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Portugal Intelligence Services
The existence in Portugal of an intelligence apparatus
for
political surveillance and control was as old as the
modern state
and dated at least from the sixteenth century. Under
Salazar,
however, a secret police organization of extensive and
pervasive
influence became a formidable component of his
authoritarian
regime. The secret police, called the International Police
for
the Defense of the State (Polícia Internacional e de
Defesa do
Estado--PIDE), although under jurisdiction of the Ministry
of
Justice, was in fact controlled directly by Salazar. Under
revisions of the law after 1954, PIDE officers were
entitled to
act as inquiring magistrates empowered to detain for trial
persons suspected of crimes against the state. Suspects
were
routinely arrested without warrants and often held for
months
without specific charges brought against them and without
access
to legal assistance. Disappearance and torture were
commonplace.
Agents of PIDE carried out covert operations within
communist
organizations, the government-run labor unions, the armed
forces,
the universities, and the Portuguese emigré communities
abroad.
During the 1960s and 1970s, PIDE directed its efforts to
suppressing opposition to the war effort in the African
colonies,
particularly on university campuses, and to tracking down
antiregime terrorists responsible for bombing military and
strategic installations.
Although PIDE was renamed the General Security
Directorate
(Direcção Geral de Segurança--DGS) by Marcello Caetano's
government, it retained its old image. The abhorrence felt
for it
was so strong that it was abolished in Portugal the day
after the
Caetano regime was toppled. Abuses by the security
apparatus were
subsequently reported in detail in the Portuguese press,
causing
even more revulsion among the public. Outrage over the
prolonged
detention and torture of suspected terrorists and
opposition
politicians resulted in the arrest of PIDE-DGS agents and
investigations of past operations of the organization.
The lingering specter of PIDE and DGS as pillars of the
authoritarian regime in the memory of the Portuguese
people
delayed the establishment of a new civilian intelligence
agency
for more than a decade. Following an Armenian terrorist
attack on
the Embassy of Turkey in 1983, the assassination of a
Palestine
Liberation Organization representative at a Socialist
International conference the same year, and a number of
domestic
terrorist attacks, the Portuguese government became
convinced of
the need for a new intelligence agency. After the passage
of
authorizing legislation in late 1984, the Intelligence
System of
the Republic of Portugal (Sistema de Informações da
República
Portuguesa--SIRP) was established in 1986. SIRP was
intended to
be the parent body for three separate intelligence
services: the
Security Intelligence Service (Serviço de Informações e
Segurança--SIS), the Military Intelligence Service
(Serviço de
Informações Militares--SIM), and the Defense Strategic
Intelligence Service (Serviço de Informações Estratégicas
de
Defesa--SIED). SIS, under the minister of internal
administration, was given the mission of gathering
intelligence
to ensure internal security and to prevent sabotage,
terrorism,
espionage, and acts that could alter or destroy the
constitutionally established state of law. SIM was
intended to
replace the Military Intelligence Division of the armed
forces,
but the transition had not been effected as of 1991.
Military
intelligence continued to be the responsibility of the
chief of
staff of the armed forces. Its authority was limited to
gathering
intelligence needed to carry out the missions of the armed
forces
and to guarantee military security, although some
strategic
intelligence collection abroad was reportedly also
conducted.
Under the 1984 legislation, SIED, reporting directly to
the
prime minister, was to be responsible for producing
intelligence
needed to safeguard the independence and external security
of the
Portuguese state. The government had decided to defer the
creation of SIED, however, asserting that the limited
financial
resources available should be dedicated to developing an
effective internal security organization rather than an
agency
focusing on external security. Thus, SIS was the only arm
of the
intelligence apparatus operating as contemplated in the
1984
legislation. SIS functioned under considerable handicaps,
employing only about eighty persons as of 1990. Its sole
office
was in Lisbon, although branches were planned for Porto,
Ponta
Delgada, and Funchal. SIS agents were not authorized to
make
searches or arrests, to intercept correspondence or tap
telephones, or to intervene in normal criminal cases.
Although no
SIS agents were known to have been exposed to violence,
they were
entitled to hazardous duty pay at about 30 percent above
normal
civil service scales.
The 1984 security law prohibited the employment of
former
PIDE agents in any Portuguese intelligence function.
Accordingly,
SIS was launched with few adequately qualified
individuals. In
spite of a public recruiting drive, analysts estimated
that it
would be some years before Portugal could boast of a
domestic
intelligence service staffed with fully seasoned
personnel.
In light of the history of violations of civil rights
by
PIDE, several bodies were formed to monitor the activities
of the
Portuguese intelligence community. The Council to Oversee
the
Intelligence Services, composed of three deputies elected
by the
Assembly of the Republic, was mandated to review the
actions of
the intelligence services and report its findings annually
to the
Assembly of the Republic. The Commission to Control Data,
made up
of three judges, monitored the intelligence data center to
protect individuals against any collection of data
violating
their rights under the Constitution. The Superior
Intelligence
Council, a twelve-member interministerial body, advised
the prime
minister and coordinated intelligence matters.
Data as of January 1993
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