|
Somalia The Igaal Government
The new president nominated as prime minister Mahammad
Ibrahim Igaal, who raised cabinet membership from thirteen to
fifteen members and included representatives of every major clanfamily , as well as some members of the rival SNC. In August 1967,
the National Assembly confirmed his appointment without serious
opposition. Although the new prime minister had supported
Shermaarke in the presidential election, he was a northerner and
had led a 1962 defection of the northern SNL assembly members
from the government. He had also been closely involved in the
founding of the SNC but, with many other northern members of that
group, had rejoined the SYL after the 1964 elections.
A more important difference between Shermaarke and Igaal,
other than their past affiliations, was the new prime minister's
moderate position on pan-Somali issues and his desire for
improved relations with other African countries. In these areas,
he was allied with the "modernists" in the government,
parliament, and administration who favored redirecting the
nation's energies from confrontation with its neighbors to
combating social and economic ills. Although many of his domestic
policies seemed more in line with those of the previous
administration, Igaal continued to hold the confidence of both
Shermaarke and the National Assembly during the eighteen months
preceding the March 1969 national elections.
Igaal's policy of regional détente resulted in improved
relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. The prime minister did not
relinquish Somalia's territorial claims, but he hoped to create
an atmosphere in which the issue could be peacefully negotiated.
In September 1968, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to establish
commercial air and telecommunication links. The termination of
the state of emergency in the border regions, which had been
declared by Ethiopia in February 1964, permitted the resumption
of free access by Somali pastoralists to their traditional
grazing lands and the reopening of the road across Ethiopian
territory between Mogadishu and Hargeysa. With foreign affairs a
less consuming issue, the government's energy and the country's
meager resources could now be applied more effectively to the
challenges of internal development. However, the relaxation of
tensions had an unanticipated effect. The conflict with its
neighbors had promoted Somalia's internal political cohesion and
solidified public opinion at all levels on at least one issue. As
tension from that source subsided, old cleavages based on clan
rivalries became more prominent.
The March 1969 elections were the first to combine voting for
municipal and National Assembly posts. Sixty-four parties
contested the elections. Only the SYL, however, presented
candidates in every election district, in many cases without
opposition. Eight other parties presented lists of candidates for
national offices in most districts. Of the remaining fifty-five
parties, only twenty-four gained representation in the assembly,
but all of these were disbanded almost immediately when their
fifty members joined the SYL.
Both the plethora of parties and the defection to the
majority party were typical of Somali parliamentary elections. To
register for elective office, a candidate merely needed either
the support of 500 voters or the sponsorship of his clan,
expressed through a vote of its traditional assembly. After
registering, the office seeker then attempted to become the
official candidate of a political party. Failing this, he would
remain on the ballot as an individual contestant. Voting was by
party list, which could make a candidate a one-person party.
(This practice explained not only the proliferation of small
parties but also the transient nature of party support.) Many
candidates affiliated with a major party only long enough to use
its symbol in the election campaign and, if elected, abandoned it
for the winning side as soon as the National Assembly met. Thus,
by the end of May 1969 the SYL parliamentary cohort had swelled
from 73 to 109.
In addition, the eleven SNC members had formed a coalition
with the SYL, which held 120 of the 123 seats in the National
Assembly. A few of these 120 left the SYL after the composition
of Igaal's cabinet became clear and after the announcement of his
program, both of which were bound to displease some who had
joined only to be on the winning side. Offered a huge list of
candidates, the almost 900,000 voters in 1969 took delight in
defeating incumbents. Of the incumbent deputies, 77 out of 123
were not returned (including 8 out of 18 members of the previous
cabinet), but these figures did not unequivocally demonstrate
dissatisfaction with the government. Statistically, they were
nearly identical with the results of the 1964 election, and,
given the profusion of parties and the system of proportional
representation, a clear sense of public opinion could not be
obtained solely on the basis of the election results. The fact
that a single party--the SYL--dominated the field implied neither
stability nor solidarity. Anthropologist I.M. Lewis has noted
that the SYL government was a very heterogeneous group with
diverging personal and lineage interests.
Candidates who had lost seats in the assembly and those who
had supported them were frustrated and angry. A number of charges
were made of government election fraud, at least some firmly
founded. Discontent was exacerbated when the Supreme Court, under
its newly appointed president, declined to accept jurisdiction
over election petitions, although it had accepted such
jurisdiction on an earlier occasion.
Neither the president nor the prime minister seemed
particularly concerned about official corruption and nepotism.
Although these practices were conceivably normal in a society
based on kinship, some were bitter over their prevalence in the
National Assembly, where it seemed that deputies ignored their
constituents in trading votes for personal gain.
Among those most dissatisfied with the government were
intellectuals and members of the armed forces and police.
(General Mahammad Abshir, the chief of police, had resigned just
before the elections after refusing to permit police vehicles to
transport SYL voters to the polls.) Of these dissatisfied groups,
the most significant element was the military, which since 1961
had remained outside politics. It had done so partly because the
government had not called upon it for support and partly because,
unlike most other African armed forces, the Somali National Army
had a genuine external mission in which it was supported by all
Somalis--that of protecting the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya.
|
