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Poland The Olszewski Government
After five weeks of struggle, Walesa reluctantly
acceded to a
Sejm coalition of five center-right parties by nominating
Jan
Olszewski of the Center Alliance as prime minister.
Relations
between the two men had been strained in early 1990 by
Olszewski's initial refusal of the position of prime
minister and
by Walesa's fear that Olszewski would abandon the
Balcerowicz
economic reforms. At that point, Walesa had even
threatened to
assume the duties of prime minister himself.
Although supported by a fragile, unlikely coalition
that
included the Confederation for an Independent Poland and
the
Liberal-Democratic Congress, Olszewski was confirmed as
prime
minister. Within days, however, the coalition began to
disintegrate. Although the Liberal-Democratic Congress had
been
promised a decisive role in setting economic policy, the
futility
of that promise soon drove the party out of the coalition.
Next
to leave was the ultranationalist Confederation for
Independent
Poland, which was alienated when it was denied control of
the
Ministry of National Defense
(see Confederation for an Independent Poland
, this ch.). A frustrated Olszewski
submitted
his resignation only two weeks after his nomination.
The Sejm rejected Olszewski's resignation, sensing that
no
other nominee was likely to form a more viable government
at that
time. The prime minister survived mainly because of
unexpected
support from a party outside the coalition, the Polish
Peasant
Party, which won several key ministerial appointments in
the
political bargain. Nevertheless, dissension within the
coalition
continued to weaken and isolate the prime minister at the
same
time that the two largest parties in the
Sejm--Mazowiecki's
Democratic Union and the Social Democracy of the Republic
of
Poland, heir to the PZPR--openly opposed the government.
Although condemning the previous two governments for
the deep
recession and budget crisis, Olszewski had very little
room to
maneuver and continued the austerity policies initiated by
those
governments. Far from easing the pain of economic
transition,
Olszewski was forced to impose steep energy and
transportation
price increases. Government spending could not be
increased
without jeopardizing crucial credit arrangements with the
International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary).
A critical vote in the Sejm in March 1992 rejected the
government's economic program outline and revealed the
untenable
position of the prime minister. The program, constructed
by the
head of the Office of Central Planning, Jerzy Eysymontt,
called
for continued sacrifice, reduced government spending, and
higher
prices for traditionally subsidized goods and services.
This
program clearly conflicted with the government's promises
for a
rapid breakthrough and a reversal of Balcerowicz's
austerity
policies
(see Economic Policy Making in the 1990s
, ch. 3).
Efforts to bring the major opposition parties into the
governing coalition began in 1992, but preliminary talks
produced
nothing and alienated coalition members who had not been
consulted in advance. Some members objected to all
compromises
with the Liberal-Democratic Congress and the Democratic
Union.
One such member was the Christian National Union, a strong
supporter of Olszewski, which dominated his cabinet and
advanced
a Roman Catholic agenda incompatible with the secular
views of
the two opposition parties. The most problematic issue
upon which
the parties disagreed was the state's position on
abortion.
The Sejm's rejection of his economic program convinced
Olszewski to push harder for expansion of his coalition.
In the
days following the vote, Olszewski personally offered
economic
compromise to Mazowiecki in exchange for support by the
Democratic Union. Mazowiecki insisted on a dominant role
in
economic policy and inclusion of his allied parties in a
restructured government. Several weeks of amicable
negotiations
failed to enlarge Olszewski's coalition.
Even as he sought potential coalition partners and
proposed
economic compromises, Olszewski alienated the opposition
and,
most importantly, President Walesa, by his partisan
leadership
style and personnel policies at all levels of
administration.
Two members of Olszewski's cabinet defied presidential
prerogatives in highly publicized, politically
destabilizing
incidents. First, Minister of National Defense Jan Parys
enraged
Walesa by failing to consult him in making key personnel
decisions, a failure that led to dismissal of Parys for
making
public accusations that members of the president's circle
planned
a coup. Then the circulation of an unsubstantiated list of
sixtytwo current and former government officials alleged to
have
collaborated with the communist secret police caused a
major
upheaval. Walesa charged that the list threatened the
stability
of the state and required the dismissal of the Olszewski
government. The Sejm then voted Olszewski out of office in
June
1992 by the substantial margin of 273 to 119 votes.
Olszewski and his cabinet did not leave office quietly.
The
outgoing government launched unprecedented personal
attacks on
Walesa, accusing him of presiding over the recommunization
of
Poland. Walesa replied that Olszewski had issued orders to
place
on alert security forces in Warsaw, including the
presidential
guard, as a prelude to a coup d'état.
Data as of October 1992
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