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Romania Military Strategy
According to the assumptions explicit in its military
doctrine
since 1968, Romania's greatest likelihood of future
military
conflict is a defensive war fought on its territory
against a more
powerful aggressor. Thus, Romania's strategy aims at
victory
achieved not through a military defeat of an invading
enemy, but
through massive, prolonged resistance that denies an enemy
the
possibility of a rapid, successful military operation
against
Romania. During a protracted war of attrition against a
foreign
occupation, Romania would seek international sympathy and
support
for its struggle to throw off its invader. Strategists
hoped that
the aggressor would suffer international political
opprobrium
outweighing any conceivable strategic benefit of a
continued
occupation. Meanwhile, Romanians would drain the morale of
occupying forces through constant harassing actions. As a
result,
an invader would eventually withdraw or retreat from
Romania to cut
its political and military losses.
To execute this strategic concept, Romania's political
and
military leaders have developed a particular type of
military
organization and tactics. A strategy of prolonged
resistance
against invading forces depends on the ability of the
relatively
small regular armed forces to slow an advancing enemy and
to
provide time for paramilitary units to mobilize. Although
the
latter's effectiveness in combat is uncertain, Romanian
experts
assert that one-third of the country's population can be
put under
arms in a national emergency and that it would require an
army of
1 million men to maintain an occupation of Romania, much
less to
pacify it. Romania's leaders have elaborated the basic
operational
and tactical principles that underlie this strategy.
Foremost among
them, Romania would fight a more powerful invader on terms
that
would neutralize the latter's numerical and technological
superiority. It would avoid large battles between its
ground forces
and the enemy in favor of small-unit attacks on an
invading army in
areas where it is unable to deploy large forces.
Romania placed confidence in its ability to choose
propitious
times and favorable terrain for battle. The use of
surprise and
night attacks would help the paramilitary forces offset
the
preponderance of a conventional occupation army.
Familiarity with
the country's rugged terrain would also favor Romanian
defenders.
The narrow valleys of the Carpathian Mountains and
Transylvanian
Alps, which cut through the center of Romania, could serve
as a
formidable base of operations for protracted guerrilla
warfare
against an invader. Finally, Romanian doctrine calls for
the local
population to follow a "scorched earth" policy throughout
the
countryside along the enemy's invasion route to deny it
sources of
supply and to complicate its logistical support of an
extended
occupation of Romania.
Data as of July 1989
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