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Somalia Supreme Revolutionary Council
The SRC also gave priority to rapid economic and social
development through "crash programs," efficient and responsive
government, and creation of a standard written form of Somali as
the country's single official language. The regime pledged
continuance of regional détente in its foreign relations without
relinquishing Somali claims to disputed territories.
The SRC's domestic program, known as the First Charter of the
Revolution, appeared in 1969. Along with Law Number 1, an
enabling instrument promulgated on the day of the military
takeover, the First Charter provided the institutional and
ideological framework of the new regime. Law Number 1 assigned to
the SRC all functions previously performed by the president, the
National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers, as well as many
duties of the courts. The role of the twenty-five-member military
junta was that of an executive committee that made decisions and
had responsibility to formulate and execute policy. Actions were
based on majority vote, but deliberations rarely were published.
SRC members met in specialized committees to oversee government
operations in given areas. A subordinate fourteen-man
secretariat--the Council of the Secretaries of State (CSS)--
functioned as a cabinet and was responsible for day-to-day
government operation, although it lacked political power. The CSS
consisted largely of civilians, but until 1974 several key
ministries were headed by military officers who were concurrently
members of the SRC. Existing legislation from the previous
democratic government remained in force unless specifically
abrogated by the SRC, usually on the grounds that it was
"incompatible...with the spirit of the Revolution." In February
1970, the democratic constitution of 1960, suspended at the time
of the coup, was repealed by the SRC under powers conferred by
Law Number 1.
Although the SRC monopolized executive and legislative
authority, Siad Barre filled a number of executive posts: titular
head of state, chairman of the CSS (and thereby head of
government), commander in chief of the armed forces, and
president of the SRC. His titles were of less importance,
however, than was his personal authority, to which most SRC
members deferred, and his ability to manipulate the clans.
Military and police officers, including some SRC members,
headed government agencies and public institutions to supervise
economic development, financial management, trade,
communications, and public utilities. Military officers replaced
civilian district and regional officials. Meanwhile, civil
servants attended reorientation courses that combined
professional training with political indoctrination, and those
found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were fired. A
mass dismissal of civil servants in 1974, however, was dictated
in part by economic pressures.
The legal system functioned after the coup, subject to
modification. In 1970 special tribunals, the National Security
Courts (NSC), were set up as the judicial arm of the SRC. Using a
military attorney as prosecutor, the courts operated outside the
ordinary legal system as watchdogs against activities considered
to be counterrevolutionary. The first cases that the courts dealt
with involved Shermaarke's assassination and charges of
corruption leveled by the SRC against members of the democratic
regime. The NSC subsequently heard cases with and without
political content. A uniform civil code introduced in 1973
replaced predecessor laws inherited from the Italians and British
and also imposed restrictions on the activities of sharia courts.
The new regime subsequently extended the death penalty and prison
sentences to individual offenders, formally eliminating
collective responsibility through the payment of
diya (see Glossary) or blood money
(see Courts
, ch. 4).
The SRC also overhauled local government, breaking up the old
regions into smaller units as part of a long-range
decentralization program intended to destroy the influence of the
traditional clan assemblies and, in the government's words, to
bring government "closer to the people." Local councils, composed
of military administrators and representatives appointed by the
SRC, were established under the Ministry of Interior at the
regional, district, and village levels to advise the government
on local conditions and to expedite its directives. Other
institutional innovations included the organization (under Soviet
direction) of the National Security Service (NSS), directed
initially at halting the flow of professionals and dissidents out
of the country and at counteracting attempts to settle disputes
among the clans by traditional means. The newly formed Ministry
of Information and National Guidance set up local political
education bureaus to carry the government's message to the people
and used Somalia's print and broadcast media for the "success of
the socialist, revolutionary road." A censorship board, appointed
by the ministry, tailored information to SRC guidelines.
The SRC took its toughest political stance in the campaign to
break down the solidarity of the lineage groups. Tribalism was
condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity. Siad
Barre denounced tribalism in a wider context as a "disease"
obstructing development not only in Somalia, but also throughout
the Third World. The government meted out prison terms and fines
for a broad category of proscribed activities classified as
tribalism. Traditional headmen, whom the democratic government
had paid a stipend, were replaced by reliable local dignitaries
known as "peacekeepers" (nabod doan), appointed by
Mogadishu to represent government interests. Community
identification rather than lineage affiliation was forcefully
advocated at orientation centers set up in every district as the
foci of local political and social activity. For example, the SRC
decreed that all marriage ceremonies should occur at an
orientation center. Siad Barre presided over these ceremonies
from time to time and contrasted the benefits of socialism to the
evils he associated with tribalism.
To increase production and control over the nomads, the
government resettled 140,000 nomadic pastoralists in farming
communities and in coastal towns, where the erstwhile herders
were encouraged to engage in agriculture and fishing. By
dispersing the nomads and severing their ties with the land to
which specific clans made collective claim, the government may
also have undercut clan solidarity. In many instances, real
improvement in the living conditions of resettled nomads was
evident, but despite government efforts to eliminate it, clan
consciousness as well as a desire to return to the nomadic life
persisted. Concurrent SRC attempts to improve the status of
Somali women were unpopular in a traditional Muslim society,
despite Siad Barre's argument that such reforms were consonant
with Islamic principles.
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