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NepalIndia
Although landlocked Nepal was surrounded by both India
and
China, the kingdom's geographic, economic, and cultural
orientation
was more closely linked to India. Whereas many Nepalese
stressed
the differences that defined Nepal's national existence,
India's
policy makers tended to stress the similarities that bound
the two
countries together. According to New Delhi's perception,
South Asia
constituted an integral security unit in which India
played the
lead role. Many Nepalese resented this interpretation and
accused
India of being insensitive to Nepal's status as an
independent
nation.
Despite New Delhi's insistence that stable, independent
neighbors were vital to India's security, many Nepalese
regarded
India as a regional bully. Because of these differing
attitudes,
Nepal's relations with India oscillated considerably over
the
years, particularly in matters relating to security.
In a speech before Parliament in 1950, the Indian prime
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, summed up India's security
concerns
vis-à-vis Nepal. He stated: "From time immemorial, the
Himalayas
have provided us with magnificent frontiers. . . . We
cannot allow
that barrier to be penetrated, because it is also the
principal
barrier to India. Therefore, as much as we appreciate the
independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go
wrong in
Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened,
because
that would be a risk to our own security." Nehru and his
successors
subsequently stated that any Chinese attack on Nepal would
be
regarded as aggression against India.
In 1950 China forcibly annexed Tibet, which New Delhi
regarded
as a buffer zone shielding the subcontinent from real or
potential
Chinese incursions. Nepal thus came to play a much larger
role in
India's security calculations. Fearing that China might
eventually
subvert or invade Nepal, India signed a Treaty of Peace
and
Friendship with the Rana regime in 1950. Although not a
formal
military alliance, the treaty required both parties to
consult and
"devise effective countermeasures" in the event of a
security
threat to either country. Nepal's inclusion in the Indian
defense
perimeter was made explicit by an exchange of secret
letters--later
made public--that accompanied the treaty, stating inter
alia that
"neither government shall tolerate any threat to the
security of
the other by a foreign aggressor." To assuage Nepalese
fears of
Indian domination, the treaty also stipulated that Indian
forces
could be introduced into the country only at the
invitation of the
Nepalese government. The two sides simultaneously signed a
trade
and transit agreement that extended reciprocal rights with
regard
to bilateral trade and residential arrangements as well as
transshipment of Nepalese goods through India.
In 1952 the Indian Military Mission arrived in
Kathmandu to
reorganize Nepal's armed forces and bring the kingdom's
defenses
more in line with India's security requirements. In
implementing
changes, Nepal drastically reduced the size of its postwar
army and
revamped its training and organization along Indian lines.
Indian
advisers also played key roles in training the civil
service and
police force. Many Nepalese--military officers and civil
servants,
in particular--were outraged by India's actions, which
they saw as
an insult to national self-respect. Indian influence was
further
strengthened, however, by the cooperation of both
countries'
militaries on several occasions in the 1950s, when at
Nepal's
request Indian troops helped quell disturbances near their
common
boundary. As Sino-Indian tensions mounted in the late
1950s, Indian
soldiers and technicians assisted in staffing some of the
checkposts on the frontier with Tibet. Despite close
military ties,
Nepal, however, has never allowed garrisoning of Indian
troops or
joint military exercises in the country.
In 1962 Indian and Chinese forces fought a brief but
decisive
war over desolate stretches of their disputed frontier.
India's
unprepared forces suffered a humiliating defeat, despite
the fact
that China unilaterally withdrew its forces after several
weeks of
heavy fighting. Although Nepal did not become embroiled in
the
fighting and both belligerents respected the kingdom's
territorial
integrity, the war reinforced Nepalese perceptions of
their
country's perilous role as a Sino-Indian security buffer.
Because of India's growing influence and Nepal's
corresponding
dependence on India, international diplomacy has always
been a
vital element of Nepal's survival strategy. Nepal was an
active
participant and a voice of moderation in the United
Nations (UN)
and the Nonaligned Movement, although the viability of the
latter
organization was in doubt after the end of the Cold War
(see International and Regional Organizations
, ch. 4). In
addition,
Nepal firmly supported the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation
(SAARC--see Glossary)
headquartered in
Kathmandu. SAARC
eschewed any role in regional security because the threats
perceived by Nepal and the other small states of the
region were
often at variance with those perceived by India.
In 1975 King Birendra proposed that the UN declare
Nepal a zone
of peace, where military competition would be off-limits.
In
Birendra's view, the proposal symbolized Nepal's desire to
maintain
cordial relations with both its neighbors by placing
internationally sanctioned restrictions on the use of
military
force
(see Foreign Policy
, ch. 4).
Nepalese-Indian relations underwent major jolts over a
protracted period starting in 1988. In June of that year,
Birendra
concluded a secret arms purchase with China, whereby
Beijing would
supply obsolescent air defense artillery at bargain
prices. India
probably learned of the deal within days or weeks of the
agreement
and protested vigorously that Birendra's action had
violated the
spirit, if not the letter, of the 1950 treaty. Although
the
appearance of a limited number of vintage air defense
weapons
hardly represented a threat to Indian Air Force
contingency plans,
India interpreted the sale as a dangerous precedent that
could not
go unchallenged. As bilateral tensions mounted, India
added other
complaints regarding Nepal's supposed insensitivity to
India's
vital interests. Birendra, capitalizing on nationalistic
fervor,
was intransigent and insisted that Nepal had the sovereign
right to
determine its own defense requirements. He also pointed
out that
Nepal's use of air defense assets against India would
never arise
as long as Indian fighters respected Nepalese air space;
New Delhi
countered that the only plausible use for the weapons was
against
India.
In March 1989, the Nepal-India trade and transit
agreement came
up for renewal. India's prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi,
refused to
extend the agreement unless Nepal agreed to meet India's
commercial
and defense concerns. After both sides refused to back
down, India
allowed the agreement to lapse and closed thirteen of the
fifteen
border checkposts that regulated most of Nepal's trade
with the
outside world. The blackade was a severe blow to Nepal
because
there were no other reliable transit routes. The Chinese
rail line
in Tibet ended 800 kilometers short of the Nepalese
border, and the
road linking Kathmandu and Tibet was closed much of the
year by
avalanches and monsoon landslides. Although the Nepalese
army was
pressed into action to keep Nepal's section of the road
open to the
extent possible, it could improve the situation only to a
limited
extent. Pakistan and Bangladesh were hardly in a position
to supply
major assistance because their only land routes to Nepal
traversed
India. The Soviet Union, the United States, and other
Western
powers quietly declined to take sides and urged India and
Nepal to
return to the bargaining table.
In the final analysis, the dispute underscored a
central
geopolitical reality: landlocked Nepal did not have the
military,
diplomatic, or economic clout to withstand an Indian
blockade as
long as the government in New Delhi was willing to risk
international opprobrium and press its case against the
kingdom.
Many Nepalese saw New Delhi's actions as "punishment" for
Birendra's show of independence and as a manifestation of
India's
supposed policy of isolating and subjugating its smaller
neighbors.
Some Nepalese observers, however, criticized Birendra's
handling of
the dispute, arguing that the king harnessed popular
fervor against
India to rally patriotic support behind the palace.
Some fifteen months of economic dislocations and
diplomatic
recriminations placed heavy pressure on both sides to halt
the
slide in relations. Finally, both sides reaffirmed the
1950 treaty,
and Kathmandu agreed not to purchase defense items abroad
without
consulting New Delhi. Birendra requested that China stop
delivery
of a final shipment of air defense equipment. Relations
gradually
returned to normal and improved significantly after
Nepal's
democratically elected government assumed office in May
1991. The
dispute convinced many Nepalese, however, that India had
the
capacity and will to pressure small neighbors in pursuit
of its
foreign policy objectives--a message that New Delhi
clearly
intended to convey to Beijing.
Data as of September 1991
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