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MoldovaIntroduction
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Figure 1. Belarus and Moldova: Geographic Setting, 1995
LOCATED ON THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS of the Russian
Empire and
later the Soviet Union, the regions that would one day
become the
republics of Belarus and Moldova had long been part of a
buffer
zone used to protect Russia from Western influences and
military
forces. The imperial and Soviet governments attempted to
fully
integrate the two regions' economies into their own and to
Russify
their people in order to bind them seamlessly into the
their
respective empires. For a long time, these efforts seemed
to work,
but in 1991 Belarus and Moldova declared their
independence from
the Soviet Union and began to go their separate,
post-Soviet ways.
Independence was not a totally new experience for the two
countries, however, each of which had existed briefly as a
sovereign entity during the previous hundred years, but
this time
they had much to undo from the previous regime.
The two countries, former republics of the now-defunct
Soviet
Union, are a study in contrasts. Belarus, mostly ethnic
Belarusian
(and overwhelmingly Slavic) in population, had long been
part of
the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union. The
tsars,
and later the commissars, sought to meld Belorussia with
Russia and
the Belorussians with the Russians. They succeeded to a
remarkable
extent: independent Belarus still identifies closely with
Russia,
and Belarusian nationalists are in the minority.
Soviet-era
political and economic structures, and even symbols, have
been
retained and even reintroduced, as was the case after the
May 1995
referendum that brought back the Soviet-era flag and
emblem (both
slightly modified) and the Russian language.
Moldova, a country that had also been part of both
empires
since the 19th century, has a majority population of
ethnic
Romanians, who are not Slavs. Despite Russian and Soviet
efforts to
Slavicize them, most ethnic Romanians were able to
maintain their
identity and looked to Romania as the source of their
culture. When
the Soviet Union began to crumble, Moldova asserted first
its
sovereignty and then its independence, although the
population was
far from unanimous on either. But the nationalists
eventually
carried the day, and Moldova sought to distance itself
from Russia,
despite the wishes of the Transnistrians, who in 1990
proclaimed
the "Dnestr Moldavian Republic," with a pro-Soviet
extralegal
government, on the east bank of the Nistru River. The
Transnistrians want no part of independent Moldova, its
ethnic-
Romanian nationalists, or a possible reunification with
Romania,
where they would be a small minority instead of a powerful
political force.
In both Belarus and Moldova, there are many who wish to
return
to the days of the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons,
some
economic, some nostalgic, and some fearful. In Belarus
these
conservatives (ethnic Belarusians as well as ethnic
Russians) are
in the majority and are to be found throughout the
population and
the government. Their domination is felt not only in the
political
arena but in the social sphere as well.
In Moldova the conservatives (mainly, but not
exclusively,
ethnic Slavs) are located throughout society and the
government,
but their influence is not as overwhelming as in Belarus.
Many of
the Moldovan conservatives (although not all) live in
Transnistria.
Here, they believe, they are the keepers of the Soviet
ideal from
which a reconstituted Soviet Union will one day rise up
again.
However, time and the course of events have made it clear
that they
are trying to protect not a way of life but rather their
own
political and--especially--economic interests, which are
often
illegal (including sales of arms and illegal drugs).
Both Belarus and Moldova have stated their wish to have
free
market economies, but they have proceeded in this
direction at
different paces. The economies of both countries had been
firmly
embedded in the Soviet economy, and each had specialized
in a
certain sector--Belarus in heavy agricultural equipment
and goods
for the military, and Moldova primarily in agricultural
products
and consumer goods--while relying on other republics for
raw
materials. Both republics had been especially dependent on
Russia
for inexpensive fuels, a fact that continued to haunt them
after
independence. Subsidized fuel, priced well below world
prices, had
made the goods produced by the two countries inexpensive
and
affordable by the other Soviet republics. With the loss of
these
cheap fuels, both countries were forced to either decrease
their
fuel consumption (and their output) or improve the
efficiency of
their industries. Belarus chose the former path, which
coincided
with the fact that it was selling fewer of its goods
because of
price and quality considerations, while Moldova tried,
sometimes
unsuccessfully, to take steps toward improved efficiency.
Both countries initiated privatization, or the sale of
state-
owned property, and both were having a difficult time
reconfiguring
their economies. The Moldovan government was changing its
laws to
make them more compatible with a free market and more
friendly
toward foreign investment and business in general.
However, vested
interests sought to maintain the system or, at least, to
make large
profits during the transition.
The Belarusian government decided that, despite its
intention
to sell state-owned property, it would leave the
agricultural
sector under state control. The government's reasoning was
that
Belarusian large-scale agriculture was best suited to the
heavy
agricultural equipment that the country continued to
produce,
despite the fact that fuel for this equipment was often
scarce.
Both Belarus and Moldova stated their intention of
having
democratic political systems, as did many former Soviet
republics.
However, making the change from a communist government to
a real
democracy proved difficult, not the least because of
officials who
wished to maintain the status quo. They viewed democracy
as too
chaotic and unstable, unlike the predictability that had
characterized their previous political lives. They also
saw it as
risky and feared to lose the perquisites to which they had
been
entitled and which they wanted to retain.
Belarus's attempts to become a western democracy often
appeared
likely to remain out of reach. Although the constitution
added the
office of the president and declared a separation of
powers,
government in Belarus often seemed no different from that
of the
Soviet era. Political apathy among the population remained
so
strong that a legislature could not be seated after two
rounds of
elections in 1995; corruption was still widespread despite
the fact
that the president had campaigned as an anticorruption
candidate;
and political leaders looked to Moscow for political,
military, and
financial support, with the president trying to lead the
country
back into some sort of union with Russia.
Moldova kept its basic Soviet-era governmental
structure, while
adding a presidency, universal suffrage, and popular
elections, as
did Belarus. However, the country's first attempt at a
democratically elected parliament showed the need for
further
modification of the system. The unwieldy size of the body
and a
hardline nationalist majority made legislative compromises
among
the various ethnic groups in Moldova impossible, and the
result was
gridlock. A smaller parliament and a larger number of
moderates
after the 1994 elections have made legislative progress
possible
despite the disagreements and factions that are still to
be found.
Despite the differences between the two countries, the
focal
point for those who wish to maintain each country's
independence is
the same--the national language, the same rallying point
as in the
revolutions of 1848, a series of republican revolts
against Western
and Central European monarchies. These revolts all failed
in their
immediate goals, but they eventually led to greater
representation
of ethnic groups in legislatures and to greater cultural
autonomy,
including the use of languages that, until then, had been
dismissed
by the authorities as peasant vernaculars. However, while
nationalists in the last century sought to codify (and
sometimes
even form) a literary language, the task of the
nationalists in
1991 was to revive that language and divest it of its
Russian and
Soviet accretions.
To those who have never undergone forced cultural
assimilation,
the issue may seem trivial. What difference does it make
what
language is spoken or what it is called? To those who have
had
their use of language restricted, however, the matter goes
beyond
mere defiance. Language is the medium of the culture on
which their
daily lives and identities are based. To define what
language can
be spoken is to define the identity of not only the
individual but
also of the country.
Moldovans kept Russian as a language of interethnic
communication but subsequently entered a debate as to what
their
own language was to be called: was it Moldovan or
Romanian? The
president explained that the term "Moldovan" was used in
the
constitution for political reasons--to assuage the fears
of those
who feared imminent reunification with Romania (despite
the fact
that Germany and Austria, for example, which both use the
German
language, are separate countries). Again, politics,
language, and
emotions were thoroughly entangled.
Belarusians, the majority of whom prefer to use Russian
in
their daily lives, have dealt with the language issue
differently.
They returned Russian to its status of official language,
alongside
the Belarusian language, through their response to a May
1995
referendum question. Thus the Belarusian language policy
reflected
Belarus's pro-Russian policies in general.
May 31, 1995
* * *
In the months following preparation of this manuscript,
Belarus's president, Alyaksandr Lukashyenka, and his
government
continued their pro-Russian policies and their Soviet-era
mentality. When Orthodox Patriarch Aleksey II of Moscow
and All
Russia visited Belarus in July, Lukashyenka praised the
Orthodox
Church while reproaching the Roman Catholic Church for its
active
proselytizing and politicking. When subway workers in
Minsk went on
strike in August, the government sent special police units
and
Ministry of Interior troops against them. In addition,
Lukashyenka
reacted angrily to information that United States and
Polish trade
unions, including Solidarity, were providing financial
assistance
to the striking workers through Belarusian nongovernmental
unions.
Also in August, the president ordered that books published
in 1992-
95 be removed from secondary schools and institutes of
higher
education. In other words, these schools would return to
using
Soviet textbooks.
Lukashyenka also continued arrogating power to himself.
His
unilateral decisions, including suspending parliamentary
immunity,
outlawing strikes in sectors he deemed critical, banning
the
activity of two trade unions until further notice,
withholding the
salaries of parliamentary deputies, and making arbitrary
changes in
the state budget, paint a picture of a leader seeking to
replace
the separation of governmental powers with one-man rule.
However,
it was only after Lukashyenka's decision to suspend
parliamentary
immunity that the Supreme Soviet spoke up and petitioned
the
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of
his
measures. A constitutional crisis appeared unavoidable
unless the
two sides could come to an agreement.
Perhaps the most dramatic indication that the Soviet
mentality
is alive and well in Belarus was the hot-air balloon
tragedy in
September. A yearly international hot-air balloon race
starting in
Switzerland included three United States balloons that
crossed the
border into Belarus. Although Belarusian authorities had
been
notified of the race earlier, the Belarusian military
fired at one
of the balloons, claiming that it did not have any
identification
and that sensitive military installations were nearby. The
two
American pilots of the balloon were killed when a missile
caused
their hydrogen-filled balloon to explode. The pilots of a
second
balloon left the country before any problems arose, but
authorities
detained the pilots of the third balloon for a day before
releasing
them. The Belarusian government issued an official apology
for the
shooting that accepted "a certain amount" of blame but
nevertheless
tried to justify the military's response. Many people were
convinced that this would not be the last manifestation of
Belarus's Cold War mentality.
At the same time, events in Moldova centered on two men
--Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed', commander of the
Russian
14th Army, and Mircea Snegur, Moldova's president. The
Russian 14th
Army, previously the Soviet 14th Army, remained in
Transnistria
after the Soviet Union was dissolved to protect the ethnic
Russians
in what Moscow called "the near abroad." Despite their
ostensible
status as peacekeepers in Moldova's dispute with
Transnistria, the
14th Army supported the extralegal government of the
"Dnestr
Republic" and was even accused of supplying weapons to it
during
the worst of the fighting in 1992.
At the beginning of June, Lebed' offered his
resignation in
protest of Russian government plans to downgrade the
status of the
14th Army to that of an operational group. After initially
refusing
the general's resignation, the Russian Ministry of Defense
accepted
it and replaced him with Major General Valeriy Yevnevich.
The
Moldovan government's concern was that the new commander
continue
to keep the army's large stock of weapons safe while a
political
solution was sought for the problems in Transnistria.
Lebed' was
seen by some as a strong candidate for the Russian
presidency in
1996, but his popularity began decreasing once he resigned
and
removed himself from the public eye.
In a surprising move in July, President Snegur resigned
his
membership in the ruling Democratic Agrarian Party of
Moldova and
took his supporters with him to form a new presidential
party,
later named the Party of Rebirth and Conciliation. By
dividing the
Agrarians and depriving them of a parliamentary majority,
as well
as by considering an alliance with a pro-Romanian party,
the
president had made moves that could disrupt Moldova's
political
stability. The purpose of these actions was twofold. The
first was
preparation for the December 1996 presidential election in
which
Snegur will seek to win on the strength of the ethnic
Romanian
vote. His two challengers, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli
and
Parliament chairman Petru Lucinschi, are expected to
capture the
votes of Moldova's Russian-speaking population, thus
making Snegur
dependent on the ethnic Romanians.
Snegur's other purpose in creating the new party was an
effort
to change the government to that of a personalized
presidential
regime, a move opposed by Parliament. This regime would be
different from the existing government and would be at
odds with
Moldova's political traditions. Under a presidential
regime, the
existing balance of power between the legislative and
executive
branches would be disrupted, and, critics charge, the
country's
progress toward democracy would be jeopardized.
In Transnistria the economic situation continued to
deteriorate. The authorities of the "Dnestr Republic"
sought
greater political legitimacy in hopes that this would help
them
garner more political support and financial assistance
from Russia.
To this end, the authorities began drafting a constitution
and
election law in August in preparation for parliamentary
elections
scheduled for late fall 1995. In the meantime, bread
rationing was
introduced in Tiraspol and its suburbs in late August.
A more important event also began in August--the
wind-down of
the operational group of Russian troops in Transnistria. A
withdrawal of these troops was part of a "gentleman's
agreement,"
reached in October 1994 between Russia and Moldova, that
sought a
political solution to the stand-off between the "Dnestr
Republic"
and the rest of Moldova, but that was approved only by
Moldova.
However, until the Russian State Duma (the lower house of
the
parliament) approved the agreement, matters would remain
at a
standstill.
In mid-August the commander, Valeriy Yevnevich, now
promoted to
lieutenant general, began to transfer nonmilitary
equipment from
the operational group to Transnistrian civilian
authorities. Work
also began on the destruction of old munitions (some
manufactured
before 1940) that could not be transported to Russia.
Several
trainloads of surplus military equipment were to be sent
to Russia
as well. At the same time, there was a cutback in the
number of the
operational group's officers and support staff. But
because the
Russian Duma had not yet ratified the withdrawal of the
operational
group, military authorities were calling this a
"redeployment" of
forces and equipment rather than an actual "withdrawal."
In September, Igor' N. Smirnov, president of the
"Dnestr
Republic" addressed the Russian State Duma and made an
appeal for
official recognition of the "Dnestr Republic." President
Snegur of
Moldova protested this move and continued to place his
confidence
in political negotiations. Smirnov, on the other hand,
hoped to
drag out talks until after Russian parliamentary
elections,
scheduled for December 1995, in an effort to get more
support from
the new parliament, which he hoped would be more
sympathetic to the
Transnistrians' cause.
September 29, 1995
Helen Fedor
Data as of June 1995
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