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Saudi Arabia
Other Groups
The hereditary leaders of important beduin tribes and several
merchant families have wielded political influence in the kingdom
since its establishment. The principal tribes were the Anayzah,
Bani Khalid, Harb, Al Murrah, Mutayr, Qahtan, Shammar, and Utaiba.
In addition, there were at least fifteen minor tribes, including
the predominantly urban Quraysh, the ancient Hijaz tribe to which
the Prophet Muhammad belonged. The national guard, which has been
headed by Crown Prince Abd Allah since 1963, recruited its personnel
mostly from among the beduin tribes and its units were organized
by tribal affiliation. Abd Allah's family ties to the tribes were
also strong because his mother was the daughter of a shaykh of
the Shammar, a Najdi tribe with clans in Iraq and Syria. Although
the king and senior Al Saud princes did not usually consult with
the tribal shaykhs before making decisions affecting national
policy, the royal family routinely sought their advice on provincial
matters. Consequently, tribal leaders still exercised significant
influence in local politics.
The traditional merchant families, whose wealth rivaled that
of the Al Saud, included the Alireza, Ba Khashab, Bin Ladin, Al
Qusaibi, Jamjum, Juffali, Kaki, Nasif, Olayan, Al Rajhi, and Sulayman.
During the long reign of Abd al Aziz, the royal family depended
on these commercial families for financial support. After oil
revenues became a steady source of government income, the relationship
between the Al Saud and the merchant families began to change.
Significantly, the monarchy no longer needed monetary favors from
the merchants. Nevertheless, the families that had complied with
Abd al Aziz's repeated requests for loans were rewarded with preferential
development contracts. In addition, the post-1973 development
boom led to the emergence of new entrepreneurial families such
as Kamil, Khashoggi, Ojjeh, and Pharaon. The sons of Abd al Aziz
continued to consult regularly with business leaders and appointed
members of their families to government positions, including the
Council of Ministers and the diplomatic corps.
The social changes resulting from government-sponsored development
projects helped to create a new class of Saudi professionals and
technocrats. These men comprised an urbanbased , Western-educated
elite that emerged from both the traditional merchant class and
low-status families. The technocrats have had responsibility for
implementing the country's economic development programs. Since
the mid-1970s, a majority of the cabinet appointees to the Council
of Ministers have been members of this group. Saudi kings recruited
technocrats to high government positions on the basis of their
demonstrated competency and loyalty to Al Saud dynastic rule.
However, involvement with the extensive Al Saud carried political
risks because implementation of economic policies inevitably interfered
with the privileges or business interests of one or more princes.
For example, Fahd summarily dismissed three of the country's most
respected technocrats, former Minister of Health Ghazi al Qusaibi,
former Minister of Oil Ahmad Zaki Yamani, and former Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency head Abd al Aziz Qurayshi after their advocacy
of specific policies had alienated several Saudi princes.
Other than the Council of Ministers, the new class of technocrats
had no institutional base from which to express its views. Even
within the Council of Ministers, the influence of this new class
was circumscribed; they provided advice when the king solicited
it, but ultimate decision-making authority remained within the
royal family. Because political parties and similar associations
were not permitted, there were no legal means by which like-minded
persons might organize. Nevertheless, evidence suggested that
the Saudi professionals and technocrats were dissatisfied both
with their exclusion from the political process and their expected
conformity to rigid standards of social behavior. Periodically,
individuals of this class petitioned the king, asking him to permit
broader political participation. On the most recent occasion,
at the end of 1990, several technocrats signed a petition asking
for the creation of an elected majlis, a judiciary independent
of the ulama, and a review of the restrictive codes that applied
to women (see Cultural Homogeneity and Values , ch. 2). One of
the boldest public protests was staged by more than forty educated
women who drove their cars through the streets of Riyadh in the
fall of 1990 in violation of an unofficial but strictly enforced
ban on women driving automobiles.
The ulama, tribal leaders, wealthy merchants, and technocrats
constituted the four major groups that enjoyed varying degrees
of access to political influence. The major group excluded was
the Shia minority concentrated in and near the towns of Al Hufuf
and Al Qatif in the Eastern Province (see Shia , ch. 2). Most
of Saudi Arabia's estimated 200,000 to 400,000 Shia believed that
the government, and especially the Sunni ulama, discriminated
against them. Shia resentment exploded in a series of violent
demonstrations in 1979 and 1980; at least twenty people were killed
in these incidents. Since 1980 the government has tried to reconcile
the disaffected population through development projects in Shia
communities. However, in 1992 the Shia minority still had no means
of participating in the political process, and most held low-status
jobs. Saudi Shia, in fact, comprised virtually the only indigenous
members of the country's working class. Foreign laborers, who
had obtained temporary permits to reside in the kingdom, performed
almost all manual labor (see Saudis and Non-Saudis , ch. 2).
Data as of December 1992
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