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North Korea Inter-Korean Affairs
The reunification of the two Koreas is seen as a difficult
goal. Although P'yongyang and Seoul agreed in principle in 1972
that unification should be achieved peacefully and without
foreign interference, they continued to differ substantially on
the practical methods of attaining reunification; this area of
disagreement has not narrowed in subsequent years.
North Korea's goal of unification remains constant, but
tactics have changed depending on the perception of opportunities
and limitations implicit in shifting domestic and external
situations. From the beginning, North Korea has insisted that an
inter-Korean political formula should be based on parity or
coequality, rather than population. Because South Korea has more
than twice the population of North Korea, a supreme Korean
council set up according to a one-person, one-vote formula will
give South Korea a commanding position in that type of
relationship. Another constant is P'yongyang's insistence that
the Korean question be settled as an internal Korean affair
without foreign interference.
P'yongyang's position that unification should be achieved by
peaceful means was belied by circumstances surrounding the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and by subsequent
infiltrations, the digging of tunnels, and other incidents. North
Korea's contention that the conflict was started by South Korea
and the United States failed to impress South Korea's population.
The war, in effect, reinforced the obvious ideological and
systemic incompatibilities that were in place at the time of the
division of the peninsula in 1945. At the Geneva Conference in
mid-1954, North Korea proposed the formation of an all-Korean
commission and a single Korean legislature through elections; the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula; and
the formal declaration by outside powers of the need for peaceful
development and unification in Korea. P'yongyang also proposed
that the armies of both countries be reduced to 100,000 persons
each within a year, that neither side enter into any military
alliance, and that measures be taken to facilitate economic and
cultural exchanges. Kim Il Sung urged a mutual reduction of armed
forces and a sharp cutback in the "heavy burden of military
expenditure in South Korea," recognizing that any arms buildup
could lead to a renewed arms race on the Korean Peninsula. Kim
also called on "South Korean authorities, political parties,
social organizations, and individual personages" to have their
representatives meet their northern counterparts in P'yongyang,
Seoul, or P'anmunjm to start negotiations on all "burning issues
awaiting urgent solution."
In mid-1969 Kim signaled the resumption of peaceful gestures
to South Korea. In October 1969, P'yongyang announced that the
policy of peaceful unification would be renewed, adding that this
option had not been stressed "in the last few years" because of
alleged war policies being pursued by the United States and South
Korea. Beginning in August 1970, Seoul proposed that the two
Koreas open "a bona fide competition" to see which side could
better satisfy the various needs of the Korean people. This
development ended P'yongyang's previous monopoly on the rhetoric
of neighborly intentions and peaceful unification.
Inter-Korean affairs became more complex in 1970 and 1971, in
part because of the United States decision to withdraw some of
its troops from South Korea and because of moves by the United
States and China to improve their relations. In August 1971, amid
signs of a thaw in the Cold War and an uncertain international
environment, the Red Cross societies of Seoul and P'yongyang
agreed to open talks aimed at the eventual reunion of dispersed
families. These high-level talks--between Kim Il Sung's brother
and the chief of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency,
were held alternately in the two capitals and paralleled behind-
the-scenes contacts to initiate political negotiations,
reportedly at South Korea's suggestion. The talks continued to
evolve and resulted in a joint communiqué issued on July 4, 1972,
in which the two countries agreed to abide by three principles of
unification. As such, the two Koreas agreed to work towards
reunifying the country independently and without foreign
interference; transcending differences in ideology and political
systems; and unifying the country peacefully without the use of
armed force.
The communiqué also contained an accord designed to ease
tensions and foster mutual trust by instructing the two countries
to refrain from slandering and defaming each other, expediting
the Red Cross talks, installing a hot line between P'yongyang and
Seoul, and establishing a South-North Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) as the machinery for substantive negotiations and for
implementing the points of the agreement. The SNCC met three
times. The first and third meetings were held in Seoul from
November 30 to December 2, 1972, and June 12-14, 1973,
respectively; the second meeting was held in P'yongyang March 14-
16, 1973. At the second meeting, the committee agreed to set up
five subcommittees--political, military, foreign, economic, and
cultural affairs--under joint direction. It was stipulated
however, that subcommittees would be formed only when progress
had been made vis-à-vis SNCC dialogue.
By June 1973, inter-Korean dialogue had become deadlocked.
The fourth meeting was scheduled for August 28, 1973, in
P'yongyang, but North Korea declined to convene it, making it
official that it was no longer interested in participating in
SNCC meetings. No significant agreement has been reached through
the SNCC mechanism.
It quickly became obvious to both sides that they have
fundamentally divergent approaches. North Korea's position
focuses on three major themes: that the inter-Korean armed
confrontation must first be ended; that North Korea's
transitional scheme of coexistence called "confederation" be
recognized as a practical necessity; and that a one-Korea policy
should be pursued under all circumstances. P'yongyang seeks to
settle military questions first, proposing cessation of the
military buildup and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
South Korea. South Korea's position is one of peaceful
coexistence based on "peace first, unification later." Seoul
seeks recognition of the political systems of the two Koreas,
noninterference in each side's internal affairs, and the
promotion of mutual economic cooperation. South Korean president
Park Chung Hee stressed the importance of preserving peace at all
costs, specifying that each side refrain from invading the other
or interfering in the other's affairs.
The contrast in positions is especially evident in
international relations. South Korea suggested that both Koreas
become members of the United Nations (UN) if it were the wish of
the majority of UN members and if membership would not impede
unification. In reaffirming peace and good-neighborliness as the
basis of its foreign policy, Seoul declared its readiness to
establish formal relations even with those countries whose
ideologies and social institutions were different from South
Korea's. In an obvious allusion to communist states, Seoul called
on these countries to reciprocate by opening their doors.
North Korea began to urge the United States to refrain from
obstructing the dialogue and from giving military aid to South
Korea. In March 1974, P'yongyang proposed direct negotiations to
Washington on the question of replacing the "outdated" Korean
armistice agreement with a peace agreement. Relations between
North Korea and South Korea had, by 1975, become increasingly
complicated because of the ripple effect created by the fall of
the government in Saigon. Following Vietnam's reunification in
mid-1975, the Nixon administration reduced the United States
troop level in South Korea by about one-third. This move, in
conjunction with Nixon's opening to China, worried South Korea.
Leaders in both P'yongyang and Seoul talked increasingly
about the dangers of renewed military conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea called on South Koreans to overthrow
President Park's government and reiterated its support for what
it called a "massive popular struggle for independence and
democracy" in South Korea. In South Korea, the cry of "threat
from the North" became more shrill after Vietnam's reunification.
In August 1976, against the backdrop of escalating tensions along
the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ--see Glossary),
the telephone hot
line that had linked P'yongyang and Seoul ceased operations and
remained unused until February 1980.
In the late 1970s, North Korea and South Korea attempted to
revive their dialogue. In January 1979, North Korea agreed to
South Korea's proposal to resume talks unconditionally, but
preliminary talks held in February and March failed to narrow the
differences. North Korea maintained that the talks should be
within the framework of a "whole-nation congress" composed of
political and social groups from both sides. South Korea
countered that the talks should be on a government-to-government
basis without participation of nongovernmental mass
organizations.
In February 1980, preparatory talks got under way at
P'anmunjm in the DMZ. Through August 1980, the two sides met ten
times and agreed on several minor procedural and technical
points, even though they were unable to decide on an agenda for
the premiers' conference or on an interpretation of such terms as
"collaboration," "unity," and "peaceful reunification." Another
impediment was disagreement on whether the premiers' talks should
be treated as part of broader North-South contacts involving
various mass organizations--as North Korea contends--or whether
the talks should be on a more manageable government-to-government
basis--as South Korea demands. On September 24, 1980, two days
before the eleventh scheduled meeting, North Korea suspended the
talks, citing "the South Korean military fascist" policy of
seeking confrontation and division. On September 25, P'yongyang
also once again suspended operation of the telephone hot line. In
October 1980, at the Sixth Party Congress, Kim Il Sung proposed
the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Kory,
a system of unification based on mutual convenience and
toleration. According to the proposal, a single unified state
would be founded on the principle of coexistence, leaving the two
systems intact and federating the two governments. The Democratic
Confederal Republic of Kory, so named after a unified state that
previously existed in Korea (918-1392), is viewed by North Korea
as "the most realistic way of national reunification." A supreme
national assembly with an equal number of representatives from
north and south and an appropriate number of representatives of
overseas Koreans would be formed, with a confederal standing
committee to "guide the regional government of the north and the
south and to administer all the affairs of the confederal state."
The regional governments of the north and south would have
independent policies--within limits--consistent with the
fundamental interests and demands of the whole nation and strive
to narrow their differences in all areas.
The proposal provided that the supreme national confederal
assembly and the confederal standing committee--its permanent
organ and the de facto central government--would be the unified
government of the confederal state and, as such, would be
responsible for discussing and deciding domestic and foreign
affairs, matters of national defense, and other matters of common
concern related to the interests of the whole country and nation.
Further, the coordinated development of the country and nation
should be promoted. The confederal government would be neutral
and nonaligned. South Korea rejected the confederation as another
propaganda ploy.
No significant dialogue occurred between the two countries
until the middle of 1984, when South Korea suffered a devastating
flood. North Korea proposed to send relief goods to flood victims
in South Korea; the offer was accepted. This occasion provided
the momentum for both sides to resume their suspended dialogue.
In 1985 the two countries exchanged performing arts groups, and
ninety-two members of separated families met. In January 1986,
however, North Korea once again suddenly cut off all talks with
South Korea, blaming "Team Spirit," the annual United States-
South Korean joint military exercise.
After the inauguration of South Korean president Roh Tae Woo
in 1988, a more vigorous dialogue commenced between Seoul and
P'yongyang.
Nordpolitik (see Glossary),
South Korea's efforts
since 1984 to expand ties with the former communist bloc, and the
slowing pace of North Korea's economic development have
contributed to a basic change in P'yongyang's strategy toward
Seoul. Further encouraging this shift were the political upheaval
and demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, one of North Korea's key allies.
Subsequently, North Korea lost its guaranteed access to the
market once provided by the Soviet Union and its satellites. At
the same time, South Korea established commercial and diplomatic
relations with many East European countries. Next, the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council approved the
simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the UN in September 1991.
Five rounds of meetings were held alternately in Seoul and
P'yongyang before the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchanges, and Cooperation between the South and the North was
signed on December 13, 1991 (see
table 8, Appendix). The
agreement called for reconciliation and nonaggression on the
Korean Peninsula. Then North Korean premier Yon Hyong-muk called
the agreement "the most valuable achievement ever made between
the South and North Korean authorities." It was agreed that
further meetings would be held to resolve such issues as creating
a nuclear-free Korea, uniting divided families, and discussing
economic cooperation.
For the first time, North Korea "officially recognized" the
existence of South Korea. The accord called for North Korea and
South Korea to formally end the Korean War. Among the terms of
the accord are agreements to issue a joint declaration of
nonaggression, advance warning of troop movements and exercises,
and the installation of a hot line between top military
commanders. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchanges, and Cooperation has led to the establishment of
several joint North-South Korea subcommittees that are to work
out the specifics for implementing the general terms of the
accord. These subcommittees report to the committees that met in
conjunction with the prime ministerial level talks that had began
in September 1990. There are subcommittees on economic
cooperation affairs (concerning South Korea's commercial
investments in North Korea) and on trade and the opening of lines
of travel and communication (including telephonic) between the
two Koreas; cultural exchange, concerning the exchange of
entertainment and athletic groups and the joint sponsorship of
single teams to represent both Koreas in international sports
competitions; political affairs, on working to eliminate mutual
slander in their respective mass media and to abrogate laws
detrimental to improving understanding and cooperation; and
military affairs, on devising ways and means to reduce tensions
and exchange notice of military exercises. Separate from the
prime ministerial dialogue, yet closely associated with it, are
talks held between the North and South Korean Red Cross
organizations about reunification of families.
The two Koreas also agree that their peninsula should be
"free of nuclear weapons." The joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula calls for the
establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to
negotiate a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection
regime as called for in the declaration. Although negotiations in
all these areas produced substantive progress toward the drafting
of detailed accords for the terms of implementing the Agreement
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation,
nothing has been implemented as of mid-1993. As for negotiation
of a bilateral inspection regime, these talks also had not
achieved any significant progress by mid-1993.
Data as of June 1993
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