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Pakistan
The United States and the West
Although Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by problems
with India as well as by efforts to maximize its own external
support, its relationship with the West, particularly Britain
and the United States, was of major importance. At independence
in 1947, Pakistan became a member of the British Commonwealth
of Nations. After independence Pakistan retained Britons in high
administrative and military positions. Britain also was the primary
source of military supplies and officer training. Many of Pakistan's
key policy makers, including the nation's founding father, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah, had studied in Britain and had great faith in the
British sense of justice. Over the years, however, there was disillusionment
at what Pakistanis perceived as Britain's indifference toward
Pakistan and its failure to treat Pakistan fairly in dealings
where India was involved. Nevertheless, Pakistan remained in the
Commonwealth even after the country became a republic under the
constitution of 1956. Pakistan withdrew its membership in the
Commonwealth in 1972 to protest the recognition of Bangladesh
by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand but rejoined in October
1989 under Benazir's first government.
Pakistan's relations with the United States developed against
the backdrop of the Cold War. Pakistan's strategic geographic
position made it a valuable partner in Western alliance systems
to contain the spread of communism. In 1954 Pakistan signed a
Mutual Defense Agreement with the United States and subsequently
became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
and CENTO. These agreements placed Pakistan in the United States
sphere of influence. Pakistan was also used as a base for United
States military reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory.
During the Cold War years, Pakistan was considered one of Washington's
closest allies in Asia.
Pakistan, in return, received large amounts of economic and military
assistance. The program of military assistance continued until
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War when President Lyndon B. Johnson placed
an embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan and India. The United
States embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan remained in place
during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and was not lifted until
1975, during the administration of President Gerald R. Ford.
United States-Pakistani relations preceding the 1971 war were
characterized by poor communication and much confusion. The administration
of President Richard M. Nixon was forced to formulate a public
stance on the brutal crackdown on East Pakistanis by West Pakistani
troops that began in March 25, 1971, and it maintained that the
crackdown was essentially an internal affair of Pakistan in which
direct intervention of outside powers was to be avoided. The Nixon
administration expressed its concern about human rights violations
to Pakistan and restricted the flow of assistance--yet it stopped
short of an open condemnation.
Despite the United States widely publicized "tilt" toward Pakistan
during the 1971 war, Pakistan's new leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
felt betrayed. In his opinion, the United States could have prevented
India from intervening in Pakistan's civil war, thereby saving
his country the trauma of defeat and dismemberment. Bhutto now
strove to lessen Pakistan's dependence on the United States.
The foreign policy Bhutto envisioned would place Pakistan at
the forefront of Islamic nations. Issues central to the developing
world would take precedence in foreign affairs over those of the
superpowers. Bhutto called this policy "bilateralism," which implied
neutrality in the Cold War with equal treatment accorded both
superpowers. Bhutto's distancing of Islamabad from Washington
and other Western links was accompanied by Pakistan's renewed
bid for leadership in the developing world.
Following the loss of the East Wing, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO.
Pakistan's military links with the West continued to decline throughout
Bhutto's tenure in power and into the first years of the Zia regime.
CENTO was disbanded following the fall of the shah of Iran in
March 1979, and Pakistan then joined the Nonaligned Movement.
Zia also continued Bhutto's policy of developing Pakistan's nuclear
capability. This policy had originated as a defensive measure
in reaction to India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974.
In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter cut off economic assistance
to Pakistan, except for food assistance, as required under the
Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This
amendment called for ceasing economic assistance to nonnuclear
weapon countries that imported uranium-enrichment technology.
Relations between the United States and Pakistan were further
strained in November 1979 when protesters sacked the United States
embassy in Islamabad, resulting in the death of four persons.
The violence had been sparked by a false report that the United
States was involved in a fire at the Grand Mosque in Mecca.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 revived the
close relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Initially,
however, the Carter administration's offer the following month
of US$400 million in economic and military aid to Pakistan was
spurned by Zia, who termed it "peanuts." Under President Ronald
Reagan, the United States agreed in 1981 to provide US$3.2 billion
to Pakistan over a period of six years, equally divided between
economic and military assistance. However, although the Symington
Amendment was waived, the amount was subject to the annual appropriation
process. A second economic and military assistance program was
announced in 1986, this time for over US$4.0 billion, with 57
percent for economic assistance. The continuation of the war in
Afghanistan led to waivers--in the case of Pakistan--of legislative
restrictions on providing aid to countries with nuclear programs.
The Pressler Amendment of 1985 required that if the United States
president could not certify to Congress on an annual basis that
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon, United States assistance
to that country would be cut off. For several years, the United
States president, with Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear
program was for peaceful uses, was able to make this certification.
However, with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and
the end of the Cold War, the United States took a harder position
on the nuclear weapons issue. In 1990 President George Bush refused
to make the certification required under the Pressler Amendment,
and assistance to Pakistan was subsequently terminated.
After 1990 Pakistan's retention of the nuclear option became
a defining issue in its relations with the United States. Pakistan,
like India, considered the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons to be discriminatory--allowing the five acknowledged nuclear
states to keep their weapons while banning others from joining
the club. Pakistan declared that it would sign the treaty only
in the unlikely event that India did so first. India refused to
join any regional accord as long as China possessed nuclear weapons.
Although the United States government continued to push both India
and Pakistan for a regional solution to the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation, Pakistan complained that it bore the brunt
of United States antiproliferation policies.
The underpinnings of the long and close security relationship
between the United States and Pakistan existed as of early 1994,
although the 1954 Mutual Defense Agreement on which the relationship
rested was increasingly regarded by some in the United States
government as outdated--and thus less pertinent to the post-Cold
War period. Moreover, despite Pakistan's differences with the
position of the United States on nuclear and other issues, both
countries were determined to maintain friendly relations.
Data as of April 1994
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