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Saudi Arabia
Relations with Iraq
Saudi relations with Iraq have been the most problematic, vacillating
from tension to de facto alliance to war. Throughout the 1960s
and into the early 1970s, Riyadh had suspected Baghdad of supporting
political movements hostile to Saudi interests, not only in the
Arabian Peninsula but also in other Middle Eastern countries.
Saudi-Iraqi ties consequently were strained; the kingdom tried
to contain the spread of Iraqi radicalism by strengthening its
relations with states such as Iran, Kuwait, Syria, and the United
States, all of which shared its distrust of Baghdad. Beginning
about 1975, however, Iraq began to moderate its foreign policies,
a change that significantly lessened tensions between Riyadh and
Baghdad. Saudi Arabia's diplomatic relations with Iraq were relatively
cordial by the time the Iranian Islamic Revolution erupted in
1979.
The Saudis and Iraqis both felt threatened by the Iranian advocacy
of exporting Islamic revolution, and this shared fear fostered
an unprecedented degree of cooperation between them. Although
Riyadh declared its neutrality at the outset of the Iran-Iraq
War in 1980, it helped Baghdad in nonmilitary ways. For example,
during the conflict's eight years, Saudi Arabia provided Iraq
with an estimated US$25 billion in low-interest loans and grants,
reserved for Iraqi customers part of its production from oil fields
in the Iraq-Saudi Arabian Neutral Zone, and assisted with the
construction of an oil pipeline to transport Iraqi oil across
its territory (see External Boundaries , ch. 2).
Despite its considerable financial investment in creating a political
alliance with Iraq, Saudi Arabia failed to acquire a long-term
friend. On the contrary, in August 1990, only two years after
Baghdad and Tehran had agreed to cease hostilities, Iraqi forces
unexpectedly invaded and occupied Kuwait. From a Saudi perspective,
Iraq's action posed a more direct and serious threat to its immediate
security than the possibility of Iraniansupported subversion.
The Saudis were genuinely frightened and requested the United
States to bring troops into the kingdom to help confront the menace.
Riyadh's fears concerning Baghdad's ultimate intentions prompted
Saudi Arabia to become involved directly in the war against Iraq
during January and February 1991. Although the United States was
the principal military power in the coalition of forces that opposed
Iraq, the kingdom's air bases served as main staging areas for
aerial strikes against Iraqi targets, and personnel of the Saudi
armed forces participated in both the bombing assaults and the
ground offensive (see Persian Gulf War, 1991 , ch. 5). Iraq responded
by firing several Scud-B missiles at Riyadh and other Saudi towns.
This conflict marked the first time since its invasion of Yemen
in 1934 that Saudi Arabia had fought against another Arab state.
Saudi leaders were relieved when Iraq was defeated, but they also
recognized that relations with Baghdad had been damaged as severely
as Iraqi military equipment had been in the deserts of Kuwait
and southern Iraq. Consequently, postwar Saudi policy focused
on ways to contain potential Iraqi threats to the kingdom and
the region. One element of Riyadh's containment policy included
support for Iraqi opposition forces that advocated the overthrow
of Saddam Husayn's government. In the past, backing for such groups
had been discreet, but in early 1992 the Saudis invited several
Iraqi opposition leaders to Riyadh to attend a well-publicized
conference. To further demonstrate Saudi dissatisfaction with
the regime in Baghdad, Crown Prince Abd Allah permitted the media
to videotape his meeting with some of the opponents of Saddam
Husayn.
Data as of December 1992
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