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North Korea LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION
Beginning in the fall of 1975, North Koreans used the term
party center to refer to Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il is
reported to have concentrated a great deal of effort on the
performing arts, and many artists began to use the term when
referring to Kim in articles in K lloja. However, for a
few years after its initial introduction the term was used only
infrequently because Kim Il Sung's efforts to promote his son met
some resistance. Many of Kim Jong Il's opponents have been purged
by Kim Il Sung, however, and neither Kim faces any active
opposition any longer.
Kim Il Sung was awarded the rank of generalissimo
(taewnsu) on April 13, 1992. On April 20, 1992, Kim Jong
Il, as supreme commander of the armed forces, was given the title
marshal (wnsu) of the DPRK. Kim Il Sung was the president
and chairman of the National Defense Commission with command and
control of the armed forces until Kim Jong Il assumed the latter
position in April 1993. O Chin-u also became a marshal.
There are many scenarios for leadership succession. Some of
the prospects are based on a common postulation that Kim Il
Sung's succession scheme will take at least a few years because
of the decades-long preparation of a succession plan. South
Korean scholar Yang Sung-Chul labels this "positive skepticism"
and calls short-term failure, such as a coup d'état or a
revolution, "negative skepticism." "Negative skepticism" is not
to be dismissed, however, because of Kim Jong Il's weaknesses--
his lack of charisma, poor international recognition, and unknown
governing skills--as well as the sagging domestic economy and
external factors such as inter-Korean, Japan-DPRK, and United
States-DPRK relations
(see Foreign Policy
, this ch.).
Kim Jong Il's appointment as commander of the Korean People's
Army suggests that the succession issue finally has been solved
because the military was once considered Kim's weak point; he
already has full control of the state and the economic
administration. Kim Jong Il also manages political affairs and
KWP businesses as a primary authority and handles symbolic roles
such as meeting with foreign leaders and appearing at national
celebrations.
In addition, Kim Jong Il plays a prominent role in the KWP
propaganda machine--mass media, literature, and art. Many
literary and art works--including films, operas, and dramas--are
produced under the revolutionary tradition of the KWP and Kim's
guidance. Kim uses popular culture to broaden his public image
and gain popular support.
Kim Jong Il has tried to expedite economic growth and
productivity using the Three Revolution Team Movement and the
Three Revolution Red Flag Movement. Both movements are designed
to inspire the broad masses into actively participating in the
Three Revolutions. At the Fifth Party Congress, Kim Il Sung
emphasized the necessity of pressing ahead more vigorously with
the three revolutions to consolidate the socialist system. In
response, Kim Jong Il developed the follow-up slogan, "Let us
meet the requirements of the chuch'e in ideology,
technology and culture." Most units forged ahead with
"ideological education" to teach the party members and other
workers to become revolutionaries of the chuch'e idea. In
many spheres of the national economy, productivity also is
expected to increase as a result of the technology emphasis of
the campaigns. In addition, the "cultural revolution" addresses
promoting literacy and cultural identity.
Chuch'e, instrumental in providing a consistent and
unifying framework for commitment and action in the political
arena, offers a foundation for the party's incessant demand for
spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and dedication. It has
not yet been determined, however, whether chuch'e is an
asset or liability for Kim. Nonetheless, Kim is likely to
continue to emphasize chuch'e as the only satisfactory
answer to all challenging questions in North Korea, particularly
because he attributes the collapse of communism in the Soviet
Union and East European countries to their lack of chuch'e
ideology.
Graduates of the first class of the Mangyngdae Revolutionary
Institute, established in 1947, support Kim Jong Il's power base.
Many of these graduates occupy key positions in government and
the military. For example, O Guk-nyol and General Paek Hak-nim--
the latter, the minister of public security--are members of the
Central Military Commission, KWP Central Committee, and the SPA;
Kim Hwan, the former minister of chemical industry and a vice
premier as of mid-1993, is a member of both the KWP Central
Committee and the SPA; and Kim Yong-sun, a candidate member of
the Politburo, is the director of the International Affairs
Department, KWP Central Committee.
Data as of June 1993
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