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Poland Soviet Union and Russia
The geopolitical realities of postwar Europe allowed
Poland
little room to maneuver in foreign policy. Until the late
1980s,
the ever present threat of Soviet intervention kept Poland
a
compliant member of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, Jaruzelski
maintained that the decision to impose martial law in
December
1981 was taken to preempt a Soviet invasion. Such an
invasion
would have been consistent with the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which
justified military intervention in any Warsaw Pact member
where
socialism was threatened. In early 1992, Jaruzelski's
claim
received corroboration when a high official in the former
Red
Army revealed the Soviet Union's plan to invade Poland at
the end
of 1981 under precisely that pretext.
In the late 1980s, the Brezhnev Doctrine was suspended
when
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev enunciated a new world
view,
which he called "new thinking." For the first time in the
postwar
era, the Soviet Union acknowledged the right of its East
European
neighbors to pursue their own paths of social and economic
development. Thus, Moscow reluctantly accepted Poland's
1989
Round Table Agreement, the defeat of the communists in
Poland's
first open parliamentary elections, and the ensuing
installation
of a noncommunist government as beyond its legitimate
concern.
As the first postcommunist leadership of Poland, the
Mazowiecki government approached its relationship with the
Soviet
Union with cautious resolve, reassuring Moscow that Poland
would
fulfill its obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon. Nevertheless, Poland soon demonstrated its
determination
to transform these Soviet-dominated military and economic
alliances into consultative bodies respecting the
sovereignty of
all member countries. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski guided
foreign affairs skillfully through this delicate period,
as the
Warsaw Pact, Comecon, and the Soviet Union itself
disintegrated.
Among the difficult issues the new government
confronted in
redefining its relationship with the Soviet Union were the
presence of some 58,000 Soviet troops on Polish territory;
the
future role of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; new terms of
bilateral trade; the plight of more than 1 million ethnic
Poles
living on Soviet territory; clarification of the "blank
spots" in
the history of Soviet-Polish relations; and the Polish
relationship to Soviet republics seeking independence.
Skubiszewski handled the issue of Soviet troop
withdrawal
delicately. In negotiating with Moscow, the government
faced
accusations of timidity from presidential candidate Walesa
on the
one hand and the risk of antagonizing Moscow and
strengthening
the position of Kremlin hardliners on the other. Walesa
and some
of the center-right parties believed the Mazowiecki
government
was moving too cautiously on the issue. But Mazowiecki
viewed
Warsaw Pact forces as a counterbalance to a reunited,
possibly
expansionist Germany. In September 1990, Mazowiecki
yielded to
domestic pressure by demanding negotiations on the
withdrawal of
Soviet forces and cleanup of the extensive environmental
damage
they had caused
(see Environmental Conditions and Crises
, ch. 2).
By the end of 1990, the Polish side was pushing Moscow to
remove
all its forces within one year.
Postcommunist Poland's trade relationship with the
Soviet
Union also presented a complex problem. Moscow was
Poland's most
important trading partner, the source of nearly all its
imported
oil and gas, and the market for 70 percent of its
industrial
exports. Poland had benefited from the comfortable if
inefficient
Comecon trading arrangements of administered prices
denominated
in transferable rubles. Although the impending end of
Comecon
clearly signaled the need for drastic reorientation of
trade
policy, in 1990 no source could replace rapidly the
fundamental
supplies available from the old system. Thus, Moscow
retained its
economic influence on Polish foreign policy despite
Gorbachev's
pledges to respect Polish sovereignty.
Yet another obstacle to normalized relations was the
legacy
of Stalin's crimes against the Polish people in World War
II and
the plight of Polish nationals who remained in Soviet
territory
after the war. In April 1990, Gorbachev finally
acknowledged
Soviet culpability in the massacre of thousands of Polish
officers in the Katyn Forest, which until that time the
Soviets
had attributed to the German army despite widespread
knowledge of
the true situation
(see World War II
, ch. 1). Indeed,
early in
1989 the Jaruzelski government had declared that Stalin's
secret
police, not the German army, had committed the atrocities.
Gorbachev's action in 1990 did not placate Poland. The
Polish
government continued to demand information on critical
"blank
spots" in the history of the World War II era, notably the
fate
of Poles whom Stalin exiled to Siberia and Central Asia.
In 1990 and 1991, the Bielecki government continued
Mazowiecki's policy toward Moscow. The withdrawal of
Soviet
forces, the interruption of oil and gas deliveries, and
the
collapse of the Soviet market for Polish exports dominated
bilateral relations during Bielecki's tenure. Moscow's
decision
to shift to hard-currency trade at world prices as of
January 1,
1992 had painful consequences for Poland. In response to
severe
disruption of its export market, fuel delivery, and
domestic
employment, Warsaw established ad hoc barter arrangements
with
the Soviet Union and individual neighboring republics.
Meanwhile, on the security front, the Soviets pressured
Poland and other members of the dying Warsaw Pact to sign
new
bilateral treaties giving Moscow the right to veto entry
into
alliances inimical to Soviet interests. Among the East
European
nations formerly in the Soviet sphere, however, only
Romania
yielded to Moscow's pressure. Poland refused to surrender
its
sovereign right to choose allies. After a failed attempt
by
hardliners to take over the Soviet government in August
1991,
Moscow dropped its demand, and bilateral negotiations
proceeded
more smoothly.
The coup attempt in the Soviet Union placed Warsaw in a
precarious situation and emphasized the real possibility
that
Soviet hegemony would return to Eastern Europe if
reactionaries
overthrew Gorbachev. For Warsaw such a scenario was quite
plausible because substantial Soviet forces remained in
Poland
and the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
at the
time of the coup, and no bilateral treaty guaranteed
withdrawal.
Although Walesa's official statements during the crisis
affirmed
Poland's sovereignty and commitment to democracy, later
rumors
suggested that he had considered recognizing the Moscow
junta.
Galvanized by the coup events, Poland pressed the
Soviet
Union for a withdrawal timetable. In October 1991, the
countries
initialed a treaty providing for the removal of all combat
troops
by November 15, 1992, leaving only 6,000 support personnel
by the
beginning of 1993. Signature of a final treaty, however,
was
delayed by disagreement on compensation details. Moscow
claimed
compensation for fixed assets left in Poland, while Warsaw
demanded compensation for damage done to its environment
and
infrastructure by the basing and transport of Soviet
troops and
equipment. Walesa and Russian president Boris Yeltsin
signed the
final accords in May 1992.
The presidents also signed several other bilateral
agreements
on that occasion. The most important was a new cooperation
treaty
to replace the Polish-Soviet friendship treaty of 1965.
The
breakthrough on the new treaty had come soon after the
failed
August coup, which dramatically changed the relationship
among
the republics of the Soviet Union. Moscow conceded to
Poland the
right to pursue its own security relationships and to deal
directly with individual republics. During his Moscow
visit,
Walesa announced the beginning of a new chapter in
Polish-Russian
relations; in return, Yeltsin expressed hope for mutual
understanding and partnership in future relations.
Walesa's visit to Moscow also yielded a Polish-Russian
consular convention; a declaration on cultural,
scientific, and
educational cooperation; a provisional settlement of the
issue of
double taxation; and an agreement on border crossing
points. The
presidents issued a joint statement condemning the crimes
of
Stalinism against both the Polish and Russian peoples and
pledging to base bilateral relations on the principles of
international law, democracy, and the observance of human
rights.
Data as of October 1992
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