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Somalia Politics of Reconciliation
During the final three years of Siad Barre's rule, there was
relatively intense fighting throughout the country as the
opposition groups gradually wrested control of extensive areas:
the SNM in the northwest, the SSDF in the northeast, the USC in
central Somalia, and the SPM in the south. Demonstrations against
Siad Barre's rule spread even to the capital, where the military
was used to suppress protests. A July 1989 mass demonstration in
Mogadishu was dispersed only after government troops shot and
killed a number of persons variously estimated to be between 200
and 300. The deteriorating situation alarmed those civilian
politicians, businessmen, intellectuals, and religious leaders
who were critical of the regime's repressive policies and
supportive of introducing democratic reforms peacefully. A group
of these prominent leaders, who included representatives of all
the country's major clans, eventually formed the Council for
National Reconciliation and Salvation (CNRS) to press demands for
political change. In addition to their commitment to
democratization, those involved with the CNRS also wished to
create a political organization that would transcend clan
loyalties. The CNRS issued its first open manifesto in May 1990.
This document, signed by 114 leading citizens of Mogadishu,
called for Siad Barre's resignation, the establishment of an
interim government consisting of representatives of the
opposition movements, and a timetable for multiparty elections.
The CNRS's manifesto aroused interest both in and outside
Somalia, although it was not welcomed by Siad Barre.
Nevertheless, the president was reluctant to take immediate
action against the signatories because of the risks involved in
antagonizing so many different clans and further straining
diplomatic relations with donor countries that had become
critical of his regime's human rights policies
(see Foreign Relations
, this ch.). Siad Barre eventually did order the arrest of
the signers, although security forces were able to round up only
forty-five of them. Their detention prompted strenuous protests
from Egypt, Italy, and other countries, and after a few weeks the
regime released them. The experience emboldened the CNRS to push
more assertively for peaceful resolution of the country's
political crisis. With the support of Egypt and Italy, the CNRS
called in September 1990 for a national reconciliation
roundtable. The CNRS invited the Siad Barre regime and five
guerrilla groups to send representatives to Cairo to discuss how
to end the dictatorship and return the country to democratic
government. Neither Siad Barre nor the armed opposition, however,
were willing to attend such a roundtable unless each party agreed
to the other's conditions.
In 1990 guerrilla leaders generally were disinclined to
negotiate with the Siad Barre regime because they had become
convinced of their eventual success. The prospect of defeating
Siad Barre inevitably compelled them to focus on relations among
their various organizations. A series of informal talks concluded
in August 1990 with an announcement from the SNM, the Aidid
faction of the USC, and the SPM that they had agreed to
coordinate strategy toward the government. In September leaders
of the three groups met in Ethiopia, where they signed an
agreement to form a military alliance. Although cooperation among
the major opposition forces was essential to a smooth transition
to a post-Siad Barre era, the pace of events after September did
not provide adequate time for mutual trust and cooperative
relations to develop. The SNM, USC, and SPM fighters, who for the
most part operated in clan-based enclaves, never participated in
any joint actions. During the final assault on Siad Barre's
forces, in December 1990 and January 1991, guerrillas of the
Abgaal faction of the USC infiltrated Mogadishu, whose population
was approximately 80 percent Hawiye, and successfully fought
without the assistance of either the SNM, the SPM, or the Habar
Gidir faction of the USC.
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