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Kyrgyzstan
Russia
In fact, whereas the other Central Asian republics have sometimes
complained of Russian interference, Kyrgyzstan has more often
wished for more attention and support from Moscow than it has
been able to obtain. For all the financial support that the world
community has offered, Kyrgyzstan remains economically dependent
on Russia, both directly and through Kazakstan. In early 1995,
Akayev attempted to sell Russian companies controlling shares
in the republic's twenty-nine largest industrial plants, an offer
that Russia refused.
Akayev has been equally enthusiastic about more direct forms
of reintegration, such as the Euro-Asian Union that Nazarbayev
proposed in June 1994. Because Kyrgyzstan presumably would receive
much more from such a union than it would contribute, Akayev's
enthusiasm has met with little response from Russia and the other,
larger states that would be involved in such an arrangement. Akayev's
invitation for Russian border guards to take charge of Kyrgyzstan's
Chinese border, a major revision of his policy of neutrality,
was another move toward reintegration (see Armed Forces, this
ch.).
The Kyrgyzstani government also has felt compelled to request
Russia's economic protection. The harsh reality of Kyrgyzstan's
economic situation means that the nation is an inevitable international
client state, at least for the foreseeable future. Despite concerted
efforts to seek international "sponsors," Akayev has not received
much more than a great deal of international good will. Even if
the president had not lived seventeen years in Russia himself
and even if his advisers, family, and friends were not all Soviet-era
intellectuals with a high degree of familiarity with Russia, economic
necessity probably would push Kyrgyzstan further toward Russia.
On his February 1994 visit to Moscow, Akayev signed several economic
agreements. Having promised the republic a 75-billion-ruble line
of credit (presumably for use in 1994) and some US$65 million
in trade agreements, Russia also promised to extend to Kyrgyzstan
most-favored-nation status for the purchase of oil and other fuels.
For its part, Kyrgyzstan agreed to the creation of a Kyrgyzstani-Russian
investment company, which would purchase idle defense-related
factories in the republic to provide employment for the increasingly
dissatisfied Russian population of Kyrgyzstan. In early 1995,
prime ministers Jumagulov of Kyrgyzstan and Viktor Chernomyrdin
of Russia signed a series of agreements establishing bilateral
coordination of economic reform in the two states, further binding
Kyrgyzstan to Russia. After lobbying hard for inclusion, Kyrgyzstan
became a member of the customs union that Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakstan established in February 1996.
For its part, Russia sees aid to Kyrgyzstan as a successful precedent
in its new policy of gaining influence in its "near abroad," the
states that once were Soviet republics. Russia does not want a
massive in-migration of Russians from the new republics; some
2 million ethnic Russians moved back to Russia between 1992 and
1995, with at least that many again expected by the end of the
century. Akayev, on the other hand, must find a way to stem the
loss of his Russian population, which already has caused an enormous
deficit of doctors, teachers, and engineers.
For these reasons, despite opposition from Kyrgyz nationalists
and other independence-minded politicians, in 1995 Akayev granted
the request of Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin to review the
constitutional provision making Kyrgyz the sole official language.
Early in 1996, Kyrgyzstan took legal steps toward making Russian
the republic's second official language, subject to amendment
of the constitution. That initiative coincided with the customs
union signed with Russia, Kazakstan, and Belarus in February 1996.
The long-term success of Akayev's search for reintegration is
questionable because of Kyrgyzstan's minimal strategic importance
and the potential cost to an outside country supporting the republic's
shaky economy.
Data as of March 1996
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