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NepalInternal Security
Owing to its historical position as an instrument of
royal
authority, the army had always assumed the role of
protecting the
king against threats to his political as well as physical
survival.
In the modern era, the 28,000-strong Nepalese Police Force
ordinarily was the first line of defense in combating
incidents of
political and criminal violence
(see The Police System;
The Judicial System
, this ch.). A primary mission of the army,
however,
was to back up the police whenever additional coverage or
firepower
was required. This mission, known as
"aid-to-the-civil-power" in
British parlance, posed risks for the regular army.
Detailing
soldiers to arrest demonstrators, root out subversives,
and fire on
crowds risked tarnishing the army's reputation for
impartiality.
Moreover, overuse of the army in domestic peacekeeping
tasks
undermined military morale and discipline, upset routine
training
cycles, and diverted soldiers from conventional defense
chores,
such as border security. Ordinarily, the army preferred to
leave
routine internal security chores to the police.
The army has performed aid-to-the-civil-power duties,
including
riot control and disaster relief. In the 1960s and 1970s,
for
example, the army conducted sporadic counterinsurgency
operations
against Tibetan Khampa guerrillas operating in the remote
mountains
of northwestern Nepal. The campaign, which was finally
suppressed
in 1974, employed small army units trained in
counterguerrilla
tactics.
The army faced its most severe test during the strikes
and
demonstrations called by the Movement for the Restoration
of
Democracy, or prodemocracy movement, in the spring of
1990. The
prodemocracy movement, composed of a broad spectrum of
political
parties led by the Nepali Congress Party and the United
Left Front
(a group of seven communist parties), staged a civil
disobedience
campaign in support of its demands for sweeping
constitutional
reforms. The police responded to the crescendo of protests
by
arresting movement leaders, closing the university and
colleges,
and censoring news reports of the disturbances. When these
measures
failed to check the demonstrations, security forces made
mass
arrests and resorted to firing on unruly, although usually
unarmed,
crowds. By March 1990, army units were heavily involved in
putting
down the protests and often staged "flag marches," or
shows of
force, to prevent crowds from gathering or to signal the
government's determination to enforce emergency
regulations. On
April 6, the day after King Birendra reorganized his
government and
agreed to institute constitutional reforms, a crowd of as
many as
200,000 strong gathered in downtown Kathmandu. By all
accounts, the
army panicked and fired on the crowd as it approached the
palace,
killing at least twenty-five protesters. All told,
security forces
reportedly killed at least fifty persons during the height
of the
protests between February and April.
The national elections held in May 1991 witnessed an
unprecedented peacetime mobilization of military force in
Nepal.
Many observers of the Nepalese political scene predicted
widespread
violence. To head off any trouble, the entire army was put
on alert
and deployed throughout the country to ensure a free and
fair
election. Its missions included protecting polling booths,
monitoring campaign rallies, and patrolling streets and
highways.
In addition, 42,000 retired police and soldiers were
pressed into
temporary service. By all accounts, the army performed
well. A
minimum of violence and few electoral irregularities were
reported
(see Elections
, ch. 4). Once the voting was completed, the
army
returned to the barracks, police auxiliaries were relieved
of their
duties, and the regular police force resumed normal
duties.
Data as of September 1991
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