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Portugal The Military Takeover of 1974
As the inconclusive colonial wars of the 1960s and
early
1970s dragged on, support for them turned to indifference
at
home. Separated from home and family during repeated
twenty-four
month tours of duty, military professionals felt
increasingly
estranged and demoralized. White officers, especially
those
commanding black troops, were often hostile to the white
settlers
over their treatment of blacks and in many cases were
sympathetic
to black aspirations for freedom. The mounting antiwar
sentiment
in Portugal was reflected in a growing rate of desertion
and
failures of conscripts to report for duty. Evasion of
combat by
unenthusiastic conscripts and university graduates
commissioned
as junior officers (milicianos) became increasingly
common. Many of the milicianos formed a radical
element
that agitated against Portugal's involvement in overseas
wars.
Traditionally, the officer corps had been the preserve
of
younger sons of wealthy families and sons of officers who
could
afford the tuition charged by the Military Academy.
Military
careers were sought by wealthy candidates more for
prestige than
reward because pay was relatively poor compared with that
of
other professions. The low salaries of senior officers,
however,
were often augmented by remunerative sinecures as
corporation
board members. Extended periods of leave to work in the
private
sector were not unusual.
In 1958 the Military Academy, failing to attract
anywhere
near the numbers of cadets needed for the army, ended its
tuition
requirements, and henceforth the student body was
dominated by
sons of shopkeepers, smallholders, and lower-level
provincial
bureaucrats who could not have afforded a university
education
earlier. This new class of cadets expected that after
graduation
they would enter the peaceful garrison life at home or in
the
colonies that the Portuguese army had known for
generations.
Instead, they were thrown directly into the colonial wars
and
eventually became the disgruntled captains who instigated
the
revolution.
A number of events in the 1960s and 1970s helped to
coalesce
revolutionary sentiment in the military. One such event
was the
loss of the Portuguese Goa. In 1961 the Portuguese enclave
of Goa
on the coast of India was threatened by an Indian invasion
force
of some 30,000. The 3,000 Portuguese troops in Goa were
badly
equipped and unprepared to put up more than token
resistance. In
spite of Salazar's insistence that the colony should be
defended,
it was quickly overrun. Salazar punished the army for its
failure
to make a stand by ordering a number of dismissals and
other
penalties. The army, in turn, blamed the Goan debacle on
Salazar
and resented the punishments that they felt humiliated the
entire
officer corps.
Further undermining the loyalty of career officers was
Decree
Law 353-73, issued by the government of Prime Minister
Marcello
Caetano. The decree law stated that nonregular officers,
in most
cases milicianos commissioned after a short army
course,
would be permitted to convert to a regular commission at
their
conscript rank and to receive the same consideration for
promotion as those who had graduated from the Military
Academy.
Career officers felt that the decree undermined their
status in
the army, as well as in society.
The growing dissatisfaction, based largely among junior
career officers, led to the formation in 1973 of the
Captains'
Movement. This ad hoc committee of career officers--mostly
captains--initially banded together to give voice to their
professional grievances. In a short time, the captains
found that
their grievances were shared by career officers of the
navy and
the air force, as well as noncareer officers of all
services. The
Captains' Movement became the Armed Forces Movement
(Movimento
das Forças Armadas--MFA) and emerged in November 1973 as a
fullblown dissident group whose clandestine membership ranged
across
the political spectrum. In addition to the question of
professional status, officers were discontented over their
low
pay and long postings abroad under harsh conditions. They
were
also disturbed over the lack of modern equipment to match
the
arms furnished to the African insurgents by the Soviet
Union, the
East European countries, and China. A reason for this
disadvantage was that the United States and several other
NATO
countries had imposed an embargo on the shipment of arms
to
Portugal that might be employed against the African
liberation
movements.
Dissent among senior officers with the government's
conduct
of the colonial wars was centered in two groups. The right
wing
was associated with General Kaúlza de Arriaga, the former
commander in chief in Mozambique, who conspired to seize
power to
enforce a military solution to the wars in Africa. More
moderate
officers, such as Chief of Staff General Francisco de
Costa Gomes
and General Spínola, who had been named deputy chief of
staff,
favored negotiation with the liberation movements.
Spínola's
influential book, Portugal and the Future,
advocating a loose confederation with the African colonies
because military victory was impossible, hardened the
resolve of
the increasingly radical MFA plotters.
In March 1974, when Spínola and Costa Gomes failed to
appear
at a public ceremony in which they were to endorse
existing
policy in Africa, Caetano fired both of them. A premature
coup
attempt followed Spínola's dismissal, but loyal troops
turned
back a column marching on Lisbon. No shots were fired, but
many
officers were arrested or transferred. Five weeks later,
on April
25, 1974, the main group of MFA conspirators deposed the
Caetano
government without resistance by the loyalist forces. The
chief
architect of the meticulously planned coup was the leftist
major
(later brigadier general) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.
The MFA quickly appointed a board of seven
officers--the
Junta of National Salvation--with General Spínola at its
head to
govern the country according to the MFA program. Assuming
power
for the first time in almost fifty years, the military
pledged
that authority would be transferred to a new government
when
constitutional institutions freely chosen by the people
had been
established.
Friction developed almost immediately between the thenanonymous leadership of the MFA and President Spínola's
junta
over the issue of the pace and direction of
decolonization. The
MFA favored immediate dissolution of the links with the
colonies
and withdrawal of Portuguese forces, whereas Spínola
favored a
gradual solution leading to limited autonomy within a
Portuguese
federation. Most conscript officers and men were anxious
to
abandon the struggle in Africa and return home. Although
Spínola
had wide popular appeal, his position was shaky because he
was
viewed as insufficiently committed to the revolution by
radicals
controlling the MFA. A powerful weapon in the hands of the
MFA
was an elite military organization--Continental Operations
Command (Comando Operacional do Continente--COPCON)--with
Carvalho at its head. Formed in July 1974 of paratroopers,
marines, and army commandos, its mission was to control
rising
political and labor violence at a time when the police
were
reluctant to appear on the streets to enforce the law.
In September 1974, after Spínola's rightist supporters
attempted without success to dislodge the left-wing inner
circle
of the MFA from control, he resigned the presidency. The
leftist
climate within the military strengthened as the MFA
continued to
shift radical officers into key positions while sidelining
those
considered to lack revolutionary zeal. Nevertheless, when
officers were able to express their choice by ballot,
support for
the left wing seemed weak, and many officers were eager to
return
to the barracks.
After conservative military units backing Spínola
mounted an
abortive countercoup in March 1975, Spínola and other
officers
were forced to flee to Spain by helicopter. The MFA moved
rapidly
to consolidate its control, setting up a Council of the
Revolution that consisted of the leading MFA officers. The
council had the power to control the presidency and a veto
over
the legislative process.
Elections held for the Constituent Assembly in April
1975
showed the communist and ultra-left parties to be in the
minority. The MFA continued to advance revolutionary plans
but
became increasingly factionalized in the mounting
political
turbulence. The angry reaction to takeovers of the
pro-socialist
opposition newspaper and of the Roman Catholic radio
station by
ultra-leftists, together with attacks against communists
by
conservative northern peasants, attested to a shift in the
tide
against radical elements.
Discipline began to break down within the armed forces
under
the anarchic conditions prevailing in the late summer and
fall of
1975. Moderates, still a majority among the officers,
gradually
improved their position. A left-wing coup attempt by air
force
paratroopers and various Lisbon army detachments was
decisively
put down by a well-organized countercoup on November 25,
1975.
COPCON was dissolved, Carvalho and 200 other radical
officers
were arrested, and others were purged from the armed
forces. With
the moderate element of the MFA firmly in charge, the
military
formally agreed to hand power back to the civilians after
a new
constitution was drawn up.
Data as of January 1993
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