|
Sri Lanka India's Perspective
By the close of 1984, it was becoming clear that the parties
within Sri Lanka were incapable of reaching a workable compromise
on their own. The new Congress (I), I for Indira Gandhi,
government of Rajiv Gandhi in India assumed an active mediation
role at the request of the government of Sri Lanka. Gandhi's own
interest in containing the ethnic crisis was self-evident.
Thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees were fleeing to Tamil Nadu
State, which was also a sanctuary for most of the militant groups
and the now disenfranchised TULF (the number of Tamil refugees
was more than 100,000 in early 1987). Local politicians,
particularly Tamil Nadu's chief minister, M.G. Ramachandran,
demanded initiatives on the part of New Delhi to halt the
violence. Ramachandran's AIADMK was one of the few southern
regional parties friendly to Gandhi's Congress (I). An appearance
of insensitivity to Tamil suffering on the part of New Delhi
might cost it the support of the AIADMK or strengthen the hand of
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the state's major opposition
party.
At the same time, Gandhi, whose predecessor as prime minister
(his mother) had been assassinated by Sikh extremists on October
31, 1984, had no desire to encourage separatist forces within his
own ethnically and religiously divided country by sponsoring
separatist sentiments in Sri Lanka. New Delhi wished to rein in
the Tigers without appearing to be too enthusiastic a backer of
Jayewardene's government.
A third problem for Gandhi was strategic. As the ethnic
crisis deepened, the Jayewardene government sought increasing
military aid from countries of which India was suspicious or
which seemed to challenge New Delhi's primacy in the Indian Ocean
region. China, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany), and South Africa supplied Sri Lanka with arms. Israel
operated a special interest section in the United States Embassy
in Colombo, and Israeli experts provided training in
counterinsurgency and land settlement strategies. Retired members
of Britain's Special Air Service also trained Sri Lankan military
personnel. India also feared that the United States naval forces
might establish an Indian Ocean base at the strategic port of
Trincomalee ("another Diego Garcia" charged India). The most
ominous foreign presence, however, was Pakistan's. In March-April
1985, Jayewardene made an official visit to Islamabad to confer
with President Mohammed Zia ul Haq and other top Pakistani
officials. According to Indian sources, Sri Lankan forces were
trained by Pakistani advisers both in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.
Gandhi, like his mother before him, referred to Sri Lanka's
inclusion within a "Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis".
Data as of October 1988
|
