Syria THE ASSAD ERA
A devastated street in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War
Courtesy As'ad AbuKhalil
A section of Hamah, before and after the devastating
government assault
Soon after taking power, Assad moved quickly to create an
organizational infrastructure for the government. In February
1971, the 173-member People's Council was organized, with the
Baath Party taking 87 seats; the remaining seats were divided
among the "popular organizations" and other minor parties. In
March 1971 the Baath Party held its regional congress and elected
the 21-member Regional Command headed by Assad. That same month,
by a national referendum, Assad was elected president for a 7-
year term and in April Major Abdul Rahman Khulayfawi was
designated prime minister with Mahmud al Ayyubi as vice
president. The transfer of power from Jadid to Assad was widely
regarded as a conservative and moderating movement away from
Communist radicalism.
In foreign affairs Syria's relations with the Soviet Union,
strained toward the end of 1970, improved dramatically in 1971
and 1972. Syria's relations with other Arab states, particularly
Egypt and Libya, became more cordial, as demonstrated by the
April 1971 formation of the short-lived Federation of Arab
Republics, made up of Syria, Egypt, and Libya.
In March 1972, the Progressive National Front was formed. It
consisted of the Baath Party and four non-Baathist groups: the
Syrian Arab Socialist Union, a Nasserite group under Jamal
Atassi; the Socialist Union Movement under Jamal Sufi; the Arab
Socialist Party, composed of the followers of the Baathist Akram
Hawrani; and the Syrian Communist Party, under Khalid Bakdash.
In March 1973, the Permanent Constitution went into effect,
further strengthening Assad's already formidable presidential
authority. However, the Assad regime was not without underlying
tension. This tension stemmed from sectarian differences between
the majority Sunni Muslims and the minority Alawis; but it had
much wider implications, not the least of which were political.
The immediate focus of the opposition to the regime was the
demand by Sunni Muslims that Islam be declared the state religion
in the constitution. The draft constitution that was adopted by
the People's Council at the end of January 1973 had no provision
to that effect. Viewing the constitution as the product of an
Alawi-dominated, secular, Baathist ruling elite, Sunni militants
staged a series of riots in February 1973 in conservative and
predominantly Sunni cities such as Hamah and Homs. A number of
demonstrators were killed and wounded in clashes between the
troops and demonstrators. As a result of these demonstrations,
the Assad regime had the draft charter amended to include a
provision that the president of Syria must be a Muslim. Implicit
in this amendment was a declaration that Alawis are Muslims--a
formula not accepted by many Sunni Muslims. The draft was
approved in a popular referendum held in mid-March for formal
promulgation. Assad's compromise, coupled with the government's
effective security measures, calmed the situation, but sporadic
demonstrations continued through April 1973. Other major
developments in 1973 included the holding in March of
parliamentary elections for the People's Council, the first since
1962, and the Syrian-Egyptian war against Israel in October.
Syrian forces acquitted themselves better against the Israeli
forces in the October 1973 War than in the 1967 one; in fact, the
war was widely regarded in Syria as a "victory" and helped to
boost Syrian morale substantially. Moreover, in 1974, as a result
of the disengagement agreement, Syria recovered parts of the
Golan Heights it initially had lost to Israel.
In foreign affairs, the Assad regime charted a pragmatic and
increasingly independent course. It maintained close ties with
the Soviet Union and East European states, ensuring a sustained
flow of Soviet military aid, especially after the October 1973
War. At the same time, Assad moved to improve Syrian relations
with Jordan and with the United States and other Western nations.
In May 1973, diplomatic relations with Britain, severed in
1967, were fully restored. Relations with the United States, also
severed in 1967, were normalized in June 1974. Two months later
diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany) were resumed after having been severed in 1965, when the
West German government exchanged ambassadors with Israel.
Meanwhile, relations with Jordan grew progressively more cordial,
so that in August 1975 Syria and Jordan announced the
establishment of a joint supreme command to direct political and
military action against Israel.
Perhaps the severest test of the Assad regime came in the
latter half of the 1970s as a result of Syrian intervention in
the Lebanese civil war. During 1976, Assad was firmly resolved to
stabilize the volatile Lebanese situation by providing troops,
first unilaterally and later as part of the Lebanese-based
peacekeeping Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The Syrian intervention,
in effect on the side of the Lebanese Christian right against the
Palestinians and Muslim left, tended to aggravate relations with
other Arab countries, Egypt and Iraq in particular. In addition,
the intervention in Lebanon was economically costly for Syria and
not popular domestically, and a cease-fire was arranged in
October 1976. Even so, in early 1987 Syrian troops still
controlled large portions of eastern Lebanon.
Domestically, Assad's supremacy remained unassailable. He
brooked no opposition and his control of the Baath Party and the
military and security organizations was complete. All political
activities continued to be closely monitored by the party and a
multiplicity of intelligence and security forces
(see Civil Police and Internal Security Apparatus
, ch. 5). The regime did
not rely primarily on coercion, however; the Baath Party sought,
with mixed results, to evolve into a truly mass-based
organization. The peasants, workers, and revolutionary
intellectuals continued to receive much rhetorical attention, and
the party's high command continued to explore the relative merits
of socialism for the Syrian economy. The regime's responsiveness
to public opinion after 1976 apparently was prompted by three
factors: first, renewed concern about the persistence of
sectarian tensions; second, an economic slowdown stemming from
the burden of military intervention in Lebanon as well as the
considerable decline and uncertainty of foreign aid from other
Arab oil states; and finally, signs of corruption in the higher
echelons of the government and state-run economic enterprises. In
August 1976, official concern was manifested when Prime Minister
Mahmud al Ayyubi was replaced by Abdul Rahman Khulayfawi, a Sunni
who formerly headed the cabinet (1971-72) and who was also highly
popular among army officers for his honesty and thoroughness.
A major test of the regime's popularity came in August 1977
when Syrians went to the polls to elect the People's Council for
a 4-year term (1977-81). Election results gave cause for concern;
the voter turnout was dismally low even by Syrian standards. It
was estimated to range from 4 to 6 percent of the 4 million
eligible voters, even though the polls were kept open an extra
day because of the low turnout.
The election indicated the public's unhappiness with the
government, an unhappiness that prompted Assad to institute what
came to be known as his "anti-corruption campaign". To this end,
the Committee for the Investigation of Illegal Profits was
formed. Opposition to the regime did not abate however, and, on
November 1, 1977, Ali ibn Abid al Ali, an Alawi professor of
agriculture at the University of Aleppo and a close a friend of
Assad, was assassinated.
In February 1978, Assad was reelected for a second 7-year
term (1978-85). However, his reelection coincided with the
beginning of a period of domestic unrest. Even Assad's inner
circle showed signs of dissolution; one of the first was the
dismissal of Naji Jamil, who was air force commander, chief of
the National Security Bureau, and deputy defense minister. His
replacement was Brigadier Muhammad Khuli, chief of air force
intelligence and an Alawi. On March 30, 1978, the cabinet of
Khulayfawi was dismissed and Muhammad Ali al Halabi was asked to
form a new cabinet. No significant changes were made in cabinet
membership.
The most important opposition groups during this period were
Sunni Muslim organizations, whose membership was drawn from urban
Sunni youth. The largest and most militant of these groups was
the Muslim Brotherhood. Other organizations included the Aleppo-
based Islamic Liberation Movement, established in 1963; the
Islamic Liberation Party, originally established in Jordan in the
1950s; Muhammad's Youth; Jundullah (Soldiers of God); and Marwan
Hadid's group, established in Hamah in 1965, often referred to as
At Tali'a al Muqatilia (Fighting Vanguard). All, it is rumored,
received financial assistance from private sources in Saudi
Arabia, the Gulf countries, and the revolutionary committees in
Iran. It is also speculated that they received weapons smuggled
from Iraq and Lebanon and training and assistance from Al Fatah
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
In addition to the militant Muslim opposition, there was
opposition from intellectuals and professional associations,
whose purpose was not to overthrow the regime but to reform it.
The first time such groups challenged the government was on March
31, 1980, in Aleppo and Hamah. Additional opposition came from
expatriate Syrian politicians, mostly Sunni Baath politicians of
the pre-1966 era who opposed the military and sectarian nature of
the government and its drift away from Arab nationalist policies.
The leader of this group was Bitar, the cofounder of the Baath
Party.
In the spring of 1980, these nonmilitant professional groups
formed a loose alliance called the National Democratic Gathering
and demanded freedom of the press, freedom of political action,
promulgation of civil law with the ending of the state of
emergency, and free parliamentary elections. The alliance had no
contact with the Muslim Brotherhood and was considered a peaceful
alternative to it.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there were a number of
religiously motivated violent attacks, many instigated by the
Muslim Brotherhood and directed at Assad's regime, members of the
ruling Baath Party, and members of the Alawi religious sect. At
the outset, rather than blaming the Muslim Brotherhood, the
government blamed Iraq and disaffected Palestinians for these
acts, and it retaliated by holding public hangings in September
1976 and June 1977.
In the spring of 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed credit
for a series of attacks on persons, usually Alawis, and
government and military installations. The most serious attacks
occurred in June 1979 when Muslim Brotherhood gunmen killed 50
Alawi cadets at the military academy in Aleppo. This clearly
showed the Muslim Brotherhood's capability and determination.
After this incident, the government resolved to crush the
opposition and did so ruthlessly. Nevertheless, support for the
Muslim Brotherhood grew over the next two years, and operations
against Syrian government officials and installations increased
in number and severity and included, for the first time, attacks
on Soviet military and civilian advisers in Syria.
Terrorist acts by the militant Sunni Muslims during this
period centered around urban centers such as Damascus, Hamah,
Homs, and the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus. In March
1980, the attacks were directed at widespread targets, most
effectively in Aleppo. The violence reached its height on March
5. Although Aleppo was the primary target, violence spread to
Hamah, Homs, and Dayr az Zawr, where Baath Party and military
installations were attacked. In June 1980 an attempt was made on
Assad's life.
Government security forces tried to uproot the Muslim
Brotherhood from Hamah and Aleppo in late March and early April
1981. A large-scale search operation resulted in the deaths of
200 to 300 people and the destruction of sections of both cities.
Tight security measures were implemented; membership in the
Muslim Brotherhood was made a capital offense, the use of
motorcycles was banned in some cities (they were used by the
Muslim Brotherhood in hit-and-run attacks), and under the guise
of holding a general census, the Ministry of Interior ordered all
citizens 14 years of age and older to obtain new identity cards.
In addition, a series of political, economic, and social measures
were aimed at improving the regime's image and gaining more
popular support.
In February 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood ambushed government
forces who were searching for dissidents in Hamah. Several
thousand Syrian troops, supported by armor and artillery, moved
into the city and crushed the insurgents during two weeks of
bloodshed. When the fighting was over, perhaps as many as 10,000
to 25,000 people lay dead, including an estimated 1,000 soldiers.
In addition, large sections of Hamah's old city were destroyed.
This battle led to the establishment of the National Alliance for
the Liberation of Syria, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Islamic Front, the pro-Iraqi wing of the Baath party, and other
independent political figures. The destruction of Hamah and the
ruthlessness of Assad's measures apparently has had a chastening
effect on Syria's estimated 30,000 Muslim Brotherhood
sympathizers.
In the 1980s, Syria continued to rely heavily on the Soviet
Union, which resupplied the Syrian armed forces with
sophisticated weapons, and with which it concluded a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation on October 8, 1980. This relationship
did not evolve, however, to either country's complete
satisfaction. As of 1987, Syria has not granted the Soviets
permanent port facilities, and, although the Soviets had pledged
to defend Syria if it were attacked by Israel, it refused to
support a Syrian blitz on the Golan
(see Foreign Policy
, ch. 4).
Since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Syria has
aligned itself with Iran, to the chagrin of the moderate Arab
countries. Despite this alienation, Syria has been receiving
generous amounts of financial aid from Saudi Arabia, which hopes
that the funding will moderate Syria's radical policies. In
addition, since 1982, Syria has been receiving a substantial
amount of oil from Iran as repayment for its support and as
compensation for the closure of the Iraqi oil pipeline, which
runs through Syria
(see Foreign Trade
, ch. 3). Syrian-Israeli
relations were tense during the early 1980s. In December 1981,
Israel formally annexed the Golan Heights; in June 1982, Israel
invaded Lebanon and destroyed Syrian surface-to-air missiles
deployed in the Biqa Valley as well about 79 Syrian MiG-21 and
MiG-23 aircraft
(see Syria and the Middle East Conflict
, ch. 5).
In late 1986, Syria faced a multitude of domestic and foreign
challenges, some more threatening than others. The economy, for
example, was in steady decline as a result of, among other
factors, a chronic balance of payments deficit, foreign exchange
shortages, a 3-year-long drought, low commodities prices, and
reduced subsidies from other Arab states
(see
Growth and Struture of the Economy
, ch. 3). With
President Assad in uncertain health, aspirants appeared to be
maneuvering to succeed him
(see Political Dynamics
, ch. 4). In
foreign relations, Syria remained fairly isolated from other Arab
states, while considerable numbers of Syrian troops were
stationed in Lebanon, entangled in that country's conflict
(see Syria snd the Lebabese Crisis, 1975-87,
ch. 5). Furthermore, with Egypt at peace with Israel, and Iran
and Iraq preoccupied with their war, Syria assumed a major role
in the Arab-Israeli dispute; in fact, some Western observers
openly speculated about renewed Syrian-Israeli hostilities over
the Golan Heights. Meanwhile, on the basis of
investigations of incidents which occurred in Europe, the United
States and some Western European governments were accusing the
Syrian regime of actively supporting international terrorism
(see Sponsorship of Terrorism
, ch. 5). Thus, in the late 1980s, serious uncertainty remained
concerning Syria's future.
* * *
Scholarly works on modern Syria are relatively few
considering the importance of the country. Much of the best
material available is in periodical literature. The single most
authoritative study is Tabitha Petran's Syria, which
offers comprehensive analyses of the effect on Syria of its
temporary union with Egypt, the development of the Baath
revolution, and the response of Syria to its traumatic 1967
defeat by the Israelis. John F. Devlin has written a work
critical to a complete understanding of the Baath, The Ba'th
Party: A History from its Origins to 1966. In the same genre
is Patrick Seale's The Struggle for Syria. A.L. Tibawi's
A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine
has excellent coverage of the period from the Ottomans up to, but
not including, the 1967 War. John Bagot Glubb's Syria Lebanon
Jordan is a sensitive study reflecting the author's knowledge
of the area, gained from decades of experience as commander of
Jordan's Arab Legion. Philip K. Hitti's Syria, A Short
History remains the best single source for the ancient and
medieval periods. Robin Fedden's Syria and Lebanon is a
reflective account of his travels there interwoven with major
cultural themes of Syria's ancient and medieval periods. Well-
written accounts of events that have taken place in Syria in the
1970s and 1980s can be found in John Devlin's book Modern
Syria in an Ancient Land and in the Middle East
Contemporary Survey, edited by Colin Legum. (For further
information and complete citations
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of April 1987
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