995
Kyrgyzstani forces had the responsibility of sealing a small portion
of the Tajikistan border near Panj from Tajikistani rebel forces.
The greater risk to Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan is the general
destabilization that the protracted civil war has brought to the
region. In particular, the Khorugh-Osh road, the so-called "highway
above the clouds," has become a major conduit of contraband of
all sorts, including weapons and drugs (see Internal Security,
this ch.). A meeting of the heads of the state security agencies
of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan, held in
Osh in the spring of 1995, also drew the conclusion that ethnic,
social, and economic conditions in Osh were increasingly similar
to those in Tajikistan in the late 1980s, thus recognizing the
contagion of Tajikistan's instability.
Chinese-Kyrgyzstani relations are an area of substantial uncertainty
for the government in Bishkek. China has become Kyrgyzstan's largest
non-CIS trade partner, but China's influence is stronger in the
north of Kyrgyzstan than in the south. This limitation could change
if efforts to join the Karakorum Highway to Osh through Sary-Tash
are successful. The free-trade zone in Naryn has attracted large
numbers of Chinese businesspeople, who have come to dominate most
of the republic's import and export of small goods. Most of this
trade is in barter conducted by ethnic Kyrgyz or Kazaks who are
Chinese citizens. The Kyrgyzstani government has expressed alarm
over the numbers of Chinese who are moving into Naryn and other
parts of Kyrgyzstan, but no preventive measures have been taken.
The Akayev government also must be solicitous of Chinese sensibilities
on questions of nationalism because the Chinese do not want the
independence of the Central Asian states to stimulate dreams of
statehood among their own Turkic Muslim peoples. Although the
Kyrgyz in China have been historically quiescent, China's Uygurs
(of whom there is a small exile community in Kyrgyzstan) have
been militant in their desire to attain independence. This is
the major reason that Kyrgyzstan has refused to permit the formation
of an Uygur party (see Political Parties, this ch.).
In the 1990s, trade with China has grown to such a volume that
some officials in Kyrgyzstan fear that by the late 1990s Kyrgyzstan's
economy will be entirely dominated by China. In some political
quarters, the prospect of Chinese domination has stimulated nostalgia
for the days of Moscow's control.
Data as of March 1996
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