|
Sri Lanka The Eastern Province Question
Indian pressure was apparently a major factor in persuading
the four major guerrilla groups included within the Eelam
National Liberation Front (the LTTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF) and
the Tamil political party, TULF, to hold talks with a government
delegation headed by the president's brother, Hector Jayewardene.
The meetings were convened in July and August 1985 in Thimpu,
capital of Bhutan. Jayewardene advanced a proposal involving, as
in the 1984 All Party Conference, the granting of autonomy to
district councils. He also proposed the creation of a separate
legislature for the Tamil-majority northern region of the island.
The Tamil groups made four demands: recognition of the Tamils as
a distinct national group, the creation of a Tamil state (Eelam)
from Northern and Eastern provinces, the right of self-
determination for the Tamil "nation," and full citizenship rights
for all Tamils resident in Sri Lanka. The government rejected the
first three on the grounds that they amounted to separatism,
which was prohibited by the Constitution and the talks broke off
abruptly on August 18, 1985, when Tamil delegates accused the
armed forces of continuing to perpetrate atrocities against Tamil
civilians. The fourth demand, for granting Sri Lankan citizenship
to 96,000 Indian Tamils, was met in January 1986.
In December 1985, TULF broke ranks with the militants and
announced support for a Tamil-majority federal state remaining
within Sri Lanka with the devolution of substantial executive,
legislative, and judicial powers. The government, however,
objected to the controversial joining of Eastern Province with
Northern Province in the proposed federal unit. Although Northern
Province clearly had a Tamil majority and limited economic
potential, the position in Eastern Province was ambiguous: 58
percent of its population was either Sinhalese or Muslim.
Although Eastern Province Muslims spoke Tamil, the great majority
were descended from Arab settlers. Also, Eastern Province
contained large areas of fertile and economically exploitable
land and the strategic port of Trincomalee. Although a second All
Party Conference was held in June 1986, neither TULF nor the
militants participated. Talks in Colombo between TULF and the
government were snagged on the issue of the status of Eastern
Province.
The Eastern Province issue brought the Muslims into the
negotiations not only because they viewed themselves as a
community quite separate from both the Tamils and Sinhalese but
also because there had been communal violence involving Tamils
and Muslims in Eastern Province during the 1980s, and the latter
were not enthusiastic about being included in a separate, Tamil-
dominated state. According to the leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress, M. Ashraff, "we are a community being oppressed both by
the Sinhalese and the Tamils." Some younger Muslims expressed
sympathy for the LTTE, but the leadership of the community wanted
the government to grant them some kind of autonomous status
separate from any settlement with the Tamils.
By late 1986, Jayewardene's government found itself tied down
by conflicting communal interests that included not only the Sri
Lankan Tamils and Muslims but Sinhalese who rallied behind the
nationalist appeal of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Movement for
Defense of the Nation. Against a background of unremitting
violence that included bloody Tamil terrorist bombings in
Colombo, the status of Eastern Province remained a major
stumbling block. Given the stalemate, India's participation
loomed larger in any formula that had a chance of achieving
peace.
In November 1986, Sri Lankan and Indian leaders conferred at
the annual summit meeting of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Bangalore, India. They outlined a
settlement that included provincial councils for Northern and
Eastern provinces and special provisions for Eastern Province
that would entail the establishment of local councils for
Sinhalese in Trincomalee, Tamils in Batticaloa District, and
Muslims in the southern district of Amparai. This arrangement was
scrapped in the face of Tamil opposition. On December 17-19,
1986, President Jayewardene met cabinet-level Indian officials in
Colombo and agreed to another set of proposals, described as a
"beginning point for further negotiations," which conceded the
possible merger of Northern and Eastern provinces and the joining
of Sinhalese-majority areas of Amparai District to the inland
province of Uva. This proposal, too, was scrapped, because of the
objections of Amparai Muslims.
By early 1987, India had grown impatient with the lack of
progress on an accord and threatened to end its mediating role. A
still more serious problem was the apparent determination of the
Sri Lankan government to use military means to solve the crisis.
In late May, a large-scale offensive, dubbed Operation
Liberation, was launched against the LTTE in the Jaffna
Peninsula. The offensive caused considerable hardship among local
civilians. Indian efforts to bring relief supplies by boat were
rebuffed by the Sri Lankan Navy on June 3, 1987, but an airdrop
of supplies by the Indian Air Force took place the next day. Sri
Lanka labelled this action a "naked violation" of its territorial
integrity.
By July 1987, however, Jayewardene--weary of the bloodletting
and sincere in his desire for a peaceful solution--and Prime
Minister Gandhi, perceiving that he could not afford an
indefinite prolongation of the crisis, had groped to within reach
of a viable accord. In a July 1 letter, Gandhi urged Jayewardene
to come up with some "new ideas" on a settlement. On July 16,
Jayewardene, his cabinet, and the Indian high commissioner in
Colombo, Jyotindra Nath Dixit, conferred on an "improved version"
of the December 19, 1986, proposals which were sent two days
later to New Delhi and subsequently formed the basis for the July
29, 1987, Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.
The major task for Gandhi, acting as middleman, was to draw
the Tamil militants into the settlement. On July 28, after a last
minute meeting with the Indian prime minister, LTTE leader
Prabhakaran announced his support for the accord. In an interview
with India Today, he reconciled this decision with the
longstanding LTTE demand for an independent state by citing the
accord's recognition of the Northern and Eastern provinces'
status as places of "historical habitation of Tamil-speaking
people." But Prabhakaran also noted that he had not been a party
to the accord and doubted that it would bring lasting peace. The
four other major guerilla groups also gave their backing to the
pact on July 28, though they expressed concern about its
"deficiencies."
On July 30, 1987, Gandhi arrived in Colombo to sign a
comprehensive settlement that had, as its main points the turn in
of weapons by militant groups, a merger of Northern and Eastern
provinces to create a single administrative unit; nationwide
elections for eight (instead of the former nine) provincial
councils before December 31, 1987 (not held until 1988);
recognition of both Tamil and English as official (rather than
national) languages on an equal status with Sinhala; amnesty for
Tamil guerrillas and detainees; a cease-fire; return of Sri
Lankan security forces to their barracks; the disbanding of
Sinhalese militia units (who had acquired a reputation of
viciousness toward Tamil civilians); and a referendum for Eastern
Province, originally scheduled for December 31, 1988 but
postponed until January 1990, to decide whether the merger of
Northern and Eastern provinces should be permanent. India agreed
to assist implementation of the accord by posting a peacekeeping
force in the northern part of Sri Lanka (subsequently known as
the Indian Peacekeeping Force) and helping to oversee the
surrender of arms by Tamil militants, to be accomplished by
August 3, 1987
(see Sri Lanka - Foreign Military Presence
, ch. 5). New Delhi
would also oblige Tamil militants to abandon their bases in Tamil
Nadu State and assist the Sri Lankan Navy in patrolling the
waters of the Palk Strait.
Rather predictably, the accord sparked the ire of the
Sinhalese population. Gandhi was physically attacked by a rifle-
wielding sailor while reviewing an honor guard in Colombo on July
30. Demonstrations against the accord in Colombo and other places
resulted in nearly forty deaths. At the same time, the pact
caused a cabinet crisis. Several factions within the UNP opposed
the merger of Northern and Eastern provinces and the alleged
surrender of Sri Lankan independence to India. The opponents
included Prime Minister Ramasinghe Premadasa, Minister of Defense
and National Security Lalith Athulathmudali, and several other
cabinet members. Premadasa signalled his displeasure by not
attending the official functions held for Gandhi in Colombo on
July 29 and 30. As the fighting in the north subsided following
the cease-fire, however, so did the cabinet crisis.
Optimism over the accord soon turned to disappointment when
the LTTE refused to turn in its weapons and hostilities flared up
again, this time between the LTTE and the Indian Peacekeeping
Force. By October 1987, approximately 20,000 Indian troops were
engaged in pitched battles with between 2,000 and 3,000 LTTE
guerrillas. The fighting represented a major loss of face for New
Delhi. India had promised Sri Lanka that the Tigers would be
completely disarmed, but it was apparent that the militants had
surrendered only a fraction of their arsenal in August. In the
face of mounting Indian military and Tamil civilian casualties,
pessimists on the subcontinent speculated whether the accord
signalled the beginning of India's "Vietnam" or "Afghanistan." In
Colombo, SLFP leader Anura Bandaranaike declared that "the Indian
Army is like the Trojan Horse. We accepted them and expected them
to bring peace, and they then started watching as our people were
butchered.... They have come here to stay. They won't take the
President's orders."
Jayewardene, who survived a grenade attack in the Parliament
building on August 18, 1987, was faced with the daunting task of
obtaining the legislature's approval of the radical political
changes outlined in the July 29 accord. Provincial autonomy was
embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution,
which the Supreme Court, in a five to four ruling, declared would
not need to be submitted to a popular referendum if minor changes
were made. Against the background of the JVP-instigated terrorist
attacks in Sinhalese-majority areas and assassination threats
against members of Parliament who approved the amendment, it was
passed by 136 to 11, or substantially more than the required two-
thirds majority. Few observers believed, however, that the
establishment of new provincial political institutions would
bring lasting peace to this strife-torn country.
Data as of October 1988
|
