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Oman The Dhofar Rebellion
The Dhofar rebellion combined economic grievances with
political ideology. Placed in a regional context, Arab
nationalism, the principal ideology of the 1950s and
1960s,
indicted the conservative monarchs of the gulf and
demanded their
overthrow. Oman was susceptible to these populist
stirrings, and,
given Dhofar's economic backwardness, it was a tinderbox.
Dhofaris resonated with the Marxist ideology of the
People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, also seen as South
Yemen)
during the late 1960s. The primary objective of the Omani
liberation movement named the Popular Front for the
Liberation of
the Occupied Arabian Gulf (in 1972 renamed the Popular
Front for
the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf and in 1974
further
renamed the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman) was
the
removal of Sultan Said ibn Taimur. The government's
policies and
strategy after Sultan Qabus ibn Said's ascent to power
diffused
much of this opposition. Pacification occurred through the
dual
strategy of carrot and stick--military pressure and
economic
rewards.
Qabus ibn Said engaged neighboring states, apprehensive
of
the growth of left-wing movements in the region, in
dispatching
economic and military assistance. In 1973 the shah of
Iran,
fulfilling his self-perceived role as guardian of the
Persian
Gulf following the departure of the British, dispatched
ground
forces (eventually numbering more than 3,000) and air
units to
Dhofar to assist the sultan. Oman received annual
financial aid
of about US$200 million from Abu Dhabi to assist military
and
civil development projects and about US$2.5 billion from
Saudi
Arabia, with which relations had improved. Britain,
Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan provided training in military
schools
for armed forces personnel. The UAE and Jordan
occasionally
provided troop units for guard duty in the north, thereby
releasing Omani units for service in Dhofar.
To erode the Dhofaris' political will, Qabus ibn Said
directed a disproportionate percentage of government
revenues to
the southern region. The shift was designed in part to
augment
military capabilities in the event of a resumption of
hostilities
and in part as economic appeasement. The construction of
schools,
hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure ameliorated the
underprivileged status of the south.
Almost 25 percent of the approximately RO600 million
(US$1.8
billion) allocated for development between 1971 and 1975
went to
Dhofar to improve transportation, education, rural health,
and
religious facilities. This amount was spent on projects in
Dhofar, although the population only numbered about
50,000, in
comparison with the population of the rest of Oman of
400,000 in
the mid-1970s.
The government also benefited from factionalization
within
the insurrectionary movement. The movement in the region
had
originally been organized in 1963 under the Dhofar
Liberation
Front, led largely by Arab nationalists and religious
conservatives who could enlist support of tribal shaykhs
in a
common struggle against Sultan Said ibn Taimur. In 1968
the
Marxists took over leadership, having the support of the
PDRY,
the Soviet Union, and China. Conservative Dhofaris broke
with the
movement, and when Qabus ibn Said seized power in 1970,
many
agreed to support him against the insurgency. By the
mid-1970s,
as many as 2,000 rebels had surrendered, been retrained,
and
incorporated into the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) as
pledged
under the terms of the amnesty declared shortly after the
1970
coup.
The government based its new administration and
distribution
networks on preexisting tribal structures. The government
established centers headed by local representatives,
usually
minor tribal leaders elected by the population of their
respective districts but who had to be endorsed by the
governor
of Dhofar before assuming office. In the larger coastal
settlements, local deputy governors managed the district
administration independent of the governor of Dhofar. Most
of
these were major tribal shaykhs, who received a monthly
stipend
from the government and additional allowances, usually on
state
or religious holidays. The government's financial
allowances to
the shaykhs, irrespective of whether or not the shaykh
held an
administrative position, served to ensure allegiance to
authorities in Muscat. Two state institutions distributed
these
allowances: the finance section of the wali
(governor) and
the palace administration, popularly known as Diwan
Affairs.
Data as of January 1993
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