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Portugal STRATEGIC CONCEPTS UNDERLYING THE PORTUGUESE DEFENSE POSTURE
Historically, Portugal has had two essential security
objectives: the protection of its colonial empire, and the
maintenance of its status as a distinctive national entity
on the
Iberian Peninsula. The nation's geographic position--a
band of
territory on the Atlantic coast, isolated from the main
powers of
Europe--has always been central to its strategic thinking.
Portugal has never been strong enough to defend itself
without
assistance, but it had a long tradition of resistance to
the
presence of foreign troops on its soil. Accordingly, it
has
followed a policy of aligning itself with the leading
naval power
of the time. Its alliance with Britain, first established
by the
1386 Treaty of Windsor, has been periodically reaffirmed
until
the twentieth century. After World War II and the creation
of
NATO, a close relationship with the United States came to
be
regarded as essential to preserving the country's overseas
possessions. The nation's territorial integrity has not
been even
remotely threatened since the Napoleonic period, nor have
immediate concerns of national security been the most
compelling
factors in military planning or the decision to join NATO.
Rather, the country's participation in NATO until the
mid-1970s
was primarily aimed at winning political and military
support for
its colonial policies in Africa.
Portugal made only a marginal contribution to NATO
during the
Salazar and Caetano eras, and its involvement in Africa
alienated
it from the other members of the alliance. However, the
prevailing Portuguese attitude after 1974 was favorable to
greater Portuguese activity in NATO and the defense of the
West,
based on recognition of the dangers represented by the
Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. Public opinion polls in
Portugal
reflected a decidedly pro-Atlantic, pro-NATO sentiment,
especially when compared with that of other countries in
NATO's
southern tier, such as Spain and Greece. The events of
1974-75,
when Portuguese communists gained control of important
functions
of the state and deeply infiltrated the military,
solidified the
majority perception that the nation's interests lay in
association with the West European community and NATO. The
upheavals of 1974-75, together with Moscow's role in
supporting
the African liberation movements, inclined the Portuguese
military leaders to regard the Soviet Union as a hostile
power
against which the country must constantly remain vigilant.
In geostrategic terms, the country is perceived as a
narrow
strip along the Atlantic flank of the Iberian Peninsula
that,
together with the archipelagoes of Madeira and Azores,
forms the
Portuguese "strategic triangle." It occupies an
intermediate
position between the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas and
between
Europe and Africa. The strategic triangle is crossed by
important
sea and air lines of communication, linking North America
and the
east coast of South America to Europe, southern Africa to
Europe,
and the Mediterranean lands to Northern Europe. In the
event of
an East-West confrontation, the defense of these waters
would be
imperative for reinforcing the European southern flank.
The
Portuguese territories and waters would also be critical
to
control over the Straits of Gibraltar. The Lajes Air Base
in the
Azores, in addition to its advanced position for air
resupply, is
ideal for surveillance of the Atlantic and the conduct of
antisubmarine warfare. As stated by United States
Secretary of
State George Shultz in 1984, "...the Azores base is
pivotal if
the United States is to react effectively to military
challenges
in Europe or to threats to Western security outside NATO."
The military doctrine incorporated in the Portuguese
strategic concept emphasized the role of air and naval
components
to protect communications linking the Azores, Madeira, and
the
Portuguese mainland. This task always necessitated the
employment
of naval vessels equipped for antisubmarine warfare and
the use
of the "angles" of the strategic triangle as bases for
maritime
patrol and interceptor aircraft. Another part of
Portuguese
strategic thinking stressed the growing ability of the
North
African countries--Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--to engage
in
modern military operations. Regional or religious
conflicts in
the area or the establishment of Soviet basing privileges
would
affect NATO's lines of communications and Portugal's
responsibilities. Lisbon's efforts to foster good
relations with
the North African countries, especially Morocco, had as
one
object, therefore, the reduction of such risks.
Recognizing that with the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from
Central Europe and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact the
military threat to Europe had subsided, the Portuguese
political
leadership became increasingly reluctant to assume
financial and
personnel commitments needed to carry out NATO missions.
As of
early 1992, defense strategy was clearly at a transitional
stage.
According to official statements, the armed forces would
continue
to be scaled down in areas of secondary importance, while
efforts
would be made to continue modernization and to achieve
high
operational efficiency in designated areas, notably air
defense,
naval patrols, and rapid reinforcement capability at any
point of
the national territory. The break-up of the Warsaw Pact
had not,
according to the official view, caused all threats to
disappear.
There was no guarantee that regional crises, low-intensity
conflicts, and religious fundamentalism would not
destabilize
nations and entire regions. Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco
Silva
pointed out in May 1990 that the NATO alliance had served
peace
for more than forty years over a vast territory. It would
be
rash, he said, for the West to disarm unilaterally and
hurriedly
and for the existing balance in Europe to be jeopardized.
Similarly, Portugal was reluctant to assign security
responsibilities to the European Community
(EC--see Glossary)
that would diminish the standing of NATO as the primary
instrument of collective self-defense.
During the period in late 1990 leading up to the
Persian Gulf
conflict, Portuguese political leaders supported the
United
Nation (UN) resolution and expressed strong solidarity
with the
country's allies. In addition to quickly approving transit
facilities in the Azores and on the mainland, Portugal
provided
medical assistance teams and a transport plane for
evacuating
refugees. A cargo vessel was assigned to support the
movement of
British forces to the Persian Gulf, and Portuguese vessels
joined
NATO standby forces in the Mediterranean. However, the
government
announced that Portugal would not contribute ships or
troop units
to take a direct part in the conflict, a decision
reportedly
received with discontent by senior military officers.
Data as of January 1993
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