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Somalia Pan-Somalism
Despite the difficulties encountered in integrating north and
south, the most important political issue in postindependence
Somali politics was the unification of all areas populated by
Somalis into one country--a concept identified as pan-Somalism,
or Greater Somalia. Politicians assumed that this issue dominated
popular opinion and that any government would fall if it did not
demonstrate a militant attitude toward neighboring countries
occupying Somali territory.
Preoccupation with Greater Somalia shaped the character of
the country's newly formed institutions and led to the build-up
of the Somali military and ultimately to the war with Ethiopia
and fighting in the NFD in Kenya. By law the exact size of the
National Assembly was not established in order to facilitate the
inclusion of representatives of the contested areas after
unification. The national flag featured a five-pointed star whose
points represented those areas claimed as part of the Somali
nation--the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden,
Djibouti, and the NFD. Moreover, the preamble to the constitution
approved in 1961 included the statement, "The Somali Republic
promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the
territories." The constitution also provided that all ethnic
Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the
republic. The Somalis did not claim sovereignty over adjacent
territories, but rather demanded that Somalis living in them be
granted the right to self-determination. Somali leaders asserted
that they would be satisfied only when their fellow Somalis
outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves
what their status would be.
At the 1961 London talks on the future of Kenya, Somali
representatives from the NFD demanded that Britain arrange for
the NFD's separation before Kenya was granted independence. The
British government appointed a commission to ascertain popular
opinion in the NFD on the question. Its investigation indicated
that separation from Kenya was almost unanimously supported by
the Somalis and their fellow nomadic pastoralists, the Oromo.
These two peoples, it was noted, represented a majority of the
NFD's population.
Despite Somali diplomatic activity, the colonial government
in Kenya did not act on the commission's findings. British
officials believed that the federal format then proposed in the
Kenyan constitution would provide a solution through the degree
of autonomy it allowed the predominantly Somali region within the
federal system. This solution did not diminish Somali demands for
unification, however, and the modicum of federalism disappeared
after Kenya's government opted for a centralized constitution in
1964.
The denial of Somali claims led to growing hostility between
the Kenyan government and Somalis in the NFD. Adapting easily to
life as shiftas, or bandits, the Somalis conducted a
guerrilla campaign against the police and army for more than four
years between 1960 and 1964. The Somali government officially
denied Kenya's charges that the guerrillas were trained in
Somalia, equipped there with Soviet arms, and directed from
Mogadishu. But it could not deny that the Voice of Somalia radio
influenced the level of guerrilla activity by means of its
broadcasts beamed into Kenya.
Somalia refused to acknowledge in particular the validity of
the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954 recognizing Ethiopia's claim
to the Haud or, in general, the relevance of treaties defining
Somali-Ethiopian borders. Somalia's position was based on three
points: first, that the treaties disregarded agreements made with
the clans that had put them under British protection; second,
that the Somalis were not consulted on the terms of the treaties
and in fact had not been informed of their existence; and third,
that such treaties violated the self-determination principle.
Incidents began to occur in the Haud within six months after
Somali independence. At first the incidents were confined to
minor clashes between Ethiopian police and armed parties of
Somali nomads, usually resulting from traditional provocations
such as smuggling, livestock rustling, and tax collecting, rather
than irredentist agitation. Their actual causes aside, these
incidents tended to be viewed in Somalia as expressions of Somali
nationalism. Hostilities grew steadily, eventually involving
small-scale actions between Somali and Ethiopian armed forces
along the border. In February 1964, armed conflict erupted along
the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, and Ethiopian aircraft raided
targets in Somalia. Hostilities ended in April through the
mediation of Sudan, acting under the auspices of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU). Under the terms of the cease-fire, a
joint commission was established to examine the causes of
frontier incidents, and a demilitarized zone ten to fifteen
kilometers wide was established on either side of the border. At
least temporarily, further military confrontations were
prevented.
Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defense pact in 1964 in
response to what both countries perceived as a continuing threat
from Somalia. This pact was renewed in 1980 and again on August
28, 1987, calling for the coordination of the armed forces of
both states in the event of an attack by Somalia. Most OAU
members were alienated by Somali irredentism and feared that if
Somalia were successful in detaching the Somali-populated
portions of Kenya and Ethiopia, the example might inspire their
own restive minorities divided by frontiers imposed during the
colonial period. In addition, in making its irredentist claims,
the Somalis had challenged two of Africa's leading elder
statesmen, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia.
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