|
Pakistan
The Government of Nawaz Sharif
When Mian Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in November 1990,
his political coalition, the IJI, had more than a two- thirds
majority in the National Assembly. The IJI alliance, a grouping
of parties whose chief components were the PML and the JI, had
been formed in 1988 to oppose the PPP in the elections of that
year. In the 1988 elections, the PPP emerged as the single largest
group in the National Assembly, and its leader, Benazir, became
prime minister. At the same time, however, Nawaz Sharif emerged
as the most powerful politician outside the PPP. Just two years
later, the IJI under Nawaz Sharif's leadership achieved victory
at the polls, and Nawaz Sharif took over in a peaceful, constitutional
transfer of power--the third prime minister since Zia's death
in 1988 ushered in a return to democracy. Nawaz Sharif's ascendancy
also marked a transition in the political culture of Pakistan--a
power shift from the traditional feudal aristocracy to a growing
class of modern entrepreneurs. This transition mirrored the socioeconomic
changes that had been at work in Pakistan, moving the country
gradually from a feudal to an industrial society.
Nawaz Sharif, born in Lahore in 1949, belongs to a postindependence
generation of politicians. Scion of a leading industrial family,
he is a practicing Muslim, an ardent capitalist, and a political
moderate. A graduate of Government College Lahore, with a degree
from Punjab University Law College, also in Lahore, he rose to
prominence representing an urban constituency seeking its own
political identity. His family, along with other major industrial
families, had suffered from the nationalization of large industrial
enterprises during Bhutto's regime (1971-77). Nawaz Sharif had
worked to build a political constituency that would favor private
industrial and commercial entrepreneurship. He served in Punjab,
first as finance minister and then as chief minister, before coming
to national office. As finance minister, he presented development-oriented
budgets. As chief minister, he stressed welfare and development
activities and the maintenance of law and order.
In his first address to the nation after taking office as prime
minister, Nawaz Sharif announced his government's comprehensive
national reconstruction plan and said that its implementation
would ensure the successful march of Pakistan into the twenty-first
century. He stressed that proper use of the country's natural
resources would be made, the pace of industrialization expedited,
and the best use of talented manpower identified. Under his development
policy, investment would be encouraged, and restrictions on setting
up new industries would be lifted.
Early assessments of Nawaz Sharif and his government noted his
initiative, youthful energy, and already proven ability and popularity
in his home province, the country's power base. The newspaper
Dawn pointed out, however, that his Punjab connection
was both an asset and a liability and that "to acquire a genuinely
all-Pakistan stature, he will have to have ingenuity, and acumen,
magnanimity and vision, and the strength to take bold decisions."
Nawaz Sharif's cabinet initially included eighteen ministers:
nine from Punjab, two from the Islamabad Capital Territory, six
from Sindh, and one from Balochistan. His cabinet was later expanded
to include representation from the North-West Frontier Province.
Of paramount importance to the new government was implementation
of Nawaz Sharif's program for strengthening the economy. Goals
of the program included self-reliance, deregulation and denationalization,
taxation reform, foreign- exchange and payment reform, administrative
and law reform, and increases in agricultural productivity and
exports. The government's economic strategy rested on streamlining
the institutional framework for industrialization and on starting
a new partnership with the private sector in order to promote
common objectives. Nawaz Sharif regarded unemployment as Pakistan's
major problem and believed it could be solved only by rapid industrialization.
He said his government was considering special incentives for
rural industrialization and agro-based industries and was fully
committed to a policy of deregulation.
The IJI government was third in a line representing a dyarchical
arrangement of shared power between Pakistan's civil- military
and political forces. Nawaz Sharif and his predecessors, Junejo
and Benazir, came to power under a constitutional framework in
which, under the controversial Eighth Amendment introduced by
Zia, the president was empowered to dissolve the parliament and
dismiss the government. Both Junejo and Benazir had earlier been
unceremoniously dismissed from office, and the constitutional
framework limited Nawaz Sharif's ability to govern despite the
support of a majority in the parliament. He, too, would be dismissed
under the constitutional framework in 1993.
President Ishaq Khan had been credited with guiding Pakistan
back to democracy after eleven years of autocracy and martial
law under Zia. After Zia's death, Ishaq Khan, then chairman of
the Senate, was next in the line of succession as stipulated in
the constitution. The armed forces requested him to assume the
presidency. As acting president, Ishaq Khan instituted an emergency
council, and he and the council decided that general elections
would be held in November 1988 and that political parties would
be allowed to participate in them. When the PPP won these elections,
Ishaq Khan called on Benazir to form a government, and she was
sworn in as prime minister. Ishaq Khan was elected president by
a combined sitting of the national and provincial assemblies,
receiving 78 percent of the electoral votes. When Ishaq Khan dismissed
Benazir and her government in 1990, he again called a general
election. As a result, Nawaz Sharif was brought to power in 1990.
Pakistan's emerging two-party system was strengthened by the
1988 and 1990 elections and the constitutional transfer of power
in 1990 from Benazir to Nawaz Sharif. In these elections, the
two political alliances, the IJI and the PDA (headed by the PPP),
became the main contenders for power. Although both alliances
agreed on Pakistan's need for a liberal democracy and a market
economy, the PDA opposition represented a real political challenge
to the government, and Benazir conducted a relentless campaign
to oust Nawaz Sharif.
From the outset, the Nawaz Sharif government's record was mixed.
On the one hand, it achieved passage in May 1991 of the Shariat
Bill, which declared the Quran and the sunna
(see Glossary) to be the law of the land. Islamic fundamentalists,
on the other hand, did not think the bill went far enough. The
more secular-minded Pakistanis feared that a theocracy was being
established. A working group was set up to monitor and make recommendations
for enforcing Islamic laws in the country. The working group adopted
a nineteen-point plan that included calls for the implementation
of all Islamic legislation, especially the laws creating sharia
courts; transformation of the education system to reflect Islamic
teaching; controls on the print and electronic media designed
to ensure Islamic moral values; uniform and enforced prayer schedules;
and the establishment of an Islamic banking system and the total
abolition of interest.
Additionally, in November 1991 the Federal Shariat Court, Pakistan's
supreme religious court, declared the provisions of some twenty
federal and provincial laws repugnant to Islam. A particular problem
was the ruling that payment of interest (riba) was prohibited
by Islam even if the loan involved was for productive purposes.
Although the government had publicly committed itself to Islamization,
its major domestic policy initiative was the liberalization of
the economy. If the ruling on riba were fully implemented,
this new economic policy likely would fail. With no consensus
in Pakistan regarding either the content or the pace of Islamic
reform, Nawaz Sharif sought to strike an acceptable balance to
enable his government to remain in power.
The government also had to contend with rampant crime and terrorism,
which continued to be a cause for alarm in the country, particularly
in Sindh. Kidnappings, bombings, and murders persisted despite
concerted efforts by the police and the military to stem lawlessness.
Pakistanis called this state of affairs the Kalashnikov culture
because the flood of available automatic weapons gave long-standing
ethnic and political rivalries a deadly new significance (see
Prospects for Social Cohesion , ch. 2). The arms were largely
a legacy from the war in neighboring Afghanistan. The police were
increasingly outgunned, and even foreigners were not immune from
attack. In the summer of 1991, the prime minister was forced to
cancel an important trip to Japan in quest of investment in order
to calm a population shaken by a particularly savage string of
murders in Punjab. In an effort to stem the violence, the government
decreed that Pakistanis turn in their weapons, but, predictably,
few of them did. The government also passed the Twelfth Amendment
to the constitution, which provided for the further jurisdictional
authority of Speedy Trial Courts to dispense summary justice.
The opposition, however, criticized the law as suppressing fundamental
rights.
Nawaz Sharif held to his conviction that the solution to Pakistan's
political problems was free-market reform and economic growth,
so he liberalized foreign-exchange regulations and denationalized
public-sector industrial enterprises and financial institutions.
Furthermore, government approval was no longer required for the
establishment of new industrial enterprises (with some exceptions,
particularly in relation to arms and explosives). A number of
important industries such as electricity generation, shipping,
airlines, highway construction, and telecommunications were opened
up to the private sector. Although there was support for liberalizing
and privatizing the economy, there was considerable criticism
of the process of implementation. Some critics feared that moving
too fast could produce turmoil, with the resultant demand for
renationalization. Other critics asked for protection for the
more vulnerable groups in society who would not be able to compete
in a free market. The government's ability to focus effectively
on and deal with these problems was weakened by its involvement
with the Pakistan Cooperative Societies and the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (BCCI) financial scandals (see Finance
, ch. 3).
In keeping with his goals of consolidating economic growth and
overcoming the country's regional divisions, Nawaz Sharif was
convinced of the need for a modern national infrastructure, regardless
of cost. As a result, he launched the construction of a US$1 billion
superhighway project, which National Highway Authority chairman
Hidayat Niazi described as a step toward building a nation (see
Transportation , ch. 3).
Nawaz Sharif's government continued to be under pressure from
within and without, and his ruling coalition, the IJI, was plagued
by internal dissention. Tensions, disagreements, and political
rivalries were present within the IJI's largest component, the
Pakistan Muslim League. In May 1992, the fundamentalist JI, the
second largest member of the coalition, formally left the IJI.
Since its inception, the IJI had been an alliance of varied right-of-center
and Islamic parties in a marriage of convenience to oppose the
PPP. However, the PML and the JI had long been antagonists, and
their disagreements mounted over a number of issues. The JI was
unhappy with the IJI government's support of Saudi Arabia and
the United States during the Persian Gulf crisis (1990-91), fearing
that the defeat of Iraq would transform Shia (see Glossary) Iran
into a major regional power. The JI also criticized the mainstream
PML for what it perceived to be foot-dragging on Islamization,
including the matter of riba, as well as its abandonment
of support for the Afghan mujahidin in favor of efforts
to establish a neutral, United Nations-sponsored government in
Kabul. The JI also criticized the government's policy on Kashmir
as not evidencing sufficient commitment to Islamic "freedom fighters"
there.
The government's chief opposition, Benazir and the PPP, criticized
Nawaz Sharif's efforts at privatization, calling them the "loot
and plunder" of Pakistan and saying his plan favored large investors
and ran roughshod over labor. Benazir was also critical of the
government's Islamization policies and continued to allege that
the 1990 elections, which brought Nawaz Sharif's government to
power, were fraudulent. In late 1992, she tried to organize widespread
protest marches against the government. In response, Nawaz Sharif
banned Benazir from two of the country's largest cities and ordered
police measures against her supporters.
Benazir ultimately did not muster enough demonstrators throughout
the country to threaten the government. However, Nawaz Sharif's
actions, in the eyes of some, made him appear too willing to espouse
repressive measures rather than adhere to democratic principles.
Subsequently, relations between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir appeared
to soften somewhat. He reportedly ceased calling her an "enemy
of Pakistan," and Benazir abandoned her demonstrations designed
to topple Nawaz Sharif's government through street power.
The ruling coalition appeared to weaken by early 1993. The four
major powers in Pakistan continued to be the president, the military,
Nawaz Sharif's IJI government, and the PPP opposition led by Benazir.
Reports of a growing rift between Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan
became more commonplace. The military--which never had an overt
constitutional role in the government but which had historically
been a key player in the formation and dismissal of governments--was
closely and nervously monitored by observers.
Data as of April 1994
|
