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Saudi Arabia
Relations with the GCC Countries
In contrast to its relations with Iran or Iraq, Saudi Arabia's
ties with the small Arab oil-producing states along its eastern
flank have been historically close. In 1992 the kingdom was allied
with its fellow monarchies and shaykhdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), a regional collective security and economic organization.
Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in forming the GCC. The outbreak
of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 had provided the impetus
Riyadh needed to convince its neighbors to join in a defensive
pact. During the initial phase of that conflict, Iraqi forces
achieved major victories inside Iran. Despite their distrust of
the revolutionary regime in Tehran, Iraq's early successes alarmed
the Saudis because they feared a defeat of Iran would embolden
Baghdad to adopt an aggressive posture against other countries,
especially in the Arabian Peninsula. Riyadh did not need to persuade
the Kuwaitis and other gulf rulers about the security implications
of a victorious Iraq; they all shared similar views of Iraqi ambitions,
and they recognized the vulnerability of their small states. Representatives
from Saudi Arabia and the five other countries began meeting in
January 1981 to work out the details of an alliance, and the GCC
was officially inaugurated four months later.
Although the Iran-Iraq War continued to preoccupy the GCC until
the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire in 1988, the focus of
security concerns had shifted from Baghdad to Tehran by late 1981,
when it became obvious that Iraq would not be able to defeat Iran.
Even before the Iran-Iraq War had begun, the Saudis and their
allies believed Iranian agents fomented demonstrations and riots
among the Shia population living in the countries on the Arab
side of the Persian Gulf. Renewed alarm about Iran was aroused
in December 1981, when Bahraini police announced the arrest of
a clandestine group of Arab men associated with the illegal Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, based in Tehran. The Saudis
and most other GCC rulers believed that the group, which had a
large cache of arms allegedly provided by the Iranian embassy
in Manama, planned to assassinate Bahraini officials and seize
public buildings as part of a plot to overthrow the regime. This
incident convinced Saudi Arabia that Iran sponsored terrorist
groups and inclined the kingdom to support the Iraqi war effort
more openly.
GCC concerns about Iranian involvement with regional terrorism
remained high for almost three years following the Bahrain incident.
Between 1982 and 1985, a series of assassinations, detonations
of explosives-laden automobiles, and airplane hijackings throughout
the Middle East, as well as the outbreak of the tanker war in
the Persian Gulf, all contributed to reinforcing the strong suspicions
about Iran. From a GCC perspective, the most unsettling example
of terrorism was the 1983 truck bombing of several sites in Kuwait,
including the United States embassy. The Saudis and their allies
generally disbelieved Iranian denials of complicity. Nevertheless,
GCC security forces failed to obtain conclusive evidence directly
linking Iran to the various Arab Shia groups that carried out
violent acts. The lack of tangible proof prompted Oman and the
UAE to improve their bilateral relations with Iran and to mediate
between Riyadh and Tehran. These efforts actually led to a limited
rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For about a year,
from 1985 to 1986, the two countries cooperated on several issues
including oil policy.
During 1986 the intensification of the tanker-war phase of the
Iran-Iraq conflict and the revelations of covert United States
arms shipments to Tehran combined to refocus GCC concerns on conventional
security matters. Saudi Arabia differed with Kuwait regarding
the most effective means of dealing with the new threat. In particular,
the Saudis rejected the Kuwaiti view that the presence of foreign
warships in the Persian Gulf would intimidate Iran into ceasing
retaliatory attacks on GCC shipping. The Saudis believed that
the presence of foreign naval vessels would merely provoke Iran
into widening the conflict, and the ultimate consequences would
be adverse for all the GCC states. Riyadh therefore supported
the renewal of United Nations (UN) efforts to negotiate a cease-fire
between Iran and Iraq. After the UN Security Council passed Resolution
598 calling for a cease-fire and mediated peace talks between
the warring countries, Saudi Arabia joined its GCC allies in support
of all diplomatic moves to bring sanctions against Iran if it
refused to accept the resolution. All GCC countries were relieved
when Iran agreed in 1988 to abide by the terms of Resolution 598.
The cessation of fighting between Iran and Iraq led to the realization
of the GCC's deepest fears: that a militarily strong Iraq would
try to intimidate its neighbors. By the end of 1988, Iraq had
begun to pressure Kuwait for the rights to use Kuwaiti islands
that controlled access to Iraqi ports. Tension between Iraq and
Kuwait escalated, culminating in August 1990 with Iraq's invasion,
occupation, and annexation of the small country. The aggression
revealed to a stunned GCC that the alliance had insufficient power
to deter or repel an attack on one of its members. Saudi Arabia
thus requested United States assistance, as well as assistance
from its Arab allies. All other GCC members provided military
contingents for the coalition that was formed to confront Iraq.
Following the liberation of Kuwait, the GCC decided that it would
be necessary to maintain security alliances with countries from
outside the Persian Gulf region. As of 1992, however, the GCC
had not negotiated any arrangements for itself, although individual
members had concluded bilateral defense pacts with other countries.
Data as of December 1992
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