|
Romania Party Control of the Military
Of all national institutions, in 1989 only the armed
forces
were potentially strong and organized enough to challenge
PCR rule.
For that reason, the Ceausescu regime tightly controlled
the
military establishment by maintaining a PCR apparatus
within it,
co-opting the highest-ranking officers, manipulating
promotions and
appointments, and allowing the internal security service
to operate
within the armed forces. Ceausescu and the PCR exerted
their
control over the military through the Higher Political
Council of
the Army, the party's military branch. Ceausescu himself
was given
general officer rank and served as the highest party
representative
in the armed forces when he headed the Higher Political
Council of
the Army's forerunner between 1950 and 1954.
The Higher Political Council of the Army conducted
political
education within the military, supervised a huge network
of
political officers from the highest command echelon to
companysized units, reviewed promotions and other personnel
matters, and
monitored and reported on the political reliability and
loyalty of
military personnel to the Ceausescu regime. Its political
indoctrination program was founded on socialist and
nationalist
ideologies and emphasized the leading role of Ceausescu
and the
PCR in society and the economy. It conspicuously lacked
the proSoviet sentiment and "socialist internationalism"
characteristic of
indoctrination in the other Warsaw Pact countries. In 1989
approximately 90 percent of all soldiers and sailors were
PCR or
UTC members. Virtually all officers were PCR members, and
usually
only PCR members were eligible for promotions to higher
ranks.
Officers were subject to party discipline outside the
military
chain of command. Thus the PCR had the power to remove
officers of
all ranks on political grounds.
In addition to using formal party mechanisms, Ceausescu
exercised other means of control over the armed forces.
Many highranking officers were fully integrated into party and
state policymaking bodies and enjoyed considerable privilege and
status because
of their positions. In 1989 three general officers, Ion
Dinca, Ion
Coman, and former Minister of National Defense Constantin
Olteanu
were full or alternate members of the PCR Political
Executive
Committee (Polexco). Dinca was also one of three first
deputy prime
ministers. Coman was the PCR Central Committee secretary
for
military and security affairs. The minister of national
defense was
usually a full PCR Central Committee member when he
occupied his
post and then received a promotion to the Polexco. Olteanu
became
minister of national defense in 1980 and a Polexco member
in 1983.
Vasile Milea became minister of national defense in 1985
but had
not achieved Polexco membership as of mid-1989. During the
1980s,
military representation in the PCR Central Committee
dropped from
more than 4 percent of the membership to about 2 percent.
In
addition to the minister of national defense, the chief of
the
general staff, the chief of the Higher Political Council
of the
Army, and the commanders of the armed services and army
corps were
also Central Committee members.
The domestic security service, the Department of State
Security
(Departamentul Securitatii Statului--Securitate),
thoroughly
penetrated the country's armed forces and had informants
in place
at all levels to monitor the loyalty of military personnel
to the
PCR and to Ceausescu personally. One of its directorates
had
responsibility for counterespionage within the armed
forces. The
Ceausescu regime's major concern was the degree of Soviet
influence within the professional officer corps. The
Soviets
reportedly had tried to exploit their traditionally strong
ties
with the officer corps to pressure Ceausescu. Some
observers
believed that the Soviet Union might lend its support to a
military
coup d'état in the expectation that Romania would become a
more
compliant ally under different leadership.
Data as of July 1989
|
