NepalRecruitment, Training, and Morale
Parading on New Road, Kathmandu, in celebration of the royal
kumari, the virgin goddess
Courtesy Harvey Follender
In 1991 recruitment into the all-volunteer Royal Nepal
Army
theoretically was open to all citizens regardless of
caste,
religion, or ethnic background. In practice, however,
recruits
tended to be drawn from the ethnic and caste groups that
have
traditionally supplied the bulk of the Nepalese and Gurkha
regiments; the military apparently preferred to recruit
from ethnic
groups drawn from the mountain areas and the Kathmandu
Valley
(see Armed Forces and Society
, this ch.). Not only were these
groups the
traditional source of military recruitment, but they
generally were
presumed to be untainted by any real or imagined loyalties
to
India. As with similar complaints leveled against
Kathmandu's
preferential recruitment policies for government service,
residents
of the Tarai Region voiced complaints of official
discrimination in
military recruitment. According to press reports,
residents of the
Tarai Region, known as madhesis ("midlanders"),
constituted
some 40 percent of Nepal's population but were severely
underrepresented in the army and police. More than 89
percent of
the country was Hindu; accordingly, the religious
composition of
the army was thought to be almost exclusively Hindu, with
a
smattering of Buddhists.
Even though Nepalese, British, and Indian recruiters
competed
annually for the best candidates for military service,
none of the
forces had ever encountered a dearth of recruits. In a
population
of over 19 million persons, there were about 4.5 million
physically
fit males between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine
available for
military service; about 225,000 males annually reached
military
age, which was eighteen years
(see Population
, ch. 2). In
the early
1990s, the army revealed no personnel mobilization plan in
the
event of war or a declared national emergency, nor was
there any
known contingency plan to institute conscription during or
in
anticipation of an emergency. Retired soldiers, however,
customarily were regarded as a valuable resource that the
government could rely upon during wartime. Over 100,000
military
pensioners of the Nepalese, Indian, and British armies
resided in
Nepal. This group could provide a pool of military
personnel in an
emergency. All Nepalese service personnel were liable for
call-up
after retirement.
The different languages that characterized the social
mosaic of
Nepalese society posed no formidable obstacle because
virtually all
soldiers spoke Nepali (referred to in British and Indian
regiments
as "Gurkhali"). Most officers, because of the higher
educational
requirements demanded of them, possessed at least a
limited
knowledge of English. Personnel who aspired to be general
officers
or to attend military training courses abroad invariably
were
fluent in English.
Caste and ethnic differences were minimized by the
longstanding
policy of assigning recruits from the same area and ethnic
groups
to the same unit, a policy also practiced in British and
Indian
Gurkha regiments. Low-caste enlistees often were assigned
to
service units, whereas officer ranks were staffed largely
by upper-
caste recruits (primarily Chhetris) and those applicants
with long
family histories of army service.
Women played a marginal role in the armed forces in the
early
1990s. Professional opportunities for women in Nepal were
restricted. A woman's station in life generally was
confined to
raising children, maintaining the home, and performing
agricultural
and handicraft labor
(see Women's Status and Role in Society
, ch.
2). A limited number of women served in the armed forces
as
physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, and parachute
packers
attached to the para battalion. Pay scales were the same
as those
of males, although prospects for promotion within the few
job
categories open to women were limited.
Recruitment regulations prescribed that qualified
candidates
for enlistment appear before a selection and recruiting
board
composed of an officer from the Department of the Adjutant
General
and four other officers. Candidates were required to be
between
eighteen and twenty-three years of age, physically fit,
and at
least 161 centimeters tall. Exceptions were made for
honorably
discharged former Gurkha soldiers who were under the age
of thirty-
six, physically fit, and had not been convicted of a
criminal
offense. Appointment was confirmed only after the
candidate's
statements regarding residence, age, caste, and address
were
attested to by the army or civil service. A recruit could
be
dismissed at any time during the first year of training.
Upon entering the service, the recruit signed a
contract to
participate in drills and training prescribed by army
regulations
and to obey orders wherever he or she might be sent.
Enlistment
lasted for an initial period of ten years, except for
former
Gurkhas, who enlisted for three years. All recruits were
required
to take an oath to protect the life and throne of the king
and to
arrest or report any person threatening the king. As of
1991, the
army had not revised this oath so that recruits also swore
to
uphold the constitution, as was the practice in many
democracies.
Military indoctrination at all levels still was closely
associated
with the defense of the king, who many Nepalese regarded
as the
reincarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. Devotion to duty
thus
carried with it a marked element of religious devotion to
the
person of the king
(see Religion and Society
, ch. 2).
Military pay scales generally were the same as Nepalese
government civilian pay scales. Although they were
abysmally low by
Western standards, military pay and benefits were quite
attractive
by Nepalese standards, and military service was highly
sought
after. Moreover, job security, promotion prospects, and
economic
attractions offered by military service were virtually
unmatched in
the small private sector, particularly for applicants with
limited
education and job skills. Pay scales also included
allocations for
rations and travel allowances while on duty and en route
home
during leave periods. Officers received housing, medical
and
educational benefits, and family allowances that also were
attractive by Nepalese standards. Soldiers earned pensions
after
seventeen years of service; maximum pension benefits could
reach 60
percent of a soldier's final pay rate.
The army maintained a liberal leave policy that
contributed to
good morale. Leave was of three types: ordinary, home, and
sick.
The maximum twenty days' annual ordinary leave was not
cumulative
from year to year. Home leave accrued to soldiers after
one year of
service at the rate of forty-five days each year. Sick
leave of up
to fifteen days annually was authorized. Ration and travel
allowances were included as part of the leave policy.
Beyond pay and leave, other factors that contributed to
good
morale within the ranks included opportunities to acquire
an
education and job skills--attributes that were
transferable to
civilian life. Moreover, military service carried with it
the
prestige of serving in a profession that was highly
regarded by
most of the Nepalese public.
The quality of military personnel, particularly within
the
enlisted ranks, was regarded by most observers as
excellent.
Nepalese troops are renowned for their toughness, stamina,
adaptability to harsh climates and terrain, and
willingness to obey
orders.
Because the incidence of infectious diseases was high
in the
general population, malaria, tuberculosis, syphilis, and
dysentery
probably were present in any pool of recruits in spite of
efforts
to screen out the physically unfit before enlistment. In
the
service, however, medical care, adequate diet, and
hygienic
measures greatly reduced the incidence of disease, and
experience
in the varied environments of Asia, Europe, North Africa,
and the
Middle East has shown that illness in Nepalese units was
not a
serious problem. As of 1991, there was no indication that
the army
screened recruits or serving personnel for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), and there were no publicly
revealed
statistics citing the of AIDS within the military.
Before assignment to units, enlistees received almost a
year of
training under officers and noncommissioned officers
specially
chosen for this task. The long training period was
necessitated by
the high illiteracy rate--almost 70 percent
nationally--making the
recruitment of soldiers with anything beyond a rudimentary
education difficult. Many recruits had to be taught
elementary
skills, such as using a telephone and driving. On the
whole,
soldiers probably were sufficiently trained for effective
guerrilla
operations or for combat in small units--the types of
warfare most
likely to occur. The army supported a number of schools
scattered
around the country that instructed individual personnel
and whole
units in specialized skills, such as jungle operations,
communications, medicine, and mountain warfare. A limited
number of
enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers were sent
to India
each year for specialized training not offered in Nepal.
Training for aid-to-civil-power duties, such as riot
control,
was not covered extensively during the training cycle. The
military
generally preferred to let the police perform such
functions, which
most senior officers trained under the British model did
not regard
as "proper soldiering." That army personnel were, of
necessity,
becoming better acquainted with police tactics was
suggested by the
increased use of the army in aid-to-civil-power duties
during the
riots and protests that rocked the country during the 1990
prodemocracy movement, the massive army deployment to
prevent
violence during the national elections staged in May 1991,
and the
peacekeeping experience acquired during service in
Lebanon.
Officer training was modeled on that of the Indian
Army. This
training, in turn, was strongly influenced by its long
association
with the British military establishment. An Indian
Military Mission
arrived in Kathmandu in 1952 soon after an attempted coup
to assist
in correcting discipline problems and organizational
defects. With
a staff of 100 personnel commanded by a major general, the
mission
implemented significant reforms in training, recruitment,
promotion, and virtually every aspect of military life. In
1958 the
Indian Military Mission was replaced by the Indian
Military
Training and Advisory Group consisting of twenty officers.
This
group functioned in Kathmandu until 1963, when it was
renamed the
Military Liaison Group and its responsibilities were
reduced to
liaison work on common defense problems. Nepalese
nationalists
complained, however, that the army's dependence on India
for
military training and direction was repugnant. Following
significant rifts in Indo-Nepalese relations in the late
1960s, the
Indian advisory group closed its offices for good
(see Relations with India
, ch. 4). The only Indian military presence in
Nepal in
1991 consisted of a defense attaché at the high commission
in
Kathmandu and Gurkha recruitment centers located at
Pokhara and
Dharan. The only other countries with defense attachés
posted to
Kathmandu in 1991 were the United States, Britain, China,
the
Soviet Union, and Pakistan.
Although Nepalese officers still were sent to India for
a
variety of advanced or specialized courses as of 1991,
basic
officer training for "gentleman" recruits was conducted at
the
Royal Nepal Military Academy at Kharipati near Kathmandu.
Modeled
after the Indian Military Academy and Sandhurst, the
academy
conducted a fifteen-month training course. Classes,
usually
numbering between 50 and 100 students, were divided into
four cadet
companies named after famous Nepalese military victories.
At the
conclusion of training, newly commissioned second
lieutenants were
assigned to units according to their specialties and the
needs of
the army.
Those officers who showed promise for promotion to
higher
commands competed throughout their careers for highly
prized
training assignments in the United States, Britain,
Germany, India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Nepalese officers were not known
ever to
have received military training in the Soviet Union or in
East
European countries. A handful of army personnel may have
gone to
China in 1988, however, to train on the air defense guns
purchased
by Nepal at that time. Chinese military advisers have
never been
posted to Nepal, owing, in part, to Kathmandu's awareness
of
India's extreme sensitivity over Chinese activities in the
country
(see Relations with China
, ch. 4).
Over the years, Nepalese officers have attended the
United
States Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas;
the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania;
and a
number of other military schools and institutions. Most
expenses
for this training were covered by funds appropriated under
the
International Military Education Training (IMET) program.
The
program has been open to Nepalese officers since 1947,
when Nepal
and the United States exchanged diplomatic recognition.
Data as of September 1991
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