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Somalia Relations with Other African States
For ten years after the Ogaden War, the Siad Barre government
refused to renounce its public support of the Ethiopian guerrilla
organization, the Western Somali Liberation Front, and provided
it with clandestine military assistance to carry out raids inside
Ethiopia. The Mengistu government responded in kind by providing
bases, sanctuary, and military assistance to the SSDF and the
SNM. Siad Barre's fear of Ethiopian military power induced him in
the early 1980s to begin a process of rapprochement with
Somalia's other neighbors, Kenya and the former French territory
of Djibouti. Kenya had long suspected Somalia of encouraging
separatist activities among the predominantly ethnic Somali
population in its Northern Frontier District. Following a 1981
summit meeting with Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi in Nairobi,
Siad Barre's public renunciation of any Somali territorial claims
on Kenya helped dissipate mistrust.
Beginning in 1982, both Kenya and Djibouti, apparently
encouraged by Siad Barre's stated willingness to hold direct
talks with Mengistu, made diplomatic efforts to mediate between
Somalia and Ethiopia. It was not until 1986, however, that Siad
Barre and Mengistu finally agreed to meet. This first meeting
since before the Ogaden War took place in the city of Djibouti
and marked the beginning of a gradual rapprochement. Siad Barre's
willingness to defuse the situation along the Somali-Ethiopian
border stemmed from the combined pressures of escalating
guerrilla activity, overt Ethiopian military threats, drought,
and the destabilizing presence of hundreds of thousands of
Ethiopian refugees. Siad Barre and Mengistu held a second meeting
in April 1988, at which they signed a peace agreement and
formally reestablished diplomatic relations. Both leaders agreed
to withdraw their troops from their mutual borders and to cease
support for armed dissident groups trying to overthrow the
respective governments in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.
The peace accord failed to provide Siad Barre respite from
guerrilla activity and probably contributed to his eventual
demise. Anticipating the possibility of being expelled from
Ethiopia, the SNM decided to relocate within Somalia itself, a
decision that drastically changed the nature of the conflict in
the north. Despite the termination of Ethiopian assistance, SNM
guerrillas continued to defeat Siad Barre's forces with relative
ease; by August 1988 they had captured Hargeysa and other
northern towns. Siad Barre responded by ordering massive aerial
bombing, carried out by foreign mercenary pilots, that damaged or
destroyed virtually every building in Hargeysa
(see Sources of Opposition
, ch. 5). The brutal attack, which resulted in
thousands of civilian casualties and brought both domestic and
international opprobrium upon the Siad Barre regime, failed to
crush the SNM. Fighting not only intensified in the north over
the next eighteen months, but also spread throughout the country,
forcing an estimated 800,000 Somalis to seek refuge in Ethiopia.
In March 1990, Siad Barre accused Ethiopia of having violated
the 1988 peace agreement by providing continued military support
to the SNM. However, by this time the Mengistu government was as
beleaguered as the Siad Barre regime by armed opposition
movements and was not in a position to assist any Somali rebels.
Soon after Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, Mengistu
followed his example by fleeing Addis Ababa as guerrilla armies
closed upon the Ethiopian capital. Throughout 1991 the new
provisional governments in Somalia and Ethiopia regarded each
other cautiously. Both were threatened by separatist movements
and both had an interest in maintaining the integrity of
internationally recognized borders. As conditions in Somalia
worsened on account of civil strife, the collapse of central
authority, and the disruption of food production and
distribution, tens of thousands of Somalis fled to Ethiopia,
creating a massive refugee situation in that country by early
1992.
Sharing land borders with both Somalia and Ethiopia, Djibouti
believed it was in the long-term interests of the Horn of Africa
region if both countries remained intact. Djibouti's president,
Hassan Gouled Aptidon, attempted to mediate between the
provisional government and the SNM and offered his capital as a
neutral meeting place. In June 1991, Djibouti served as the venue
for a national reconciliation conference between the USC and
several other groups.
With most of Djibouti's diverse population consisting of
ethnic Somalis, Aptidon's concern about Somalia's future was not
entirely altruistic. The Somalis of Djibouti belonged
overwhelmingly to the Iise clan, traditional rival of the Isaaqs
who dominated the SNM. The Djibouti Iise tended to be suspicious
of the Isaaq, believing that they discriminated against their
Iise kinsmen in northern Somalia. This concern had prompted
Djibouti in 1990 to assist in the formation and training of a
separate Iise movement that challenged the SNM before and after
the overthrow of Siad Barre. From Djibouti's perspective, a
united Somalia composed of many clans afforded more protection to
the Iise than a northern republic controlled by Isaaq.
Kenya was concerned about the situation in southern Somalia,
which continued to be unstable throughout 1991. Somali refugees,
both civilian and military, had crossed the border into northern
Kenya to escape the fighting. The refugees included more than
fifty close associates of Siad Barre who were granted political
asylum. Since the provisional government had announced its
intention to try these officials, this action had the potential
to provoke political problems between Kenya and Somalia. By early
1992, tens of thousands of Somalis were being sheltered in
makeshift refugee camps in northern Kenya.
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